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THE WAR OF DEMOCRACY

THE ALLIES STATEMENT

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THE WAR OF DEMOCRACY

THE ALLIES' STATEMENT

Chapters on the Fundamental Significance of the Struggle for a New Europe, Prepared by

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"With firmness in the Right, as God gives us to see the Right."
—ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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INTRODUCTION

By the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce, O.M.

The pamphlets and articles contained in this collection fall into two classes. Some of them are intended to elucidate particular questions which have arisen in the course of the present war. Those of the other and larger class deal with more general matters, and investigate the causes of the war and the general issues of principle and practice which it has raised. In this brief introduction I shall endeavour to summarize the more important of these larger issues and to bespeak for them the attention which they do not seem to have yet fully received in some at least of the neutral nations. My aim is simply to recapitulate, without argument or rhetoric, the salient facts that bear upon the conduct of the War, and to ask readers in neutral countries to reflect on what these facts show, and to form their own judgment accordingly.

The present war differs from all that have gone before it not only in its vast scale and in the volume of misery it has brought upon the world, but also in the fact that it is a war of Principles, and a war in which the permanent interests, not merely of the belligerent Powers but of all nations, are involved as such interests were never involved before.

This is a fact which many persons in neutral countries have not yet understood. They seem to think

that, as has usually happened in previous wars, there is no great distinction between the combatants. They perceive that charges and counter charges are bandied to and fro, and they have not the patience to enquire which are true and which false. Being perhaps too lazy or indifferent to examine the motives and the conduct of the parties, they lapse into the easy assumption that both are equally to blame, and that if they themselves have any duty at all as citizens of a neutral country, that duty is only to do their best to bring back peace at the earliest possible moment, with no thought for a more distant future. Some neutral writers have put this view crudely by saying it is only a quarrel of two dogs over a bone, whom the bystander would like to separate. Each nation is, they assume, fighting for its own selfish interests, just as the monarchs of Europe used to fight in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to acquire territory or trade.

But this is not such a war. I do not deny that such a war of the older type might still occur. Nations might quarrel over their respective territorial claims and become angry enough to fight the matter out instead of going to arbitration. Such a war need not have raised any moral issue. For each of the contending claims there might have been good arguments, and it might well have been thought that faults on both sides had led to the outbreak of hostilities. Even if the balance of merits inclined one way or the other, dispassionate and well informed observers in neutral countries might have been divided in opinion as to those merits, and have hesitated to express their sympathies as was the case with the War between

Prussia and Austria in 1866, and between Russia and Japan in 1901. But let me repeat it, this is not a case in which neutrals can look on with an indifferent or merely curious eye. This is a war of Principles, moral and political, in which every man in neutral countries who has a sense of his personal duties to humanity ought to try to find the truth and to form an honest and impartial judgment on the merits, so that the sentiment of his country would cast its weight on the side of truth and humanity.

Into the circumstances attending the outbreak of the war I will not here enter. That would lead me into too wide a field. Those circumstances may be studied in the documents published by the belligerent powers, and they are dealt with in some of the pamphlets in this volume. No fuller and fairer examinations of them have been published than are contained in two books written by American jurists, the book of Mr. Ellery Stowell, entitled "The Diplomacy of the War of 1914," and the book of Mr. James M. Beck called "The Evidence in the Case," books to which rather than to any English book, I desire to refer because their authors, being neutrals, wrote with a complete freedom from national bias. I shall here examine not the Origins of the war but the Conduct of the war, the facts regarding which are really not in controversy, and shall try to indicate the light that conduct casts upon the character of the parties and the nature of the issues raised, as these now affect the world at large. But one preliminary word must be said as to the position and motives of Great Britain.

Britain did not expect this war and did not wish

for it. All her interests were against a war. She had nothing to gain and much to lose. She was quite unprepared for war. Her army was small, and she had made no plans for increasing it such as she has been obliged, suddenly and at an enormous cost, to improvise since the War began. She had only a small stock of artillery, the thing most necessary in modern warfare. The German Government has invented and tried to propagate three statements regarding Britain's action, all equally baseless. One is that she was filled with jealousy and envy of Germany's commercial prosperity and therefore anxious to ruin German trade and arrest German development. There is not a word of truth in this. The English were not so ignorant and destitute of business sense as not to see that the crippling of Germany by war must cost them in a few months ten times as much as they could have gained in twenty years by arresting the growth of German trade competition. Germany moreover was their best foreign customer. They bought more from her than from any foreign European nation: and they sold more to her.

Some Englishmen had become uneasy at the continued increase of the German fleet, because there was no nation except Britain against which that increase could seem to be directed. But there was no hatred of Germany in the breasts of the British people: and few believed that any war would in our time disturb the relations of the countries.

The second allegation is that the late King Edward had brought about an alliance with France intended to hem in and menace Germany. This also is untrue.

Edward VII was a genuine lover of peace and wished for friendship with the French, whom he liked, and from whom Britain had been divided by various clashes of interest. He did something, not politically, but by his personal kindliness and courtesy, to bring about good will between the two peoples. That was all. He had no hostile designs whatever against Germany, nor had his Ministers.

The third story is that Britain had arranged with Belgium to attack Germany through Belgian territory. This is a pure fabrication. All that was ever done was to consider with the Belgian Government what Britain should do, as a Power bound by treaty to protect the integrity of Belgium, in case any third Power should invade Belgian territory. This it was Britain's plain duty to consider. She had saved Belgian territory from attack in 1870 by her intervention, and might have to do so again.

Now let me ask any fair-minded neutral to follow the chief incidents of the war from August 4, 1914, and pass his judgment upon the facts, facts which are open to no controversy.

The war began, so far as Britain was concerned, with August 4th, on which day the German armies entered Belgium, having lulled the Belgian Government by the assurances which their Minister at Brussels continued to give until two days before the ultimatum, demanding a passage through the country. As the German Chancellor shortly afterward confessed in the Reichstag that his Government had done a wrong and violated international law by carrying war into a country the neutrality and independence of

which every one knows they had guaranteed, and which, had there been no guarantee at all, was entitled on the common principles of justice to be exempt from invasion, no more need be said as to the morality or legality of the German action. It was wholly unprovoked and wholly unjustified, for the stories that France had planned to attack Germany through Belgium and that French officers had already entered that country were evidently invented, and were subsequently dropped. The only effect of these stories and of that other tale that French aeroplanes had flown over German territory, a tale afterward also abandoned when it had served its momentary purpose, was to show that no reliance can be placed on statements proceeding from the German Government.

The invasion of Belgium, the most flagrant offence against international right Europe had seen for centuries, proved that the German Government could not be trusted to keep any engagement, however solemn. It does not appear to be realized in neutral countries how great is the difficulty which such a breach of faith places in the way of negotiations for armistice or peace. A Government which violates its obligations toward those with whom it has been at peace, and defends this violation by the plea of its own military necessity, can even less be relied on to fulfil any promise made to its enemies.

The next event, or rather series of events, which showed how much this war was going to differ from previous wars, was the conduct of the German invading armies in Belgium and Northern France. All along the line of their march innocent civilians, old men,

women, and children, as well as other inhabitants, were slaughtered on the pretext that some persons in the towns and villages had shot at the invading force. The leading inhabitants—often priests—were constantly seized and called "hostages," who were to be put to death if any resistance was made by any civilian, though these persons were not responsible for such resistance and could not have prevented it. Such "hostages" were frequently shot. Hundreds of innocent persons were seized, packed in baggage or cattle cars and sent by railway to Germany, often without food or drink for many hours together. Villages and large parts of such a city as Louvain were destroyed by fire. Shocking outrages were committed upon women, and that by officers as well as soldiers, and little effort was made to restrain or punish such crimes, which were often committed under the influence of liquor. The accounts of these murders and other excesses which the refugees who escaped from Belgium reported found at first little credence in England, for it was hard to believe that the soldiers of a civilized nation could commit them. But when the Belgian, French, and British Governments caused the evidence of eye witnesses among the refugees to be carefully taken and tested, it was proved beyond all question not only that such things had happened, but that they had happened by the orders of the German officers, who themselves were acting under orders from headquarters, and who sometimes expressed regret at having to execute such orders. If there are any persons in neutral countries who still think such things too horrible to be true, let them weigh these two facts. Diaries

(written in German) found upon German prisoners, or on the bodies of dead German soldiers, contain records of the same (or quite similar) crimes as the evidence of the refugees established. The genuineness of these diaries, many of which have been published by the Belgian, French, and British investigators, is not disputed by the German Government. They alone are sufficient to prove how the troops behaved. The second fact is that the German Government has never attempted to disprove the evidence adduced against them. They did publish a sort of reply to the Belgian reports, but it consisted chiefly of allegations that Belgian civilians had given provocation by firing on German troops. This attempt at a justification was a tacit admission that the massacres had occurred, and that in them there had been killed, as a matter of course, many innocent persons no way concerned in such firing. In fact the vast majority of those so executed including the so-called "hostages" had no responsibility at all for the occasional firing, such as it may have been. To the British Report, which contained a very large number of depositions by the witnesses, the German Government has never ventured, in the nineteen months that have elapsed since its publication, to make any official reply.

Next after the murders on land came those at sea. Submarines began to destroy, usually without any warning, unarmed merchant vessels, drowning their crews; and also unarmed passenger vessels, drowning their passengers. The *Lusitania*, in which twelve hundred people perished, many of these citizens of neutral countries, was only one of many cases. These

practices, gross violations of the rule of international law which requires that the safety of those on board a merchant ship shall be provided for if she is sunk, have gone on till now. Even hospital ships, about whose character there could be no mistake, have been torpedoed.

A little later than the murders on land and sea came the murders from the air. In the many air raids over England no military damage has been done, and only a handful of soldiers, about fifty (so far as I know), have suffered. But many hundreds of innocent civilians, mostly women and children, have been maimed or killed; and the murders still go on. The German Government must by this time know that these raids have no effect upon the British people except to rouse their anger and so to make them more determined than ever to prosecute the war. Why then are the air raids continued? Apparently only to make the Germans at home believe that the enemy is being injured and so to sustain their spirits when the long expected victories in France do not arrive.

In the spring of 1915 the so-called Young Turk Committee which now rules Turkey in the name of the Sultan, began without any provocation from their Armenian subjects, a series of massacres and deportations in Armenia and Asia Minor in which from 600,000 to 800,000 of those Christian subjects have been put to death, the men by murder, the women and children mostly by being torn from their homes and driven away by Turkish troops through deserts where those who did not die by the war are now dying from hunger, exposure and disease. Many more of the women have

been seized by Turks, or sold in open market, to be enslaved in Turkish harems. The German Government knew perfectly well what was being done. How far they actively encouraged it, or allowed their officers on the spot to do so, we do not yet know. But it is certain that they acquiesced in it. They could have stopped it by lifting a finger had they wished to do so, for the Turks are entirely in their hands. Instead of arresting the slaughter, they have honoured the two chief criminals, Talaat and Enver, by many compliments and the last named ruffian by a colonelcy in the German army.

I pass over other incidents, such as the treatment of war prisoners and the executions of Miss Cavell and Captain Fryatt, to come to the latest instances of the German Government's methods in warfare. Last spring they carried off hundreds of girls from their homes in Northern France to be forced to work in Germany. Within the last three months they have seized many thousands of Belgian working men, and on the pretext that there is no employment for them in the towns where they live, have carried them off, amid the cries of their children and the shrieks of their wives who flung themselves on the rails in front of the locomotives, to German towns where they will be forced to work for their enemy masters against their own fellow countrymen. The motive, so the German Government announces, is a philanthropic one. It is not good for workmen to be unemployed. The unemployment, it need hardly be said, had been caused by the German Government itself, which had taken out of the country for its own use all the raw materials

of industry and all the machinery. These workmen were not starving. When the Germans refused to feed, they were and had continued to be fed by the charity of Americans and Englishmen, directed by the energy of an American, Mr. Hoover. In one Belgian province, where some private factories were still going, the German authorities stopped these in order to invent a ground for treating the workmen as unemployed, and driving them off into Germany to labour there. This is slave raiding, worthy of those Arab marauders whom Livingstone tried to root out of Africa.

A similar violation of the best settled rules of international law is being now carried out in Poland. Here the Polish inhabitants of the invaded districts which the German armies occupy are being forced into the German army on the pretext that the country is already conquered and its people already German subjects. They will be roped in and driven to die in order to perpetuate the tyranny which the German Government has already been exercising over their brethren in part of old Poland which she has held by force these many years.

All the facts here briefly enumerated are indisputable and undisputed facts. Whatever be the excuses or palliations which the German Government may put forward, all these acts are flagrant violations not only of international law but of the long settled practice of civilized nations. They are even worse. They violate the fundamental principles of natural justice and of common humanity. Even Bonaparte, whose offences shocked his contemporaries, did not in eighteen years of war commit so many breaches of the much

laxer international rules of his time, nor so offend against helpless innocence, as the German generals have done since August 4, 1914. If some persons in neutral nations have found it hard to believe that these successive acts of cruelty and injustice really happened this is because the spirit and temper they reveal were so little to be expected from the armies of a civilized nation. The difficulty, however, disappears when one studies the manuals of military law and practice issued by the German General Staff, and learns to know what is the official German doctrine of war. According to that doctrine, the State is above all morality. Whatever is done in its interest is right. There is in international relations, be they of war or peace, really no such thing as Right but only Force. Force makes Right. Whatever war necessity prescribes is proper to be done. Treaties may be broken, neutral countries attacked, innocent non-combatants killed. Many German theorists go so far as to say that it is Germany's mission, assigned to her by Providence or by Nature, to dominate all other nations, because she is the strongest and most civilized among them. It appears, therefore, that the crimes enumerated, all of which were done by the orders of the military authorities, are done not at random but in pursuance of a System, and will be repeated as long as that System and the military caste which approves it and carries it out in practice hold sway in Germany. As was observed long ago, the occupation of Prussians is war. Among them the Soldier is master. Professor Gilbert Murray has well said: "Germany has produced the specialized soldier, not the humane soldier, the Christian soldier, the

chivalrous soldier, or the soldier with a sense of civil duties, but the soldier who is trained to be a soldier and nothing else, to disregard all the rest of human relations, to see all his country's neighbours merely as enemies to be duped and conquered, to see all life according to some system of perverted biology as a mere struggle of force and fraud. The Germans have created this type of soldier, alike concentrated, conscienceless and remorseless, and then—what no other people in the world has done—they have given the nation over to his guidance."

It is against this system and the principles on which it rests that the Allies are fighting. That is why this war is a War of Principles. Great Britain and France repudiate the German doctrines in theory and in practice. No such maxims or rules stand in their war code: they have not committed, and, as we trust, are incapable of committing, such offences as those I have mentioned. Neither of them desires to dominate other countries. What they seek is security for themselves and for all the nations that wish to live at peace, not being themselves threatened, not threatening their neighbours.

Two questions may now be addressed to impartial men in neutral nations.

First. How can any fair-minded citizen of a neutral nation, one who honours Right and loves peace, fail to see a distinction between the conduct of the War by the Allies on the one side, and its conduct by the German, Austrian, and Turkish Governments on the other? Can he not perceive what is involved for mankind at large in the victory of one or other party to this struggle,

or imagine what sort of a world there would be in the future if Germany were to conquer, what perils peaceable neutral nations would have to fear at the hands of a triumphant Prussian militarism?

Secondly. How can the Allies make peace until this militarism, this system which places Force above Right and denies all international morality, has been defeated? We in Britain can understand the passionate desire of humane men and women in neutral countries to see this awful war brought to a speedy end. Do we not feel that desire ourselves, we who in France and Britain are losing the flower of our youth, every household in mourning for sons and brothers and husbands? But we also feel—those of us who have worked for peace all our lives just as much as others—that a peace made now, leaving the military system and military caste of Germany still unbroken in power, in credit and self-confidence, in its prestige and ascendancy over its own people, would be only a truce, a brief respite in a conflict which that military caste would resume as soon as it had repaired its losses. To make the sort of treaty which Germany desires, and which she intimates she might accept, would not only leave her in possession of ill-gotten gains, with no adequate reparation for the wrongs she has inflicted, but would be an acquiescence in, almost an encouragement to repeat, the methods by which she has carried on this war. Such methods need to be stamped with the brand not only of Infamy but of Failure. Nothing else will suffice to prevent them from being repeated in future. The British people do not desire to dismember Germany nor to inflict any permanent injury

on the German people. But they do desire a victory sufficient to bring about a peace that will endure, not one darkened by prospects of future aggression and by the constant need of maintaining huge armaments for their own defence against that militarism which has so long threatened Europe. And in fighting for this they are fighting the battle of Neutrals also.

One more remark in conclusion. The crimes committed in the conduct of this war have been committed not by a free people but by a Government which hates and fears freedom. Whether you call it an autocracy or a military oligarchy matters little. What does matter is that it is not a Government which rests on public opinion and the popular will. No Government created by a free people would have embraced such principles or committed such offences. Can we imagine the people of Switzerland, or Norway, or the United States, using their troops to force thousands of innocent workers into slavery? Can we suppose that the people even of Germany itself, if they had been permitted by their tyrannical rulers to know the truth about the War and how it has been conducted, would have authorized either the inhuman treatment of non-combatants in Belgium (invaded without provocation) or the tacit approval of the hideous massacres perpetrated by their Turkish allies?

This War of Principles therefore is a War not only for the vindication of international right, for the faith of treaties, for the protection of the innocent, but also for Liberty. No greater blow could be struck at democracy than a German victory. The spirit of Militarism is the enemy of freedom as well as of peace.

Tyranny makes militarism, tyranny rules by it. This is why we in England and France trust that the peoples of all the free countries will recognize what is involved for them in this war, and will extend their moral support to a cause which is, since they love freedom, their own cause, as well as the cause of human progress.

I

THE WAR OF DEMOCRACY

Lord Haldane States Britain's Case

By EDWARD PRICE BELL

London Correspondent of the "Chicago Daily News"

FOREWORD

THIS is a reprint of an interview given by Lord Haldane to Mr. E. Price Bell, one of the most distinguished American journalists, and London correspondent of the Chicago *Daily News*. What Lord Haldane says speaks for itself, but it is obvious that a document so important as this interview (it will clearly become one of the main texts to which future historians of present events must refer) could not have been issued without the knowledge of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Lord Haldane's account of the diplomatic relations between England and Germany previous to the war, in which he played so much part, supplements in several important particulars the information already accessible from official sources. In particular we have for the first time Lord Haldane's own account of his missions to Berlin, and his own description of the feelings aroused in him by what he heard on these two occasions.

Lord Haldane, after this interview was first published in the press, was assailed on the ground that, though he had come away from Berlin feeling anxious as to Germany's pacific intentions, he still took no steps to increase the British forces available for service on the Continent. A criticism of this kind ignores our friendship and understanding with France. Lord Haldane's task as War Minister was not to create or

maintain a force sufficent to fight Germany single-handed on land, or even to take the main part in a land campaign. His task was to prepare a force sufficient to meet the needs imposed upon us by our *entente* with France should that friendship ever in tine of stress result in a military alliance.

In determining the scale and equipment of the Expeditionary Force, therefore, Lord Haldane's duty was solely to have regard to the amount of assistance which the French Government estimated they might require should we ally ourselves with them. There is no evidence, and it has never been asserted, that he failed in this particular. Indeed, it is quite clear that in the early days of the war the Expeditionary Force, by its preparedness, the rapidity of its transport, and its action in the field, more than fulfilled whatever undertakings were given to our Allies.

I

THE WAR OF DEMOCRACY

FOR an hour and a half on Sunday, March 7*, Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor of England, seated among the books and engravings of his delightful study overlooking St. James's Park, talked to me of the genesis, progress, and promise of the World War. From first to last the words of the Lord Chancellor—carefully chosen words—seemed to me full of force and fine feeling, deeply serious, unembittered, eloquent, illuminating.

Before pausing to try to indicate something of the mien, spirit, and work of Lord Haldane, I hasten to quote him on an urgent topic.

FIGHT FOR LIFE

"We ask you in America—all, whether for or against us, heirs of the early struggles of our race—to realize that when we say we are fighting for life we use no figure of speech. Hyperbole there is in plenty, of course; but this is not hyperbole. We are fighting for life, and we ask the forbearance of America while we prosecute the struggle. If we appear in a wholly new situation to go beyond some of the rules of the books we shall not violate the dictates of humanity, and shall not turn back the clock of civilization. We take it that our interest in ending the war quickly

[* 1916.]

—ending it in the only way in which the Allies can afford to see it ended at all—is also the interest of the United States.

"Germany's submarine warfare on belligerents and neutrals alike is a thing with no analogue. We are compelled to meet it. In devising a plan, we have given anxious study to the interests of neutrals. We have settled upon certain general principles that seem to us more favourable to neutrals than are the hitherto sufficient principles of international law. Some American newspaper, I believe, has said that we, in our turn, are destroying a 'scrap of paper.' We think we are creating a 'scrap of paper,' and one with which neutrals, possessing full knowledge, will find no reason to quarrel.

"If we had recourse to the full rigours of the conventional blockade, we could claim to confiscate ships and cargoes seeking to evade it. What we want to do is to spare neutrals all possible inconvenience and injury, spare their crews, ships, and cargoes, and still throw the last ounce of our naval strength into the effort to break the system that despotism has set in operation against the happiness and prosperity of the world.

"About America let me say two or three things with all emphasis. We do not assert any right to ask America to come into this war. One has heard it said that your country, as a result of the faith it has had in the security of peace, is so unprepared for war as to be relatively negligible in a warlike sense. This notion we do not share. We have not a doubt that America would be a most formidable factor in any war in which it might engage.

"But we do not claim that your country should throw its sword into the scale on our behalf. We ask no nation to do this. Such a question as that of peace or war we think should be decided by every nation with sole reference to its own view of its duty and needs. We realize America's situation. We sympathize with President Wilson in what we regard as his honourable fidelity to his official trust."

Now, just a glance at Lord Haldane, the man and his life.

He is fifty-eight, rotund, of a goodly avoirdupois. His face is clean shaven, broad, humane. His blue eyes, looking frankly at you, reflect the play of an earnest and a powerful mind. His spirit is the scholar's. He is a great constitutional lawyer. He is a deep student of German thought and character—knows more of Lessing, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Schiller than does any other British statesman. Passionate pacifist, he yet is the creator of the British army, made and making, as it exists to-day. He is a close adviser of Premier Asquith and Sir Edward Grey. He is profoundly esteemed by all his colleagues in the Cabinet. One feels quite safe in saying that this sturdy and brilliant Scotsman is not only a worthy successor of the ablest ministers Great Britain has produced, but one of the wisest and best men in the political life of the world.

Lord Haldane is said to have called Germany his "spiritual home." Whether or not he used this exact phrase, he probably would hesitate to repudiate it. Educated at Göttingen, he looks back with reverence

upon Professor Lotze, his old master, a man from whom a life of study and holy living had "stripped the bestial." There are in Germany many spots that Lord Haldane cherishes. To him the Harz Mountains are imperishably sweet. Weimar and the Thüringian Forest—the spirit of Goethe permeating them—interfused their beauty and glamour with the fairest visions of his youth. It was because he knew Germany so well that the British Government at one time selected him to try to find some permanent basis of friendship between that nation and England—some reconciliation of the ambitions of the one and the security of the other. This purpose he did his utmost to achieve. For what he did in this respect ignorance and malice have laid their flail upon him in his own country. This flail, one fancies, has not hurt him much. Probably the only flail he really would mind would be that of a duty which was his, and which he did not perform.

A MISSION TO GERMANY

"When did you first become fearful that Germany intended to break the peace of Europe?" I asked Lord Haldane.

"Well, you know," answered the Lord Chancellor, "the whole of the past decade in Europe has been rather critical. There were moments when peace trembled in the balance. The Agadir incident, particularly, compelled us to face the possibility of war. However, subsequently things improved. Anglo-German relations appeared to be getting started on the right road. It was with the object of maintaining and accelerating

the improvement that I went to Berlin on behalf of the Government in February, 1912.

"With Bethmann-Hollweg I had close and interesting conferences. The Kaiser, already well known to me, I saw again, and it was my privilege to talk with many important men. Gratifying as were these interchanges, I came away feeling uneasy, Germany was piling up armaments. She showed no disposition to restrict her naval development.

"Speaking before the American Bar Association at Montreal in September, 1913, I indicated my state of mind as the result of my Berlin visit. Referring to the optimism of Ernest Renan, Matthew Arnold, and Goethe respecting the future of humanity and to the noble prayer of Grotius in concluding his great book, 'War and Peace,' I stated that there was a long way to go before what these men hoped or prayed for could be accomplished. 'The Prayer of Grotius,' I said, 'has not yet been fulfilled, nor do recent events point to the fulfilment as being near. The world is probably a long way off from the abolition of armaments and the peril of war."

"Do you think the Kaiser favoured war?"

"In past years I think the Kaiser undoubtedly opposed war. But I am afraid his opposition to it gradually weakened. He appears to have settled into the war mood about two years ago. You will remember a remarkable communication (published in the French Yellow Book) from M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in November, 1913, reporting a conversation between the Kaiser and the

King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the German General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight before the dispatch was written: 'Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace.'

"Thus wrote Cambon, and he went on to say that the Emperor appeared to be 'completely changed'; that he had been 'brought to think that war with France must come'; and that he believed in the 'crushing superiority of the German army.' I think in the end the Kaiser was borne off his feet completely by the military party."

"Was there real fear in Germany that England and her Allies were planning an attack upon the Fatherland?"

"I am unable to see how there should have been any such fear. Certainly we had done everything in our power to obviate it. When I was in Berlin in 1912, I left no doubt in the minds of the foremost men there of England's pacific purposes and sentiments with reference to Germany. We were prepared, and we definitely told them we were prepared, to enter into the most binding agreement that in no circumstances would we be a party to any sort of aggression against Germany.

BRITAIN'S POSITION

"Moreover, I did my utmost to make the Berlin statesmen understand England's position. I disabused their minds, if unmistakable language could do it, of all doubt as to what would be England's attitude to a violation of Belgian neutrality. If the Germans ever

misunderstood me on this point, they have only themselves to thank. From what I said to Bethmann-Hollweg in so many words there ought to have been no doubt in his mind that we should regard an invasion of Belgium as something over which he could not reckon on our neutrality.

"I also told him that as long as Germany chose to continue her policy of formidable naval development we should lay down two keels to her one. There was absolutely no ambiguity in my conversation with the German Chancellor, and he understood that all I said on these matters represented the view of the British Government. It was of the very essence of my friendly purpose in going to Berlin to be perfectly candid and explicit. This was so because I felt that in no other way could Anglo-German relations be got upon the right footing."

"How did it happen that pacific Germany utterly failed to assert itself?"

"In my opinion, it was simply a case of the Prussian spirit temporarily gaining the ascendancy. Once it had got control, was in position to speak with the voice of authority, the rest followed naturally; for no other country so rushes after the flag as does Germany. The moment the Government, won over to the militarist point of view, decided to put forward the claim that the Fatherland was in danger, and that a war was necessary, all Germany responded as one man. If the war could have been averted for twenty years, I have little doubt peace-loving Germany, the Germany that prizes Right above Might, would have gained final control in Berlin, and the war would not have happened."

"Assuming that the Allies win, will they attempt to democratize German politics?"

GOVERNMENT MUST COME FROM WITHIN

"It does not seem to me the Allies will find it easy to do this unless the German people respond. You know, it really is impossible to impose government from without. Government must come from within. If the Army and the Navy and the men who made the war lose their prestige, Germany will probably recover herself. How can she better do it than by effectualizing her democracy? In other words, I feel that the real Germany, which has made so profound an impression upon the world by reason of great qualities, will take over the government of Germany when the present régime has been discredited and destroyed.

"I cannot help thinking that the present war should bring to a permanent end the system whereby political personages use peoples as pawns on a chessboard. I think secret diplomacy will disappear. Certainly, in the light of Austrian methods leading up to this war—methods that went right back to the days of Metternich—political manipulation beyond the reach of the influence of the people it affects ought to disappear."

"Then you are looking for a great democratic advance as the result of the war?"

"For a great democratic advance, and for a great moral advance. Might has sought to establish itself as the supreme law. Right is on the defensive. It is giving us some very fine examples of the best there is in human nature.

"The object lessons should be beneficial. Nobility should be quickened. Our standards should be lifted up. We all were too luxurious. You in Chicago and New York were too luxurious. We in London were too luxurious. Berlin was too luxurious. In Paris also people had become luxurious. We shall all be made simpler by the war. We shall be made more frugal, more serious, less cynical, greater. Long years will pass before any one of us ceases to feel the effects of the struggle.

MILITARISM MUST BE BROKEN

"As for democracy, it is democracy's fight—nothing else. The militarist has hurled his system against Europe. It must be broken. When it is broken, a settlement should be possible conserving the political welfare of all the peoples concerned. Freedom for all nationalities is the ideal, and I see no reason why it should not be substantially realized."

"You learned something of German military principles on one of your earlier visits to Berlin?"

"Yes; I was permitted to see a great deal of the way in which they work their military machine. The Kaiser let me see something of the working of the German War Office. Our own army at this moment is organized upon certain of the great principles of Moltke. The distinctive thing about the German army I found to be that the administrative work is kept separate from the general staff work, and from command and training. Administrative duties are not laid upon men whose business it ought to be to think out strategical problems and to train soldiers. The

general staff officers are free to exercise their professional skill in developing fighting men. This separation of functions I immediately developed in the British army."

"Did you admire all you saw of the German governmental organization?"

"The higher command I found admirable; the highest command I found dubious. In the higher command reign order, efficiency, science; in the highest command there seems to reign something resembling chaos. The personages of the highest command, of course, are the Kaiser, the heads of the Navy and Army, the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Now all these forces are self-assertive, and they are imperfectly coördinated. The heads of the Navy and Army have great influence. The Chancellor presumably has great influence. The Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot be without influence. Yet among all these there does not appear to be any intimacy of understanding. They do not coöperate with one another.

MR. BALFOUR'S SYSTEM

"In this respect we in England have much the advantage of them. Thanks to Mr. Balfour, who introduced the system, we have a body in which all points of view are represented, including those of the Colonies. The heads of all departments contribute their ideas to the common stock. Every one sees his own work, not only from his own standpoint, but from the standpoints of all the other chief officials of the Government. The result is that no one does anything

in ignorance of what other members of the Government are doing. There is no working at cross-purposes. Germany has, I think, nothing quite so good as this.

"It is said that Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow did not see the Austrian ultimatum before it was delivered. The Kaiser probably saw it. Quite possibly the heads of the Navy and Army saw it. But I doubt whether the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs did see it. Nothing of that sort could happen under our Government as at present organized."

"Do you think the ruling men in Germany feared Great Britain as a fighting power?"

"I do not think they regarded us as very formidable. They thought our army was insignificant, our navy old-fashioned, and our nation decadent. I do not think they thought we could be aroused to a tremendous national effort. I have no doubt they counted on the centrifugal forces of our Empire working to our grave embarrassment. They now must know that they misinterpreted these supposed centrifugal forces."

"What do you think of the German argument that America should not export munitions to the Allies?"

"It seems to me unfair. For years Germany was heaping up armaments. She made the most formidable army that ever had existed and a navy by no means negligible. Her arsenals were filled with munitions. She had selected her own time for a stupendous war of aggression. We were much less prepared. Parenthetically, Germany had constructed a great system of strategical railways parallel to the Russian frontier; Russia had done no corresponding thing. Now, fully prepared for war, with colossal accumulations of war

material, Germany decides upon the moment for war, and declares war. Is there any fairness, any chivalry, in her trying to prevent us, in full accord with international usage, from going into neutral markets to buy the implements that Germany's action causes us so direly to need?

THE WAR AND ARMAMENTS

"I am glad to know that American thought rejects the German proposal. I am glad to know that American newspapers are standing for the principle of the right of nations to buy munitions when they are attacked. Germany supplied large quantities of munitions of war to Russia during the war with Japan and thought it no breach of neutrality then. Why should it be such now?"

"How do you think the war is going to affect the question of armaments?"

"If the Allies win—if Germany, who has carried her military preparations to a pitch heretofore unknown, finds herself beaten—I do not imagine any nation in the future will be likely to pin its faith to armaments. If Germany, armed as she was armed, could not win, how could any nation hope to win by means of arms? I am hopeful that the world as a result of this war will get rid of at least a part of the burden of armaments. I am hopeful that civilization is going to do something to defend itself against war.

"We now know that the effects of war cannot be localized. We know that two considerable Powers cannot fight without inflicting disturbance and loss on the whole world. Definite knowledge is neces-

sary to definite action. I believe that the world is going so to organize itself that no nation out of ambition or fear, or because of any other influence or motive, will be permitted to go to war. This means that differences somehow must be settled by arbitration. If the world had been so organized last July, Germany could not have refused to accept our proposal for a peaceful settlement of the issues at stake."

ABANDON IDEALS OF WAR

"What will be the fate of Constantinople and the Dardanelles?"

"I feel certain it can be settled satisfactorily. In any case I imagine the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus will be open to the merchant ships of all nations. What a glorious thing it would be for Germany and for every one else if, following your example at Panama, she dealt with the Kiel Canal as America has dealt with the Panama Canal, and then settled down to fifty years of peace, industry, and reform. If she did this—abandoned all her ideals of war as a means of getting on—I do not think the future would suggest to her any reason to return to the discarded system."

"Do you think England would have remained out of the war if Germany had respected the neutrality of Belgium?"

"I am far from sure that we could have done so. Belgium touched our honour; France touched our feelings and our interests. Having regard to the theories of world conquest behind the successful German movement in favour of a war of aggression, it seems to me it would have been madness on our part to have sat with

hands folded while Germany removed the Continental obstacles in the way of her laying siege to the British Empire.

"In the best of circumstances, we are very near the striking power of Germany. I do not think we possibly could have permitted that striking power to come still nearer and absorb the States nearest to us without a desperate attempt to prevent it; but the attack upon Belgium gave us no time for thought or choice; we had to resist the violation of the treaty and the wrong done to a weaker State or we should have been disgraced."

II

NEUTRAL NATIONS AND THE WAR

By JAMES BRYCE (VISCOUNT BRYCE)

Author of "The Holy Roman Empire," "The American Commonwealth," etc.
Formerly Ambassador to the United States.

II

NEUTRAL NATIONS AND THE WAR

THE present war has had some unexpected consequences. It has called the attention of the world outside Germany to some amazing doctrines proclaimed there, which strike at the root of all international morality, as well as of all international law, and which threaten a return to the primitive savagery when every tribe was wont to plunder and massacre its neighbours.

These doctrines may be found set forth in the widely circulated book of General von Bernhardi, entitled "Germany and the Next War," published in 1911, and professing to be mainly based on the teachings of the famous professor of history, Heinrich von Treitschke.

To readers in other countries, and, I trust, to most readers in Germany also, they will appear to be an outburst of militarism run mad, the product of a brain intoxicated by the love of war and by superheated national self-consciousness.

They would have deserved little notice, much less refutation, but for one deplorable fact—viz.: that action has recently been taken by the Government of a great nation (though, as we venture to hope, without the approval of that nation) which is consonant with them, and seems to imply a belief in their soundness.

This fact is the conduct of the German Imperial Government, in violating the neutrality of Belgium, which Prussia, as well as Great Britain and France, had solemnly guaranteed by a treaty (made in 1839 and renewed in 1870); in invading Belgium when she refused to allow her armies to pass, although France, the other belligerent, had solemnly undertaken not to enter Belgium; and in treating the Belgian cities and people, against whom she had no cause of quarrel, with a harshness unprecedented in the history of modern European warfare.

What are these doctrines? I do not for a moment attribute them to the learned class in Germany, for whom I have profound respect, recognizing their immense services to science and learning; nor to the bulk of the civil administration, a body whose capacity and uprightness are known to all the world; and least of all to the German people generally. That the latter hold no such views appears from General Bernhardi's own words, for he repeatedly complains of, and deplores the pacific tendencies of, his fellow-countrymen.*

Nevertheless, the fact that the action referred to, which these doctrines seem to have prompted, and which cannot be justified except by them, has been actually taken, and has thus brought into this war Great Britain, whose interests and feelings made her desire peace, renders it proper to call attention to them and to all that they involve.

I have certainly no prejudice in the matter, for I

*See pp. 10-14 of English translation and note the phrase "Aspirations for peace seem to poison the soul of the German people."

have been one of those who for many years laboured to promote good relations between Germans and Englishmen, peoples that ought to be friends, and that never before had been enemies, and I had hoped and believed till the beginning of August last that there would be no war, because Belgian neutrality would be respected.

Nor was it only for the sake of Britain and Germany that the English friends of peace sought to maintain good feeling. We had hoped, as some leading German statesmen had hoped, that a friendliness with Germany might enable Britain, with the coöperation of the United States (our closest friends), to mitigate the long antagonism of Germany and of France, with whom we were already on good terms, and to so improve their relations as to secure the general peace of Europe.

Into the causes which frustrated these efforts and so suddenly brought on this war I will not enter. Many others have dealt with them. Moreover, the facts, at least as we in England see and believe them, and as the documents seem to prove them to be, appear not to be known to the German people, and the motives of the chief actors have not yet been fully ascertained.

One thing, however, I can confidently declare. It was neither commercial rivalry nor jealousy of German power that brought Britain into the field. Nor was there any hatred in the British people for Germany, nor any wish to break German power. Even now, we have no enmity to the German people. The leading political thinkers and historians

of England had given hearty sympathy to the efforts made by the German people (from 1815 to 1866 and 1870) to attain political unity, as they had sympathized with the parallel efforts of the Italians.

The two peoples, German and British, were of kindred race, and linked by many ties. In both countries there were doubtless some persons who desired war, and whose writings, apparently designed to provoke it, did much to misrepresent the general national sentiment. But these persons were, as I believe, a small minority in both countries.

So far as Britain was concerned, it was the invasion of Belgium that arrested all efforts to avert war, and made the friends of peace themselves join in holding that the duty of fulfilling their treaty obligations to a weak State was paramount to every other consideration.

I return to the doctrines set forth by General von Bernhardi, and apparently accepted by the military caste to which he belongs. Briefly summed up, they are as follows. His own words are used, except when it becomes necessary to abridge a lengthened argument:—

War is in itself a good thing. "It is a biological necessity of the first importance" (p. 18).

"The inevitableness, the idealism, the blessings of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development must be repeatedly emphasized" (p. 37).

"War is the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power."

"Efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily detrimental as soon as they influence politics" (p. 28).

"Fortunately these efforts can never attain their ultimate objects in a world bristling with arms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of most countries. 'God will see to it,' says Treitschke, 'that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race'" (p. 36).

"Efforts directed toward the abolition of war are not only foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race" (p. 34).

Courts of arbitration are pernicious delusions. "The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of development which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally" (p. 34).

"The maintenance of peace never can be or may be the goal of a policy" (p. 25).

"Efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, lead to geneal degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature, where the struggle for existence is eliminated" (p. 35).

Huge armaments are in themselves desirable. "They are the most necessary precondition of our national health" (p. 11).

"The end-all and be-all of a State is Power, and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle with politics" (Quoted from Treitschke *Politik* (p. 45).

"The State's highest moral duty is to increase its power" (pp. 45–6).

"The State is justified in making conquests whenever its own advantage seems to require additional territory" (p. 46).

"Self-preservation is the State's highest ideal," and justifies whatever action it may take, if that action be conducive to the end.

The State is the sole judge of the morality of its own action. It is, in fact, above morality, or, in other words, whatever is necessary is moral.

"Recognized rights (i. e., treaty rights) are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are conditions in which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things; in this case the infringement of the right appears morally justified" (p. 49). In fact, the State is a law to itself.

"Weak nations have not the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation" (p. 34).

"Any action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible" (p. 25).

These are startling propositions, though propounded as practically axiomatic. They are not new, for twenty-two centuries ago the sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* argued (Socrates refuting him) that Justice is nothing more than the advantage of the Stronger, i. e., Might is Right.*

The most startling among them is the denial that there are any duties owed by the State to Humanity, except that of imposing its own superior civilization upon as large a part of humanity as possible, and the

*Plato lays down that the end for which a State exists is Justice.

denial of the duty of observing treaties. Treaties are only so much paper.*

To modern German writers the State is a much more tremendous entity than it is to Englishmen or Americans. It is a supreme power with a sort of mystic sanctity, a power conceived of, as it were, self-created, a force altogether distinct from, and superior to, the persons who compose it.

But a State is, after all, only so many individuals organized under a government. It is no wiser, no more righteous, than the human beings of whom it consists, and whom it sets up to govern it.

Has the State then no morality, no responsibility?

If it is right for persons united as citizens into a State to rob and murder for their collective advantage by their collective power, why should it be wicked for the citizens as individuals to do so? Does their moral responsibility cease when and because they act together? Most legal systems hold that there are acts which one man may lawfully do which become unlawful if done by a number of men conspiring together. But now it would seem that what would be a crime in persons as individuals is high policy for those persons united in a State.†

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*There are, of course, cases in which a treaty may become obsolete by a complete change in the conditions under which it was made, as the treaties of Vienna of 1815 had become obsolete sixty years afterward. But the case of Belgium was not such a case, nor can so-called "military necessity" ever justify violation. The Hague Convention of 1907 expressly provides that belligerents must respect neutral territory.

†General Bernhardi refers approvingly to Machiavelli as "the first who declared that the keynote of every policy was the advancement of power." The Florentine, however, was not the preacher of doctrines with which he sought, like the General, to edify his contemporaries. He merely took his Italian world as he saw it. He did not attempt to buttress his doctrines by false philosophy, false history, and false science.

Is there no such thing as a common humanity? Are there no duties owed to it? Is there none of that "decent respect to the opinion of mankind" which the framers of the Declaration of Independence recognized; no sense that even the greatest States are amenable to the sentiment of the civilized world?

Let us see how these doctrines affect the smaller and weaker States which have hitherto lived in comparative security beside the Great Powers.

They will be absolutely at the mercy of the stronger. Even if protected by treaties guaranteeing their neutrality and independence they will not be safe, for treaty obligations are worthless "when they do not correspond to facts," i. e., when the strong Power finds that they stand in its way. Its interests are paramount.

If a State has valuable minerals, as Sweden has iron, and Belgium coal, and Rumania oil, or if it has abundance of water power, like Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, or if it holds the mouth of a navigable river the upper course of which belongs to another nation, the great State may conquer and annex that small State as soon as it finds that it needs the minerals, or the water power, or the river mouth.

It has the Powers, and Power gives Right. The interests, the sentiments, the patriotism and love of independence of the small people go for nothing.

Civilization has turned back upon itself, culture is to expand its domain by barbaric force. Governments derive their authority, not from the consent of the governed, but from the weapons of the conqueror.

Law and morality between nations have vanished. Herodotus tells us that the Scythians worshipped as their God a naked sword. That is the deity to be installed in the place once held by the God of Christianity, the God of righteousness and mercy.

States, mostly despotic States, have sometimes applied parts of this system of doctrine, but none has proclaimed it. The Romans, conquerors of the world, were not a scrupulous people, but even they stopped short of these principles. Certainly they never set them up as an ideal. Neither did those magnificent Saxon and Swabian emperors of the Middle Ages whose fame General von Bernhardi is fond of recalling. They did not enter Italy as conquerors, claiming her by the right of the strongest. They came on the faith of a legal title, which, however fantastic it may seem to us to-day, the Italians themselves—and, indeed, the whole of Latin Christendom—admitted. Dante, the greatest and most patriotic of Italians, welcomed the Emperor Henry the Seventh into Italy, and wrote a famous book to prove his claims, vindicating them on the ground that he, as the heir of Rome, stood for Law and Right and Peace. The noblest title which those emperors chose to bear was that of *Imperator Pacificus*. In the Middle Ages, when men were always fighting, they appreciated the blessings of war much less than does General Bernhardi, and they valued peace, not war, as a means to civilization and culture. They had not learnt in the school of Treitschke that peace means decadence and war is the true civilizing influence.

The doctrines above stated are (as I have tried

to point out) well calculated to alarm the small States which prize their liberty and their individuality, and have been thriving under the safeguard of treaties. But there are also other considerations affecting those States which ought to appeal to men in all countries, to strong nations as well as weak nations.

The small States, whose absorption is now threatened, have been potent and useful—perhaps the most potent and useful—factors in the advance of civilization. It is in them and by them that most of what is most precious in religion, in philosophy, in literature, in science, and in art has been produced.

The first great thoughts that brought man into a true relation with God came from a tiny people, inhabiting a country smaller than Denmark. The religions of mighty Babylon and populous Egypt have vanished: the religion of Israel remains in its earlier as well as in that later form which has overspread the world.

The Greeks were a small people, not united in one great State, but scattered over coasts and among hills in petty city communities, each with its own life, slender in numbers, but eager, versatile, intense. They gave us the richest, the most varied, and the most stimulating of all literatures.

When poetry and art reappeared, after the long night of the Dark Ages, their most splendid blossoms flowered in the small republics of Italy.

In modern Europe what do we not owe to little Switzerland, lighting the torch of freedom 600 years ago, and keeping it alight through all the centuries when despotic monarchies held the rest of the European

Continent; and what to free Holland, with her great men of learning and her painters surpassing those of all other countries save Italy?

So the small Scandinavian nations have given to the world famous men of science, from Linnæus downward, poets like Tegner and Björnson, scholars like Madvig, dauntless explorers like Fridjof Nansen. England had, in the age of Shakespeare, Bacon, and Milton, a population little larger than that of Bulgaria to-day. The United States, in the days of Washington and Franklin and Jefferson and Hamilton and Marshall, counted fewer inhabitants than Denmark or Greece.

In the two most brilliant generations of German literature and thought, the age of Kant and Lessing and Goethe, of Hegel and Beethoven and Schiller and Fichte, there was no real German State at all, but a congeries of principalities and free cities, independent centres of intellectual life, in which letters and science produced a richer crop than the two succeeding generations have raised, just as Britain, also with eight times the population of the year 1600, has had no more Shakespeares or Miltons.

No notion is more palpably contradicted by history than that relied on by the school to which General Bernhardi belongs, that "culture"—literary, scientific, and artistic—flourishes best in great military States. The decay of art and literature in the Roman world began just when Rome's military power had made that world one great and ordered State. The opposite view would be much nearer the truth; though one must admit that no general theory regarding the

relations of art and letters to Governments and political conditions has ever yet been proved to be sound.*

The world is already too uniform, and is becoming more uniform every day. A few leading languages, a few forms of civilization, a few types of character, are spreading out from the seven or eight greatest States and extinguishing the weaker languages, forms, and types.

Although the great States are stronger and more populous their peoples are not necessarily more gifted, and the extinction of the minor languages and types would be a misfortune for the world's future development.

We may not be able to arrest the forces which seem to be making for that extinction, but we certainly ought not to strengthen them. Rather we ought to maintain and defend the smaller States, and to favour the rise and growth of new peoples. Not merely because they were delivered from the tyranny of Sultans like Abdul Hamid did the intellect of Europe welcome the successively won liberations of Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro; it was also in the hope that those countries would in time develop out of their present relatively crude conditions new types of culture, new centres of productive intellectual life.

General Bernhardi invokes history, the ultimate

*General Bernhardi's knowledge of current history may be estimated by the fact that he assumes (1) that trade rivalry makes a war probable between Great Britain and the United States! (2) that he believes the Indian princes and peoples likely to revolt against Britain should she be involved in war!! and (3) that he expects her self-governing Colonies to take such an opportunity of severing their connection with her!!!

court of appeal. He appeals to Cæsar. To Cæsar let him go. *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.**

History declares that no nation, however great, is entitled to try to impose its type of civilization on others. No race, not even the Teutonic or the Anglo-Saxon, is entitled to claim the leadership of humanity. Each people has in its time contributed something that was distinctively its own, and the world is far richer thereby than if any one race, however gifted, had established a permanent ascendancy.

We of the Anglo-Saxon race do not claim for ourselves, any more than we admit in others, any right to dominate by force or to impose our own type of civilization on less powerful races. Perhaps we have not that assured conviction of its superiority which the school of General Bernhardi expresses for the Teutons of North Germany. We know how much we owe, even within our own islands, to the Celtic race. And though we must admit that peoples of Anglo-Saxon stock have, like others, made some mistakes and sometimes abused their strength, let it be remembered what have been the latest acts they have done abroad.

The United States have twice withdrawn their troops from Cuba, which they could easily have retained. They have resisted all temptations to annex any part of the territories of Mexico, in which the lives and property of their citizens were for three years in constant danger. So Britain also, six years ago, restored the amplest self-government to the two South African Republics (having already agreed to

*World History is the World tribunal.

the maintenance on equal terms of the Dutch language), and the citizens of those Republics, which were in arms against her thirteen years ago, have now spontaneously come forward to support her by arms, under the gallant leader who then commanded the Boers. And I may add that one reason why the princes of India have rallied so promptly and heartily to Britain in this war is because for many years past we have avoided annexing the territories of those princes, allowing them to adopt heirs when successors of their own families failed, and leaving to them as much as possible of the ordinary functions of government.

It is only vulgar minds that mistake bigness for greatness, for greatness is of the soul, not of the body. In the judgment which history will hereafter pass upon the forty centuries of recorded progress toward civilization that now lie behind us, what are the tests it will apply to determine the true greatness of a people?

Not population, not territory, not wealth, not military power. Rather will history ask: What examples of lofty character and unselfish devotion to honour and duty has a people given? What has it done to increase the volume of knowledge? What thoughts and what ideals of permanent value and unexhausted fertility has it bequeathed to mankind? What works has it produced in poetry, music, and the other arts to be an unfailing source of enjoyment to posterity?

The smaller peoples need not fear the application of such tests.

The world advances not, as the Bernhardi school suppose, only or even mainly by fighting. It advances mainly by thinking and by a process of reciprocal teaching and learning, by a continuous and unconscious coöperation of all its strongest and finest minds.

Each race—Hellenic, Italic, Celtic, and Teutonic, Iberian, and Slavonic—has something to give, each something to learn; and when their blood is blent the mixed stock may combine the gifts of both.

The most progressive races have been those who combined willingness to learn with a strength which enabled them to receive without loss to their own quality, retaining their primal vigour, but entering into the labours of others, as the Teutons who settled within the dominions of Rome profited by the lessons of the old civilization.

Let me disclaim once more before I close any intention to attribute to the German people the principles set forth by the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, their hatred of peace and arbitration, their disregard of treaty obligations, their scorn for the weaker peoples.

We in England would feel an even deeper sadness than weighs upon us now if we could suppose that such principles had been embraced by a nation whose thinkers have done so much for human progress and who have produced so many shining examples of Christian saintliness.

But when those principles have been ostentatiously proclaimed, when a peaceful neutral country which the other belligerent had undertaken to respect has been invaded and treated as Belgium has been treated,

and when attempts are made to justify these deeds as incidental to a campaign for civilization and culture, it becomes necessary to point out how untrue and how pernicious such principles are.

What are the teachings of history, history to which General Bernhardi is fond of appealing? That war has been the constant handmaid of tyranny and the source of more than half the miseries of man. That although some wars have been necessary, and have given occasion for the display of splendid heroism—wars of defence against aggression, or to succour the oppressed—most wars have been needless or unjust. That the mark of an advancing civilization has been the substitution of friendship for hatred and of peaceful for warlike ideals. That small peoples have done and can do as much for the common good of humanity as large peoples. That Treaties must be observed, for what are they but records of national faith solemnly pledged, and what could bring mankind more surely and swiftly back to that reign of violence and terror from which it has been slowly rising for the last ten centuries than the destruction of trust in the plighted faith of nations?

No event has brought out that essential unity which now exists in the world so forcibly as this war has done, for no event has ever so affected every part of the world. Four continents are involved—the whole of the Old World—and the New World suffers grievously in its trade, industry, and finance. Thus the whole world is interested in preventing the recurrence of such a calamity; and there is a general feeling throughout the world that an effort must be

made to remove the causes which have brought it upon us.

We are told that armaments must be reduced, that the baleful spirit of militarism must be quenched, that the peoples must everywhere be admitted to a fuller share in the control of foreign policy, that efforts must be made to establish a sort of League of Concord—some system of international relations and reciprocal peace alliances by which the weaker nations may be protected, and under which differences between nations may be adjusted by Courts of arbitration and conciliation of wider scope than those that now exist.

All these things are desirable. But no scheme for preventing future wars will have any chance of success unless it rests upon the assurance that the States which enter into it will loyally and steadfastly abide by it, and that each and all of them will join in coercing by their overwhelming united strength any State which may disregard the obligations it has undertaken.

The faith of treaties is the only solid foundation on which a Temple of Peace can be built up.

III

A FREE EUROPE

Being An Interview With
The Rt. Hon. SIR EDWARD GREY, BART., K.G.

By EDWARD PRICE BELL
of the "Chicago Daily News"

III

INTERVIEW WITH SIR EDWARD GREY

THE Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, K. G., M. P., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, talking with Mr. Edward Price Bell, of the Chicago *Daily News*, at luncheon in the statesman's temporary London home, on Monday, April 10, said substantially this:—

"Prussian tyranny over western Europe, including these islands, our people will not stand. The pledges given by Mr. Asquith as regards the restoration of Belgium and Serbia shall be kept. We have signed a pact to make peace only in concert with our Allies; this pact, I need not say, we shall honour, strictly, and to the end. What we and our Allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free, not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war, free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from perpetual talk of shining armour and warlords. In fact," added Sir Edward reflectively, "we feel we are fighting for equal rights; for law, justice, peace; for civilization, throughout the world, as against brute force which knows no restraint and no mercy."

To interview Sir Edward Grey, one need hardly say, is a unique privilege and honour. These came

to myself after many months of battling with the immemorial prejudice of the British public man of high responsibility against the journalist as a journalist. It is a fact, I believe, that Sir Edward Grey—one of the greatest figures of the world war, and one of the most famous men in modern political history—never was interviewed, in the journalistic sense, before. It is also true, I think, that in the long annals of the British Foreign Office this is the first instance in which its Chief has consented to speak to his fellow-men through the mediumship of a correspondent.

What is the most amazing fact about this man?

To my mind, it is that the Germans regard him as the Mephistopheles of the "Faust" of Armageddon —scoffing, sardonic, crafty, fiendish. One of their appellations for him is "Satan." They feign to believe—possibly do believe—that his main object in life has been to brew trouble, to bring about war, especially to effect the strangulation, or asphyxiation, of Germany. This of a man of the most civilized type, broad of vision, nurtured in Liberalism, a fly fisherman, a tamer of birds and squirrels, a life-long protagonist of peace!

"What do you mean by the phrase, 'destruction of Prussian militarism'?" I asked Sir Edward.

THE PRUSSIAN IDEAL

"What Prussia proposes, as we understand her, is Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe modelled and ruled by Prussians. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbours, and of us all. We say that life on these terms is intolerable. And this also

is what France and Italy and Russia say. We are not only fighting Prussia's attempt to do, in this instance, to all of Europe what she did to non-Prussian Germany, but fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost the desirability, of ever-recurrent war. Prussia under Bismarck deliberately and admittedly made three wars. We wanted a settled peace in Europe and throughout the world, which will be a guarantee against aggressive war.

"Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells disintegration, degeneracy, the sacrifice of the heroic qualities in human character. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity.

THE BRITISH IDEAL

"We are fighting this idea. We do not believe in war as the preferable method of settling disputes between nations. When nations cannot see eye to eye, when they quarrel, when there is a threat of war, we believe the controversy should be settled by methods other than those of war. Such other methods are always successful when there is good will and no aggressive spirit.

"We believe in negotiation. We have faith in international conferences. We proposed a conference before this war broke out. We urged Germany to agree to a conference. Germany declined to do so. Then I requested Germany to select some form of mediation, some method of peaceful settlement, of her own. She would not come forward with any such

suggestion. Then the Emperor of Russia proposed to Germany to send the dispute to The Hague Tribunal. There was no response. Our proposal of a conference was rejected by Germany: Russia, France and Italy all accepted it. Our proposal that Germany suggest some means of peaceful settlement met with no success, nor did the Czar's proposal of arbitration. No impartial judgment of any kind was to be permitted to enter. It was a case of Europe submitting to the Teutonic will, or going to war.

"If the conference in London in the Balkan crisis in 1912-13 had been worked to the disadvantage of Germany or her allies, the German reluctance for a conference in 1914 would have been intelligible, but no more convincing pledge of fair play and single-minded desire for fair settlement than the conduct of that conference in London was ever given. And in 1914, after Serbia had accepted nine tenths of Austria's demands, the settlement of outstanding questions would have been easy. Russia ordered no general mobilization till Germany had refused a conference and till German preparations for war were far ahead of the Russians. Germany declared war on Russia when Austria was showing every disposition to come to terms; and Germany was in fact at war with Russia four or five days before Austria, though the quarrel at that time was one that primarily concerned Austria and not Germany."

THE TWO METHODS

After a moment's reflection, Sir Edward continued:

"These two methods of settling international dis-

putes—the method of negotiation and the method of war—I ask you to consider in the light of this struggle. Do we not see the disaster of the war method conclusively shown? How much better would have been a conference, or The Hague, in 1914, than what has happened since! Industry and commerce dislocated; the burdens of life heavily increased; millions of men slain, maimed, blinded; international hatreds deepened and intensified; the very fabric of civilization menaced—these from the war method. The conference we proposed, or The Hague proposed by the Czar, would have settled the quarrel in a little time—I think a conference would have settled it in a week—and all these calamities would have been averted. Moreover—a thing of vast importance—we should have gone a long way in laying the permanent foundations for international peace."

NEUTRALS AND PEACE

"Do you think neutrals ever will be able to help toward peace?" I inquired.

"The injustice done by this war has got to be set right. The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed. When persons come to me with pacific counsels, I think they should tell me what sort of peace they have in mind. They should let me know on which side they stand, for the opponents do not agree. If they think, for example, that Belgium was innocent of offence; that she has been unspeakably wronged; that she should be set up again by those who tore her down, then, it seems to me, they should say so. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make

no attempt to discriminate between the rights and the wrongs of this war are ineffective, if not irrelevant."

"'Desire for conquest, lust for revenge, and jealousy of the economic competitor in the world market,'" I reminded Sir Edward, "were suggested by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg as 'the three driving forces of the coalition against Germany before the war.'"

"There was no coalition against Germany before the war," answered Sir Edward. "Germany knew there was no coalition against her. We had assured her, in the most formal and categorical way, that in no circumstances would we be a party to any aggression against her. She wanted us to pledge ourselves to unconditional neutrality—wanted us to declare that no matter what she did on the Continent we should not interfere. It is true that she always referred to a possible war forced on her. The trouble was that she gave us no test of a war forced on her. She remained free to claim that any war was forced on her. She now claims that this war was forced on her. I need hardly remind you that at the outset Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, definitely refused to accept this view. No one thought of attacking Germany; there was not a measure taken by any other power that was not purely defensive; the German preparations were for attack and were far ahead of others on the Continent."

BELGIUM A BULWARK

"You observed the German Chancellor's recent reference to Belgium as a 'bulwark'?"

"Belgium *was* a bulwark—defensive of Germany,

of France, and of European peace. This bulwark, until Germany decided to make war, was in no danger from any quarter. In April, 1913, we had given renewed assurance to Belgium to respect her neutrality. When war threatened, we asked France if she would adhere to her pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium. She said 'Yes.' We asked Germany the same question, and she declined to answer. Immediately afterward, in scorn of her signature, she assaulted and destroyed the bulwark. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg acknowledged the wrong, pleading that 'necessity knows no law,' and promised that as soon as Germany's military aims were realized she would restore Belgium. Now he says there can be no *status quo ante*, either in the east or in the west. In other words, Belgium's independence is gone, as Serbia's and Montenegro's are gone, unless the Allies can set them up again.

"To all this we say to Germany, 'Recognize the principle urged by lovers of freedom everywhere: give to the nationalities of Europe a real freedom, not the so-called freedom doled out to subject peoples by Prussian tyranny, and make reparation as far as it can be made for the wrong done."

BRITISH AIMS

"Should you mind indicating the object of Britain's *rapprochements* in recent years?" I asked.

"Good relations and an end to quarrels with other powers. Going far back, we had working relations with the Triple Alliance. But we were habitually in friction with France or Russia. Again and again it brought us to the verge of war. So we decided to

come to an arrangement with France, and then with Russia—not with any hostile intent toward Germany, or any other power, but wholly to pave the way to permanent peace. So, instead of preparing for war, as Germany asserts, without a vestige of truth to support the assertion, we were endeavouring to avoid war. And German statesmen knew we were endeavouring to avoid war and not to make it."

"German statesmen assert that England is the only real obstacle to peace."

"Nobody wants peace more than we want it. But we want a peace that does justice, and a peace that reëstablishes respect for the public law of the world. Presumably Germany would like neutrals to think we are applying pressure to keep France, Russia, and Italy in the war. We are not. France, Russia, and Italy need no urging to keep them in the war. They know why they are in the war. They know they are in it to preserve everything that is precious to nationality. It is this knowledge which makes them determined and unconquerable. It is quite impossible for me to express to you our admiration of the achievements of our associates in this struggle. And as is the measure of our admiration, so also will be the measure of our contribution to the common cause.

"There are two statements that come from German sources. One is that we are preventing the Allies from making peace—that goes to the address of neutrals. The other is that we are meditating separate peace with Germany and intend to abandon our Allies—that goes to the address of one or other of the Allies. Each statement is absolutely untrue."

"You have noted that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg affirms that Britain wants to destroy 'united and free Germany.'"

"We never were smitten with any such madness. We want nothing of the sort, and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg knows we want nothing of the sort. We should be glad to see the German people free, as we ourselves want to be free, and as we want the other nationalities of Europe and of the world to be free. It belongs to the rudiments of political science, it is abundantly taught by history, that you cannot enslave a people, and make a success of the job—that you cannot kill a people's soul by foreign despotism and brutality. We aspire to embark upon no such course of folly and futility toward another nation. We believe that the German people—when once the dreams of world-empire, cherished by pan-Germanism are brought to nought—will insist upon the control of its government; and in this lies the hope of secure freedom and national independence in Europe. For a German democracy will not plot and plan wars, as Prussian militarism plotted wars, to take place at a chosen date in the future."

In the midst of war, Sir Edward Grey's great vision remains a vision of peace—not a wobbly peace, not a peace vulnerable to political and militarist intrigue and ambition, but a peace secured by the unified and armed purpose of civilization. Long before this war, Sir Edward hoped for a league of nations that would be united, quick and instant, to prevent, and, if need be, to punish violation of international treaties, of public

right, of national independence, and would say to nations that come forward with grievances and claims, "Put them before an impartial tribunal. Subject your claims to the test of law or the judgment of impartial men. If you can win at this bar, you will get what you want; if you cannot, you shall not have what you want; and, if you attempt to start a war, we all shall adjudge you the common enemy of humanity, and treat you accordingly. As footpads, safe-breakers, burglars, and incendiaries are suppressed *in* nations, so those who would commit these crimes, and incalculably more than these crimes, will be suppressed *among* nations."

LESSON OF THE WAR

"Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war," said Sir Edward, in conclusion, "the struggle will have been in vain. Furthermore, it seems to me that over humanity will loom the menace of destruction. The Germans have thrown the door wide open to every form of attack upon human life. The use of poisonous fumes, or something akin to them in war, was recommended to our naval or military authorities many years ago, and was rejected by them as too horrible for civilized peoples to use. The Germans have come with floating mines in the open seas, threatening belligerents and neutrals equally; they have come with the indiscriminating, murderous Zeppelin, which does military damage only by accident; they have come with the submarine, which destroys neutral and belligerent ships and crews in scorn alike of law and of mercy; they have come upon blameless nations with invasion and incendiarism and confiscation; they

have come with poisonous gases and liquid fire. All their scientific genius has been dedicated to wiping out human life. They have forced these things into general use in war. If the world cannot organize against war, if war must go on, then nations can protect themselves henceforth only by using whatever destructive agencies they can invent, till the resources and inventions of science end by destroying the humanity that they were meant to serve. The Germans assert that their culture is so extraordinarily superior that it gives them a normal right to impose it upon the rest of the world by force. Will the outstanding contribution of Kultur disclosed in this war be such efficiency in slaughter as to lead to wholesale extermination?

"The Prussian authorities have apparently but one idea of peace, an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to war till it is defeated and renounced."

IV

THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

With a Preface by

M. PAUL HYMANS,

Minister of State (Belgium).

At present Belgian Minister in London.

IV

THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

BELGIUM, a neutral country, living in calm and complete friendship with the neighbouring Powers which had guaranteed her neutrality, an industrious nation, accustomed to liberty and devoted to the arts of peace, has been dragged against her will into the most frightful war which has ever devastated the world.

What circumstances compelled this little people of seven million souls to take up arms and to dare the German colossus? Why has she been exposed to all the horrors of invasion? Why has she poured out her blood and material resources without counting the cost?

The documents here collected furnish the answer to these questions. They set out the unswerving loyalty of Belgium and her inflexible resolve to fulfil all her duties to others as well as to herself. They set out also the cynical promises made by Germany and the brutal threat which accompanied them. Belgium needs no eloquence to succeed in her suit before the civilized world. It is enough to set out the facts. They furnish irresistible proof of the justice of her cause.

I

The international status of Belgium was determined by the Treaties of 1831 and 1839. When the Belgian

provinces separated from Holland and formed themselves into an independent and sovereign State, the representatives of the great Powers assembled at the Congress of London determined the character of the new State by two successive agreements. The "Treaty of the Eighteen Articles" of the 26th June, 1831, provides that Belgium shall form a perpetually neutral State, and that the Powers should guarantee that perpetual neutrality. The "Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles" of the 15th November, 1831, contained the following passage:—

> Article 7. Belgium, within the limits fixed by Articles 1, 2, and 4 shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. She shall be bound to observe the same neutrality toward all other States.

Lastly, on the 19th April, 1839, a final Treaty concluded between Belgium and Holland reproduced this provision, and the great Powers, Austria, France, and Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, acceding to the Treaty, declared that all its articles "are placed under their guarantee."

Belgium, therefore, is, and has been since she came into existence, a neutral State. Her neutrality is permanent and the creature of treaty, determined upon by Europe, decreed by Europe, and accepted by Belgium.

In 1870 the Franco-Prussian War broke out on our frontier and exposed us to serious perils. England preserved us from them. She approached simultaneously France and the North German Confederation, and required them to make a formal declaration that they

would respect Belgian neutrality, threatening, if that neutrality were violated, to intervene in the war. The belligerent States bound themselves by fresh treaties, which gave an added solemnity to the Treaty of 1839.

For more than eighty years Belgium, resting upon these solemn treaties, has lived peaceably, applying herself to the development of the freest institutions in the world, making herself illustrious in the arts, in commerce, and in industry; making her moral personality known throughout the world so that it has become one of the factors in universal civilization.

For some years, however, well-informed people as well as the political and military world have been rendered uneasy by the complications of European foreign policy. The Morocco crisis, the competition between nations for colonial possessions, the tension in diplomatic relations, the incidents of the Balkan crisis, gave rise to fears lest some incident should suddenly assume dangerous proportions, and result in a collision which might degenerate into a general war. In such case Belgium would find herself in a position more precarious than that of 1870. The war of 1870 remained localized throughout. Great Britain preserved neutrality, and as a judge between nations protected Belgium. Since then the whole face of Europe has been changed. The Powers had formed themselves into opposing groups. It was doubtful whether England could exercise her position as guarantor as effectively as in 1870.

Anxieties arising from international events caused the Belgian Government and Parliament to determine to strengthen the national defences. As early as 1909

a law abolishing *remplacement* had established personal military service, laying upon every family the obligation to give a son to the Army. In 1912 M. de Broqueville introduced, in the name of the Cabinet, a Bill making the obligation general, whose effect would be to double the effective strength of the Army. The new system was put in force in 1913, but could not produce its complete results until 1917.

When the ultimatum addressed by Austria to Serbia was published, the gravity of the situation became apparent to every one. It was decided to take precautionary measures. On the 28th July officers on leave and soldiers on furlough were ordered to rejoin their corps; on the 29th three classes of militia were called up, placing the Army on the footing of *paix renforcée*. The fortresses of Antwerp and the Meuse were put in a state of defence. These preparations were not the consequence of any ideas hostile to any of our neighbours, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Davignon, made an announcement to this effect to our principal Legations. They were dictated by elementary prudence. If France and Germany were to come to blows, our position would become very critical. It is true that no one anticipated an attack from either Power on neutral Belgium. But there was the risk that the operations of armies stretched out along our frontiers should overflow into our territory; and for a long time military writers had discussed openly the contingency that German or French troops, seeking to reach enemy territory by the shortest road, should make use of the valley of the Meuse or the roads of Luxemburg.

The uneasiness of the Government increased when they learned, on the evening of the 31st July, that communication by rail between Germany and Belgium had just been interrupted. During the night orders for mobilization were issued. Holland had already taken a similar measure. The Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately sent to the European Chancelleries a note in which he described the position of Belgium. He drew attention to the fact that the country had always fulfilled scrupulously the duties of neutrality, and was inflexibly determined to maintain it. The measures which the Government had just taken, he said, had no other aim but that of putting Belgium in a position to fulfil her international obligations. "It is obvious that they never have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers." Their only object was to ensure the observance of neutrality.

II

In spite of the gravity of the situation there was a general hope in Belgium that Germany and France would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

Already on the 31st July, M. Klobukowski, the French Minister, in conversation with M. Davignon, had reassured him as to the intentions of the Republic. And on the next day, the 1st August, he stated that he was authorized to inform him that the French Government would respect the neutrality of Belgium. It was only in the contingency that this neutrality

should not be respected by some other Power that France could be led to alter her attitude.

Similar action was expected from Germany. Herr von Below the German representative at Brussels, when informed by M. Davignon of the statement made by M. Klobukowski replied that he had not been instructed to make any similar statement to the Belgian Government, but that "his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which Belgium had the right to entertain toward her eastern neighbours" was well known. On the previous evening, the Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Baron van der Elst, had a long conversation with Herr von Below; he reminded the latter of an interesting exchange of opinion which he had had with his predecessor Herr von Flotow: this conversation took place in 1911 as a result of a newspaper controversy; certain newspapers had stated that in the event of a Franco-German war Germany would violate the neutrality of Belgium. It had been suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament would serve to calm public opinion, and dispel regrettable mistrust. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, when informed of this suggestion, had replied that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality, but that a public statement to this effect would weaken the military situation of Germany in regard to France, who, secure on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

At a later date, in 1913, Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a reply to a question of a Socialist Deputy during a sitting of the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, had stated that Belgian neu-

trality was determined by international treaties and that Germany was determined to respect those treaties. Baron van der Elst reminded Herr von Below of these facts. The latter not only admitted their accuracy but added that he was certain "that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed."

It was open to us to believe in the sincerity of statements made on different occasions by German diplomats and statesmen, although the Imperial Government had refrained from making the official declaration on which we counted.

Indeed in late years several incidents appear to have drawn closer the ties which bound the two countries and their ruling houses together. The brilliant part taken by Germany in the Brussels Exhibition of 1910 and the warm welcome given to the German representatives, the visit of the Emperor, the Empress, and Princess Victoria Louise to the royal family, the marks of friendship lavished on the King by the Emperor William, all drove from our minds any thought that Germany was entertaining hostile plans and meditating invasion or conquest.

The Emperor had been received at Brussels with a sympathy which, as he declared, greatly moved him. He had several times expressed to all those whom he met how greatly pleased and flattered he was. He had employed freely his seductive talents, talking with familiarity, freedom, and charm. He showed himself particularly gracious to the Burgomaster of Brussels, M. Max, who had received him formally at the Town Hall. Three years afterward, on the occasion of the *joyeuse entrée* of the King and Queen into

Liége, the Emperor had directed General von Emmich to go to that town and greet our Sovereigns in his name. The Imperial Envoy, during a banquet at which he sat next to our Minister of Justice, M. Carton de Wiart, had expressed to the latter his admiration for the institutions of the Belgian people, their virtues, and the merits of their King. That was in August, 1913. In August, 1914, the same General von Emmich was in command of the attack on the forts of Liége. Lastly, every one knows how Germans were treated in Belgium, and what an important position they had taken in the business world. At Antwerp the increase of German influence due to the action of powerful shipping houses and rich merchant princes had been long noticeable. At Brussels there was scarcely an important bank whose Board of Directors did not include representatives of German finance and industry.

Many members of the German colony were warmly received in society at Brussels and Antwerp; freely enjoyed cordial Belgian hospitality, and did not shrink from seeking honours as well as profit amongst us.

The Government, on the other hand, faithful to the policy of strict neutrality which all Belgian ministries have observed ever since the State came into existence, applied its energies, so far as it could, to maintaining a balance between the influences of the two neighbouring countries in public opinion. Sympathy for France is natural in a country which is so near to her in language and civilization and in the great likeness of many of her civil and political institutions. Hence came at times, in certain controversies, assertions of preference for France which entailed some danger of wounding

German pride and gave rise to mistrust and misunderstanding. The Government on several occasions intervened discreetly to redress the balance in public opinion, and on my own personal knowledge I can offer an important piece of evidence on this point.

About a year ago the Government asked me, though I belonged to the opposition, to approach some of my friends in the Liberal press with a view to inducing them to discuss with reserve and prudence certain questions as to German policy which were the subject of agitation at the moment. I willingly undertook this mission, for I have always been of opinion that it was necessary in our neutral country only to examine international affairs from the point of view of Belgium, considering only our position in Europe and the necessity of preserving friendship with our neighbours on both sides.

A still more characteristic incident took place on the 2nd August, the very day of the ultimatum. During the morning a Brussels paper, the *Petit Bleu*, published an article headed "Long Live France; Down with German Barbarism." The Minister of Justice, M. Carton de Wiart, ordered all the copies of the paper to be seized and directed proceedings to be taken against the publisher. It is clear that, up to the eleventh hour, the Government's anxiety was to anticipate and suppress even any moral breach of neutrality.

Belgium thus was guiltless, her attitude was correct in all respects; nothing in her policy or her domestic conduct offered any point for criticism. Germany had no cause for complaint against her.

Since then an attempt has been made by the publication and garbling of certain documents to represent falsely that the Belgian Government, long before the war, had taken sides with England and plotted against Germany.

By a search in the records of the War Department at Brussels, the Germans have brought to light a Minute by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, written in 1906, and a note by Baron Greindl, our Minister at Berlin, dated 1911, on the subject of the measures of defence to be taken by Belgium in case of a Franco-German war, and the violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality. An attempt has been made to mislead public feeling by surrounding this document with sophistical comment intended to throw suspicion on Belgian policy, and to weave a legend of duplicity around the Government.

As a matter of fact, these papers have no real importance. In order to judge fairly our military policy, it would be necessary to have a knowledge of all the documents in which it is revealed and set out. Let them be published; they would provide a striking justification of our action. In fact, the Memorandum now in question was drawn up by the Chief of the General Staff, General Ducarne, as a result of conversations between him and Colonel Barnardiston, the Military Attaché of the British Legation, on the subject of the contingency of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany in a war between that Power and France. Similarly Baron Greindl's note has reference to a plan for the defence of Luxemburg drawn up on the same hypothesis, which is the fruit of the personal action of

the head of the first division of the Department of War.

The conversations between Colonel Barnardiston and General Ducarne dealt only with technical military problems and had not the smallest influence on policy. This is all the more apparent when it is realized that at the moment when these conversations took place the relations between England and Belgium were somewhat strained. In 1906 the difficulties which arose from the Congo question were reaching their culminating point.

As to Baron Greindl's note, it dates from the period when the Agadir incident had troubled the peace of Europe and when the violation of Belgian territory by the Imperial armies in case of a Franco-German war had been pointed out as a useful and probable operation by the chief writers in Germany, for example Bernhardi and Von der Goltz.

In addition the documents published have only an academic character, were never considered by the Belgian Government, and did not produce any result. In reality they are wholly devoid of any political meaning.

And never at any time, neither then, nor before, nor afterward, has the Belgian Government ever been invited to enter or ever thought of entering into more intimate relations with the Triple Entente than with the Triple Alliance. Its sole care throughout has been to maintain completely, absolutely, and scrupulously, neutrality in word and deed.

The German press, when it waves these innocuous papers about, is merely obeying the word of command.

The object is by a clever counter attack to relieve Germany of the responsibility which weighs heavily upon her for an open disregard of a sacred engagement.

III

Up to the last moment the German representatives used all their efforts to reassure the Belgian Government and to mislead public opinion.

On the 1st August the Military Attaché of the German Legation went to the Minister of War to offer his congratulations on the order and rapidity of the mobilization operations and took care to advertise this move by a communication to the press.

Next day, 2d August, the fatal day, a sensational statement by the German Minister gave great satisfaction in Brussels. Interviewed by a reporter to one of our big daily papers he said to him "Perhaps the house of your neighbour may catch fire but your house will remain untouched." This statement printed in large type was published in a special edition and had a wide circulation. Public confidence, which had been shaken by the news of the violation of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, was reassured. The horizon seemed to grow light again.

On the same day, three hours afterward, at seven in the evening, Herr von Below went to the Foreign Office and communicated the German ultimatum to the Belgian Government. Twelve hours of the night were allowed for the reply. None of us can ever forget the tragic night which followed.

The Members of the Cabinet and Ministers of State

met together under the chairmanship of the King and deliberated.

There were two possible courses of action open to us: The first was to allow a free passage to the German armies in their march on France and to obtain a large indemnity for the damage suffered; that would have meant the friendship of Germany to-day and her sovereignty to-morrow. It would also have meant the tearing up of the title deeds of the Belgian nation and the violation by her own hand of the neutrality which had been decreed by Europe and accepted by Belgium and treason to the duties imposed upon us by that neutrality. The alternative was to run the danger of war and invasion, to oppose the most formidable military power in the world and to keep our honour unstained, to maintain our title, to respect our treaties.

There was no discussion. Our decision was plain before us. It was taken at once. We decided to protest and to resist.

The reply was drafted in the Foreign Office. It was taken to the Palace and approved unanimously by the King and the Council. At seven in the morning on the 3d August it was handed to the German Minister.

What reasons had Germany given for demanding from Belgium a free passage, the abandonment of her rights, and the surrender of her territory.

The ultimatum said "Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur."

This was only a pretext. It is disproved by facts:

For several weeks the Belgian army, unsupported, defended Belgian soil.

The childishness of the argument was so obvious to those who used it that from the very beginning they invented others which were not less absurd.

During the night of the 2d–3d August while the text of the reply to the ultimatum was being copied in the Foreign Office the German Minister was announced. He was received by Baron van der Elst and told the latter with every sign of lively emotion that he was directed by his Government to inform him that although war had not been declared a patrol of French cavalry had crossed the frontier and that French dirigibles had thrown bombs. Baron van der Elst asked where this had happened. "In Germany," replied Herr von Below. Baron van der Elst observed that in that case he did not understand the object of Herr von Below's visit, but the latter then explained that the acts which he mentioned constituted a violation of international law, and that it must therefore be supposed that France would continue to violate that law.

The German Generals, during the first days of hostilities, invented in their turn fresh grounds of complaint.

On the 4th August the first German soldiers arrived at Warsage. They distributed to the inhabitants a proclamation signed by General von Emmich, which states that "To my great regret the German troops find themselves compelled to cross the Belgian frontier. They are acting under the compulsion of inevitable necessity, Belgian neutrality having already been

violated by French officers who have crossed Belgian territory in disguise in a motor car and entered Germany."

Thus it appears that Germany declared war upon us because French officers in disguise had secretly passed along Belgian roads in a motor car.

General von Bülow has recourse to another story.

On the 9th August he issued a proclamation "To the Belgian People" in which the following passage occurs:

> "We are fighting the Belgian army solely to force a passage toward France which your Government has wrongfully refused to us although they have allowed the French to make a military reconnaissance, a fact which your papers have concealed from you."

Lastly, American defenders of German policy—very few indeed in number, and little heeded—have in their pro-German zeal invented more extraordinary justifications for the invasion of Belgium. One of them, a professor at a University, has the audacity to state that Belgium had tacitly authorized France to violate her neutrality during July by permitting French officers to inspect our fortifications, and that France, with the consent of our Government, was prepared to use Belgian territory as a base of operations. Another, also a professor, does not scruple to affirm without the least attempt at proof that the Belgian army has been trained by French officers, and that Belgium for twenty-five years has been a vassal State of France. If that is true, how is it that Germany allowed it? What explanation is there for the fact that until the striking of the dark hour when

she brought her guns into action against us she never ceased to lavish upon us marks of sympathy?

These absurd fairy tales are spread about with skill, and there is some danger that they may take people in.

It is a sufficient answer to them to state the words of the ultimatum itself, which does not impute any fault to Belgium, which makes no complaint against her, and which confines itself to attributing to the French troops the "intention" of passing through Belgian territory.

In addition, the categorical public statement to the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor destroys every pretext, every excuse, every attempt at justification. On the 4th August, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg expressed himself as follows:—

> "We are in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered the Belgian territory. That is a breach of international law . . . the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained."

Thus, to accomplish her military plans, Germany intentionally violated international law, deliberately committed an injustice, placed the interests of her defence above right and above treaties.

Besides, what do treaties matter? The Chancellor put his point of view without any reticence to the British Ambassador at Berlin. "Just for a word," he said, "neutrality, a word which in war time so often has been disregarded, just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war."

These confessions revealed the methods of thought

which have directed German policy: any idea of right has been set aside; brutal utilitarianism dominates them. Bismarck condensed it in this cynical formula —"Where the Power of Prussia is in question, I know no law."

Belgium is innocent. Her cause is pure.

Neutral in perpetuity by the decision of Europe, her duty was to defend her neutrality and her independence against any attack from wheresoever it might come. A duty imposed upon her by her own dignity and by her loyalty toward the Powers who had laid neutrality upon her and assumed the obligation to guarantee it.

To serve one of those Powers was to betray the rest.

It is a principle of international law that neutral territory is inviolable. It should have been doubly impossible for Belgian territory to be violated by Germany, inasmuch as she was bound by treaty not only to respect it herself, but even to protect it if others threatened any attempt against it.

Germany has disregarded her engagements; Belgium has remained faithful to her word.

In the drama which is being played upon the stage of the world Belgium represents "right." If a nation is permitted in the twentieth century to tear up treaties, to trample down the weak, to crush a little people to satisfy the ambition of the great, we must despair of the modern world. The whole building of civilization would crumble. International law, respect for nationalities, the liberty of peoples, the observance of the most solemn engagements, everything would be sacrifieed to caprice, the arbitrament of force.

Belgium, proud and confident, lays her case before the judgment of the world.

Meeting of the Belgian Chambers. Sitting of the 4th August, 1914

KING'S SPEECH

GENTLEMEN,

Never since 1830 has a more grave moment come to Belgium: the integrity of our territory is threatened.

The strength of our just cause, the sympathy which Belgium, proud of her free institutions and of her conquests in the moral world, has never ceased to enjoy with other nations, the fact that our independent existence is necessary for the balance of power in Europe, these considerations give rise to hope that the events which we fear will not take place.

But if our hopes fail, if we must resist the invasion of our soil and must defend our threatened homes, this duty, hard though it be, will find us armed and prepared for the greatest sacrifices [cheers and cries of "Long Live the King and Long Live Belgium"].

From this moment, with a view to meet every contingency, the valiant youth of our nation stand ready firmly resolved with the traditional tenacity and calmness of the Belgians to defend their fatherland at a moment of danger [cheers].

To them I send a brotherly greeting in the name of the nation [cheers and cries of "Long Live the Army] throughout Flanders and the country of the Wallonie in town and country one sentiment alone fills every heart—patriotism; one vision alone fills every mind—

our threatened independence. One duty alone is laid upon our wills, stubborn resistance [applause, cheers].

At this grave moment two virtues are indispensable —courage, calm [renewed cheers] but firm, and close union among all Belgians.

Striking evidence of both these virtues is already before the eyes of a nation full of enthusiasm.

The faultless mobilization of our army, the multitude of volunteers, the devotion of the civil population, the self-sacrifice of families have shown incontestably that the whole Belgian people is carried away by stimulating courage [applause]. The moment has come to act.

I have called you together, gentlemen, to give to the Legislative Chambers an opportunity to associate themselves with the impulses of the people in the same sentiment of sacrifice. Gentlemen, you will know how to deal urgently with all the measures which the situation requires for the war and for public order [general assent].

When I see this enthusiastic gathering in which there is only one party, that of the fatherland [enthusiastic cheers and cries of "Long Live Belgium"], in which at this moment all hearts beat as one, my mind goes back to the Congress of 1830, and I ask of you gentlemen, are you determined unswervingly to maintain intact the whole patrimony of our ancestors ["Yes, yes," from every side].

No one in the country will fail in his duty.

The Army, strong and disciplined, is fit to do this task: my Government and I have full confidence in its leaders and its soldiers. [Hear, hear.]

The Government, firmly attached to the population and supported by them, is conscious of its responsibilities, and will bear them to the end with the deliberate conviction that the efforts of all united in the most fervent and generous patriotism will safeguard the supreme good of the country.

If the foreigner, disregarding the neutrality whose every duty we have always observed scrupulously, should violate our territory, he will find all Belgians grouped around their sovereign who will never betray his coronation oath and around a Government possessing the absolute confidence of the entire nation. [Cheers on all the Benches.]

I have faith in our destiny; a country which defends itself commands the respect of all; such a country shall never perish. ["Hear, hear." "Long Live the King, Long Live Belgium."]

God will be with us in this just cause [fresh applause].

Long live independent Belgium [long and unanimous cheers from the Assembly and from the Galleries].

PROCLAMATION BY THE KING

SOLDIERS,

Without the least provocation on our side a neighbour, arrogant in his strength, has torn up the treaties which bear his signature and violated the land of our fathers.

Because we have been worthy of ourselves, because we have refused to stain our honour, he attacks us. The whole world stands marvelling at our loyal attitude: may the respect and esteem of the whole world strengthen you in these supreme moments.

The nation, seeing how her independence was threatened, has risen in enthusiasm and her children have rushed to the frontier. Valiant soldiers in a holy cause, I have every confidence in your stubborn valour, and greet you in the name of Belgium. Your fellow citizens are proud of you. You will triumph for you are the army which fights on the side of justice.

Cæsar said of your ancestors, "Of all the people of Gaul, the Belgians are the bravest."

May glory be yours, army of the Belgian people. Remember when you are before the enemy that you are fighting for liberty and for your threatened homes. Remember, Flemings, the battle of the Golden Spurs, and you, Wallons of Liége, who are at this moment at the place of honour, remember the 600 Franchimontois.

Soldiers! I am leaving Brussels to place myself at your head.

Given at the Palace of Brussels, this 5th day of August, 1914.

ALBERT.

OBSERVATIONS ON BELGIAN NEUTRALITY
REPLY TO GERMAN CHARGES

In its issue of 26th November the *Kölnische Zeitung* writes:—"We were justified in violating Belgian territory because Belgium did not observe the duties of neutrality. This truth appears forcibly in two unassailable documents: First, that published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, proving that there was in existence a secret agreement between Belgium and England for the coöperation of the military forces

of these two countries in a war against Germany. Secondly, adds the *Kölnische Zeitung*, it is shown by the report of the confidential conversation between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges that the English intended to land troops in Belgium in any case, even if her help had not been asked for by Belgium."

The argument of the German press consists, therefore, in justifying the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany by reason of the fact that Belgium had herself failed in the duties of neutrality by negotiating a military agreement against Germany. This argument of the German press is false. It is disproved by the facts and by the documents themselves.

When, on the 14th October, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published for the first time the secret Barnardiston minute, we challenged it to prove the existence of a military agreement between Belgium and England. It did not take up this challenge, and the facsimile documents which it published are wholly irrelevant. It would be impossible to find in them any evidence that Belgium had not observed the strictest obligations of neutrality.

What was it that in fact took place in 1906?

Colonel Barnardiston, British Military Attaché, called at the end of January at the office of the Chief of the 1st Division of the Ministry of War, General Ducarne, and had an interview with him. Colonel Barnardiston asked General Ducarne whether Belgium was ready to defend her neutrality. He received an affirmative reply. He then proceeded to enquire the number of days necessary for the mobilization of our army.

"It can take place in four days," said the General.

"How many men can you mobilize?" pursued the Military Attaché.

The General said that we could mobilize 180,000 men.

After having received this information, Colonel Barnardiston declared that in the event of the violation of our neutrality by Germany, England would send into Belgium 100,000 men for our defence.

He still pressed the question whether we were ready to resist a German invasion.

The General replied that we were ready to defend Liége against Germany, Namur against France, and Antwerp against England.

Several interviews followed between the Chief of the General Staff and the Military Attaché on the subject of the measures that England would take with a view to giving effect to her guarantee.

In examining this question the Chief of the General Staff was only performing his most elementary duty, namely, to examine in detail the dispositions which would enable Belgium to resist, either alone or with the help of her guarantors, a violation of her neutrality.

On the 10th May, 1906, General Ducarne addressed to the Minister for War a minute on his interviews with the British Military Attaché. In this minute the point is twice emphasized that the sending of British help into Belgium was contingent on the violation of Belgian neutrality. Nay, more, a marginal note by the Minister (which by a refinement of bad faith on the part of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine* was left untranslated in order that it might escape the notice of most German readers) establishes incontestably that

the entry of British troops into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. The course of events has sufficiently proved that these anticipations were justified.

These very natural interviews between the Chief of the General Staff and the British Military Attaché simply show the serious apprehensions of Great Britain on the subject of a possible violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality.

Were these apprehensions legitimate? To be convinced on this point it is only necessary to read the works of the great German military writers of the time: Von Bernhardi, Von Schliefenbach and Von der Goltz.

Were the interviews between General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston followed by any convention or agreement?

This question is answered for us by Germany herself in the document which she has published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 25th October.

This document relates to an interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, and furnishes striking evidence that the interview which took place in 1912 on the subject of putting into effect England's guarantee had no result, and matters were at the same stage as they had been left six years before in 1906. No document could more clearly establish the loyalty with which the Belgian Government fulfilled their international obligations. Colonel Bridges had apparently said that since, in view of recent developments, we were not able to defend our neutrality, the British Government would have immediately landed troops on our coast, even if we had not asked for help. To which

General Jungbluth is said to have immediately replied, "But you could not disembark troops on our coast without our consent."

Should so great an importance be attached to the views of a military attaché which, we are in a position to prove, had never been submitted to the British Foreign Office?

Did he hold the view, which we hold to be false, although it is maintained by certain writers, that in the case of a violation of neutrality the intervention of a guarantor is justified, even in the absence of an appeal from the country whose neutrality has been guaranteed?

We do not know. One thing is certain, namely, that the Military Attaché did not persist in face of the General's objections.

Was Belgium bound to acquaint her guarantors with these interviews?

As to the first interview, Colonel Barnardiston was not in a position to enter into an agreement, nor was General Ducarne in a position to register a promise of help. The incrimimating conversations, moreover, were of a purely military character and could have had no political significance whatever. They were never considered by the Government and only became known long afterward to the British Foreign Office.

As to the interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, ought the Powers to have been warned that the latter had expressed an opinion in which neither the Belgian nor the British Government would concur, and against which General Jungbluth had immediately protested without his visitor having thought it necessary to press the point?

The would-be "justification" of Germany falls back against herself. In his speech of the 4th August in the Reichstag, and in his interview the day before with the British Ambassador, the Imperial Chancellor declared that the reason for the attack on Belgium was strategical necessity.

That is our case.

Before leaving Ostend, the Belgian Government addressed the following proclamation to the people:

PROCLAMATION

CITIZENS,

For nearly two and a half months, at the cost of heroic efforts, Belgian soldiers have been defending inch by inch the soil of their country. The enemy was fully reckoning on annihilating our army at Antwerp, but this hope was falsified by a retreat which was carried out in perfect order and calmness and we thus ensured the preservation of our military forces which will continue to strive without ceasing for the most just and noble of causes.

Henceforth these forces will operate on our southern frontier where they will be supported by the Allies. With their brave help the victory of Right is certain.

Nevertheless, the circumstances of the moment require to-day a new ordeal in addition to the sacrifices already made by the Belgian nation with a courage which is only equalled by the depth of the sacrifice. At the risk of furthering the plans of the invader it is necessary for the Government to establish itself provisionally in a place where, in touch on the one hand with the Belgian army, and on the other hand

with those of France and England, it can continue to carry out its functions and preserve the continuity of national sovereignty.

That is why the Government is to-day leaving Ostend with a grateful recollection of the welcome that it has received in that town. It will be provisionally established at Havre, where the generous friendship of the Government of the French Republic assures for it both its sovereign rights and also the unrestricted exercise of its authority and the performance of its duty.

CITIZENS,

This temporary ordeal which our patriotism has to-day to face will, we are convinced, be promptly avenged. On the other hand, the Belgian public services will continue to exercise their functions so far as circumstances admit. The King and his Government rely on your wisdom and patriotism. Do you on your side rely on our ardent devotion, on the valour of our army, and on the help of our Allies, to hasten the hour of our common deliverance?

Our dear country, betrayed and odiously treated by one of the Powers that had sworn to guarantee her neutrality, awakens an ever-growing admiration throughout the whole world. Thanks to the unity, courage, and foresight of all her children she will remain worthy of this admiration, which is her comfort to-day. To-morrow she will arise from her ordeals greater and more beautiful for having suffered in the cause of justice, honour, and civilization itself.

Long live Belgium, free and independent.

Ostend, 13th October, 1914.

The Minister for War, Ch. de Broqueville; The Minister of Justice, H. Carton de Wiart; The Minister for Foreign Affairs, J. Davignon; The Minister of the Interior, P. Berryer; The Minister of Science and Arts, P. Poullet; The Minister of Finance, A. Van de Vyvere; The Minister for Agriculture and Public Works, G. Helleputte; The Minister for Industry and Labour, Arm. Hubert; The Minister for Railways, Marine, Posts, and Telegraphs, P. Seghers; The Minister for Colonies, J. Renkin.

The following members of the diplomatic corps who had accompanied the Government to Antwerp and Ostend have followed it to Havre:—

His Excellency Monsignor Tacci, Papal Ambassador; His Excellency M. Djuvara, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to H. M. The King of Rumania; His Excellency Prince Koudacheff, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to H. M. The Emperor of Russia; His Excellency M. Klobukowski, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to H. M. The King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India; His Excellency M. Le Jonkheer de Weede, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to H. M. The Queen of the Netherlands; His Excellency Nousret Sadoullah Bey, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to H. M. The Sultan of Turkey; His Excellency M. Carignani, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to H. M. The King of Italy; M. Speridan Levidis, Resident Minister to H. M. The King of Greece; M. Chiyuki Yamanaka, Japanese Chargé d'Affaires;

M. Leif-Bogh, Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires; M. Alfredo Viel, Consul-General attached to the Chilian Legation.

Military operations having compelled the Government to establish its seat provisionally at Havre, the President of the French Republic was informed of this decision and at once replied in the following letter addressed to His Majesty the King:—

Bordeaux, 11th October, 1914.

HIS MAJESTY KING ALBERT,

Ostend,

I have just been informed of the decision taken by the Royal Government. The Government of the Republic is profoundly moved and will immediately take all necessary steps to ensure that Your Majesty and Your Ministers, during their sojourn in France, will enjoy independence and sovereignty. I should like to say to Your Majesty personally how proud the French are to offer to You, until the hour of our common victory, hospitality in the town which you have chosen, and I beg to assure you of my unalterable friendship.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

His Majesty The King at once replied in the following terms:—

Ostend, 12th October, 1914.

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT,

I am deeply touched by the hospitality which France has been good enough to extend to the Belgian Government and with the steps which the Government of the Republic have taken to assure our full independence and sovereignty. We await the hour of common

victory with an unwavering confidence. We fight side by side for a just cause and our courage will never be shaken.

I have to assure you, Monsieur le Président, of my unalterable affection.

ALBERT.

M. de Broqueville, Minister for War, who remained with His Majesty The King and the Army, immediately on his arrival on French soil, sent the following telegram to the President of the Republic at Bordeaux:

Dunkirk, 14th October, 1914.

To His Excellency MONSIEUR POINCARÉ,
President of the French Republic,
Bordeaux.

At the moment when the fortune of arms leads the Royal Government to the hospitable soil of the great nation that is befriending Belgium, that Government has the honour to tender to the Head of the Republic an expression of its deepest respect, and begs you to be so good as to accept the assurance of its unwavering confidence in the triumph of right. Belgium rejoices that proud and generous France, united with Great Britain and Russia, should champion this cause.

CHARLES DE BROQUEVILLE

The President of the Republic replied in the following terms to M. de Broqueville:—

Bordeaux, 14th October, 1914.

To His Excellency MONSIEUR DE BROQUEVILLE,
Minister for War,
Dunkirk.

As I personally assured His Majesty King Albert, France is proud to receive on her soil to-day the

Government of a noble nation which is with such heroism defending its national independence and upholding the cause of international law, so outrageously violated. The Government of the Republic does not fail to identify the cause of Belgium with her own, and has made all necessary preparations for the Royal Government to observe the free exercise of its powers in the town of Havre. The certainty of final victory will lighten for you, as for the French districts already invaded, a brief ordeal from which our countries will emerge more closely united, and stronger than before.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

On Tuesday the 13th October, 1914, at 8 P. M., the members of the Belgian Government, with the exception of M. de Broqueville, Minister for War, who stayed with the King and the Army, arrived at Havre on the Belgian mail steamer, *Pieter-de-Coninck*. They were accompanied by members of the *corps diplomatique*, by M. Schollaert, President of the Chamber of Representatives and Minister of State, and by MM. van den Heuvel, Liebaert, Cooreman, Huysmans, Count Goblet d'Alviella, Hymans and Vandervelde, Ministers of State.

They were welcomed in the name of the French Government by His Excellency M. Augagneur, Minister of Marine, accompanied by Mr. William Martin, *introducteur des ambassadeurs*, together with all the officials of the Department of Seine-Inférieure, and the town of Havre. Military honours were accorded to the members of the Government.

Great pains had been taken by the French Government, and thorough preparations had been made for the installation of the Belgian Ministers and their various departmental staffs at Sainte-Adresse. This work was entrusted by the French Government to M. Hennion, who was attached to the Belgian Government for the period of its stay at Havre. As soon as it was installed, the Government addressed to the President of the French Republic the following telegram:—

Le Havre, 14th October, 1914.

To His Excellency MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT of the French Republic at Bordeaux.

The members of the Belgian Government and the Ministers of State installed at Havre beg the President of the French Republic to accept the expression of its deepest respect. They convey their cordial thanks to the French Government for having been so good as to appoint M. Augagneur, Minister of Marine, to receive them on their arrival, and to welcome them in your name. They also express their great gratitude for the arrangements made to facilitate the free exercise of the rights and duties of Belgian national sovereignty, pending the hour not far distant when the final triumph of right will sound. They will never forget with what noble alacrity France, guarantor of our neutrality, added to the observance of her plighted word every proof of fine friendship and devoted succour.

H. CARTON DE WIART,
Minister of Justice.

Monsieur le Président of the French Republic replied in the following terms:—

Bordeaux, 15th October, 1914.

His Excellency MONSIEUR CARTON DE WIART, Belgian Minister of Justice, Le Havre.

I thank you and your colleagues of the Royal Government for the sentiments that you have so kindly expressed. The population of Havre, by the welcome which it has given you, has interpreted the feelings of the whole of France. By virtue of treaty obligations we were guarantors of Belgium's neutrality, and we are not the people to disavow our signature. But the heroism of your people and the blood that we have poured out together in a common cause have made our duty still more sacred, and we will fulfil it to the very end with warm and brotherly affection.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

V

THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE PRESENT WAR

By JAMES BRYCE (VISCOUNT BRYCE)

Author of "The Holy Roman Empire," "The American Commonwealth," etc.

Formerly Ambassador to the United States.

V

THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE PRESENT WAR

WE IN Britain who respect and value the opinion of the free neutral peoples of Europe and America cannot but desire that those peoples should be duly informed of the way in which we regard the circumstances and possible results of the present conflict. I have written what follows in compliance with a request from the editor of a leading journal in one of those free countries, Switzerland, but what has been set down to be read by its people may equally well be addressed to other neutrals. I speak in these pages with no more authority than is possessed by any private citizen of my country who has had a long experience of public affairs, and I desire only to express what I believe to be its general sentiments. Other writers would doubtless convey those sentiments in somewhat different language, but I think they would do so to much the same general effect, for the British nation is at this crisis united in its views and purposes to an extent almost unprecedented in our history.

I shall not enter into the circumstances which brought about the war, for these have been often stated officially and can be readily understood from documents already published. The evidence contained in those documents appears to me to be quite

convincing to any impartial mind. All that need be said here is that the British nation did most assuredly neither desire nor contemplate war. There was no hostility to Germany except among a very few persons who thought she was already planning to attack us. The notion which has been assiduously propagated by the German Government, that England desired to bring about war because she feared the commercial competition of Germany and hoped to destroy German productive industry and mercantile prosperity, is absolutely untrue and without the slightest foundation. It is indeed an absurd suggestion, for every man of sense knew that German trade had brought more advantage to our trading classes than any damage German competition had been doing to them. England had far more to lose than to gain by war. Germany was her best foreign customer, taking more goods from her than did any other foreign country. It was evident that a war would involve England in pecuniary losses which must far exceed, and have already far exceeded, any pecuniary gain her traders could possibly have made by the crippling of German trade for many a year to come. One of the reasons why many Englishmen thought that there was no likelihood of a war between the two countries was because they believed that both countries knew what frightful losses to each the war would bring. Moreover, the fact that England had not prepared herself for a land war shows how little she expected it. She had an army very small in comparison with those of the Continental powers, and no store of guns or shell comparable to theirs; so, when the war broke out,

she found herself suddenly obliged to raise a large force by voluntary enlistment at short notice. Few supposed that the response of the people would have been so general and so hearty. The response came because the nation was united as it had never been united before in support of any war. That which united it was the invasion of Belgium; and that which has done most to keep it united and to stimulate it to exertions hitherto undreamt of has been popular indignation at the methods by which the German Government has conducted hostilities by land and by sea.

The German Government has alleged that the British fleet had been mobilized with a view to war. That is absolutely untrue. What happened was this. The fleet had been going through its usual summer manœuvres. Just as these manœuvres were coming to an end, a threatening war cloud unexpectedly arose out of a blue sky. Most naturally, the ships which would in the usual course have been dispersed to their accustomed peace stations were commanded not to disperse until further orders were received. There was in this no evidence of any purpose to embark in war, for to keep the fleet together was in the circumstances the obvious course.

Now let me try to state what are the principles which animate the British people, making them believe they have a righteous cause, and inducing them, because they so believe, to prosecute the war with their utmost energy.

There is a familiar expression which we use in England to sum up the position and aims of a nation. It is "What does the nation 'stand for'?" What are the

principles and the interests which prescribe its course? What are the ends, over and above its own welfare, which it seeks to promote? What is the nature of the mission with which it feels itself charged? What are the ideals which it would like to see prevailing throughout the world?

There are five of these principles or aims or ideals which I will here set forth, because they stand out conspicuously in the present crisis, though they are all more or less parts of the settled policy of Britain.

I

The first of these five is liberty.

England and Switzerland have been the two modern countries in which Liberty first took tangible form in laws and institutions. Holland followed, and the three peoples of the Scandinavian North, kindred to us in blood, have followed likewise.

In England Liberty appeared from early days in a recognition of the right of the citizen to be protected against arbitrary power and to bear his share in the work of governing his own community. It is from Great Britain that other European countries whose political condition had, from the end of the Middle Ages down to the end of the eighteenth century, been unfavourable to freedom, drew, in that and the following century, their examples of a government which could be united and efficient and yet popular, strong to defend itself against attack, and yet respectful of the rights of its own members. The British Constitution has been the model whence most of the countries that have within recent times adopted con-

stitutional government have drawn their institutions. Britain has herself during the last eighty years made her consitution more and more truly popular. It is now as democratic as that of any other European country, and in their dealings with other countries, the British people have shown a constant sympathy with freedom. They showed it early in the nineteenth century to Spanish constitutional reformers and to Greek insurgents against Turkish tyranny. They showed it to Switzerland when they foiled (in 1847) the attempt of Metternich to interfere with her independence. They have shown it markedly within recent years. Britain has given free governments to all those of her colonies in which there is a population of European origin capable of using them, and this has confirmed the attachment to herself of those colonies. Only seven years ago, after a war with the two Dutch Republics of South Africa which ended by a treaty making them parts of the British dominions, she restored self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and they soon afterward became members of the new autonomous confederation called the Union of South Africa, side by side with the old British colonies of the Cape and Natal. The first Prime Minister of that Union was General Louis Botha, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Boer forces in their war with Britain. What has been the result? When the present war broke out, the German Government, which had long been planning to induce the Transvaal and the Orange Free State to break away from Britain, found to their astonishment that the vast majority of the South African Boers stood

heartily by her. General Botha took command of the Union armies, and defeated the German forces in the German colony of Southwest Africa without any assistance from British troops.

There had long been troubles and controversies connected with the state of Ireland, for although she was fully represented in the British Parliament, the majority of the population expressed a desire, which excited much opposition, to have autonomous institutions granted to them. It had been found hard to find an acceptable solution of this question, chiefly because a considerable element in the Irish population did not wish for those institutions. But the question was settled in 1914 by the passing of an Act giving to Ireland (subject to certain safeguards and provisions not yet settled in detail) a local Parliament as a satisfaction to national sentiment and to the desire of a majority for that kind of autonomy which they had asked for through their representatives in Parliament. There, again, what has been the result? Ireland, on whose disaffection to the United Kingdom the German Government had been counting, has shown herself when the war broke out to be thoroughly loyal. Protestants and Roman Catholics have vied with one another in volunteering into the new armies which have been raised during the last twelve months. Some of the most powerful speeches made in defence of the war have come from the leaders of the Irish Nationalists. Some of the finest deeds of valour have been done by Irish regiments. These are the fruits of Liberty as Britain has understood it and practised it.

II

Britain stands for the principle of Nationality. She has always given her sympathy to the efforts of a people restless under a foreign dominion to deliver themselves from the stranger and to be ruled by a government of their own. The efforts of Greece from 1820 till her liberation from the Turks, the efforts of Italy to shake off the hated yoke of Austria and attain national unity under an Italian King, found their warmest support in England. English Liberals gave their sympathy to national movements in Hungary and Poland. They gave that sympathy also to the German movement for national unity from 1848 to 1870, for in those days that movement was led by German Liberals of lofty aims who did not desire, as the recent rulers of Germany have desired, to make their national strength a menace to the peace and security of their neighbours. In India, England has long ceased to absorb into her dominions the native States, and has been seeking only to guide the rulers of those States into the paths of just and humane administration, while leaving their internal affairs to their own native governments. Representative institutions like those of England herself cannot be extended to the numerous races that compose the Indian population, because they are not yet fit for such institutions. A firm and impartial hand is indeed needed to keep the peace among them. But the British Government in India regards, and has long regarded, its power as a trust to be used for the benefit of the people, and in recent years efforts have been made to asso-

ciate the people more and more with the work of the higher branches of administration and legislation. Native judges sit beside European judges in the highest courts, while the vast mass of local administration is conducted by native officials and native judges. No tribute or revenue of any kind is drawn by England from India or from any of those colonies which the Home Government controls. The happy results of this policy have been seen in the steady increase of the confidence and good will of the native rulers and aristocracy of India to the British Government, so that when the present war broke out all those rulers at once offered military aid. Large Indian forces gladly came to fight, and fought most gallantly, beside the British forces in France.

I do not claim that these successes attained by British ideas and methods are due to any innate and peculiar merits of British character. They may be largely ascribed to the fact that the insular position and the political and social conditions of England enabled her, earlier than most other peoples, both to attain constitutional liberty and to learn to love it and trust it. She has had long experience and has profited by experience. She has had cause to see how much better it is to govern by justice and in a fair and generous spirit than to rely entirely on brute force. Once in her history, 140 years ago, she lost the North American colonies because, in days when British freedom was less firmly established than it is now, a narrow-minded and obstinate King induced his Government to treat those colonies with unwise harshness. She has never forgotten that lesson, and has more and more come to

see that freedom and nationality are a surer basis for contentment and loyalty than is the application of force. Compare with the happy results that have followed the instances I have mentioned of respect for liberty and national sentiment in the cases of South Africa and Ireland and India, as well as in the self-governing colonies, the results in North Schleswig, in Posen, in Alsace-Lorraine, of the opposite policy of force sternly applied by Prussian statesmen and soldiers.

III

England stands for the Maintenance of Treaty Obligations and of those rights of the smaller nations which rest upon such obligations. The circumstances of the present war, which saw Belgium suddenly attacked by a Power that had itself solemnly guaranteed the neutrality of Belgian territory, summoned England to stand up for the defence of those rights and obligations. Her people feel that the good faith of treaties is the only foundation on which peace between nations can rest, and, especially, is the only guarantee for the security of those which do not maintain large armies. We recognize the value of the smaller States, knowing what they have done for the progress of mankind, grateful for the examples set by many of them of national heroism and of achievements in science, literature, and art. So far from desiring to see the smaller peoples absorbed into the larger, as German theorists appear to wish, we believe that the world would profit if there were in it a greater number of small peoples, each developing its own type of character and its own forms of thought and art.

Both these principles—the observance of treaties and the rights of the smaller neutral States—have been raised in the sharpest form by the unprovoked invasion of Belgium only two days after the German Minister at Brussels had lulled the uneasiness of the Belgian Government by his pacific assurances. Such conduct was a threat to every neutral nation. That which befell Belgium might have befallen Switzerland or Holland had Germany decided that it was to her interests to attack either of them for the sake of securing a passage for her armies. England was obliged to come to Belgium's support and fulfil the obligation she had herself contracted to defend the neutrality of the country unrighteously attacked. It would be superfluous to say, if the German Government had not endeavoured to deceive its own subjects and other nations by a gross misrepresentation of the facts, that England never had the least intention of entering Belgium, except to protect it should its territory be violated. The conversations which took place between British officers and Belgian authorities some time beforehand, referred, as the published text clearly proves, only to the case of an invasion of Belgium by Germany, and were intended merely to provide for that contingency, which was deemed possible, though we hoped that it never would arise. The charge made by the German Government that England had planned with Belgian Ministers to attack Germany through Belgium is therefore absolutely baseless. When the German armies suddenly crossed the Belgian frontier, carrying slaughter and destruction in their train, an issue of transcendent importance was

raised. Can treaties be violated with impunity? Is a nation which, trusting to the protection of international justice and treaty obligations, has not so armed itself as to be able to repel invasion, obliged helplessly to submit to see its territory overrun and its towns destroyed? If such violence prevails, what sense of security can any small nation enjoy? Will it not be the helpless prey of some stronger Power, whenever that Power finds an interest in pouncing upon it? What becomes of the whole fabric of international law and international justice? This issue was plainly stated by the Chancellor of the German Empire when he said in the Reichstag that the entrance of German troops upon Belgian soil was "contrary to the rules of international law," and spoke of "the wrong that we are committing." Belgium was bound by honour to resist invasion, because she had solemnly pledged herself to the other Powers to maintain neutrality. It was the condition of her creation and her existence. And England, obliged by honour to succour Belgium, has thus become the champion of international right and of the security of the smaller nations. There is nothing she more earnestly desires to obtain as a result of this war than that the smaller States should be placed for the future in a position of safety, in which the guarantees for their independence and peace shall be stronger than before, because the sanction of the law of nations will have been made more effective.

IV

England stands for the Regulation of the Methods of Warfare in the interests of humanity, and especially

for the exemption of non-combatants from the sufferings and horrors which war brings. Here is another issue raised by the present crisis, another conflict of opposing principles. In the ancient world, and among semi-civilized peoples in more recent times, non-combatant civilians as well as the fighting forces had to bear those sufferings. The men were killed, combatants and non-combatants alike; the women and children, if spared, were reduced to slavery. That is what the Turkish Government—I say "the Government" because some good Muslims disapprove—have been doing during the last few months in Asia Minor and Armenia, on a far larger scale than even the massacres perpetrated by Abdul Hamid in 1895-6. They are doing it systematically. They are slaughtering the men, they are enslaving some of the women by selling them in open market or seizing them for the harem, and driving the rest, with the children, out into deserts to perish from hunger. In Trebizond, a few months ago, they seized most of the Armenian population of the city, of both sexes, put them into sailing vessels, carried them out to sea, and drowned them all. They are deliberately exterminating the whole Christian population, and avow this to be their policy, although the Christians had not risen against them or given any offence. The Turkish Government is, of course, a thoroughly barbarous Government. But in civilized Europe Christian nations have during the last few centuries softened the conduct of war by agreeing to respect the lives and property of innocent non-combatants, and thus, although the scale of modern wars has been greater, less misery has been inflicted

on inhabitants of invaded territories. Their sufferings were less in the 18th century than in the 17th, and less in the 19th than in the 18th. In the war of 1870-71 the German troops behaved better in France than an invading force had usually behaved in similar circumstances. Now, however, in this present war, the German military and naval commanders have taken a long step backward toward barbarism. Innocent non-combatants have been slaughtered by thousands in Belgium and in France, and the only excuse offered (for the facts of the slaughter are practically admitted) is that German troops have sometimes been fired at by civilians. Now it is true that any civilian who takes up arms without observing the rules prescribed for civilian resistance is liable to be shot. The rules of war permit that. But it is contrary to the rules of war, as well as to common justice and humanity, to kill a civilian who has not himself sought to harm an invading force. The fact that some other civilian belonging to the same town may have fired on the invaders does not justify the killing of an innocent person. To seize innocent inhabitants, call them "hostages" for the good behaviour of their town, and shoot them if the invaders are molested by persons whose actions these so-called "hostages" cannot control, is murder and nothing else. Yet this is what the German commanders nave done upon a great scale.

German air-war has been conducted with equal inhumanity. Bombs are being dropped upon undefended towns and quiet country villages, in places where there are no troops, no war factories, no stores of ammunition. Hardly a combatant has suffered, and

the women and children killed have been far more numerous than the male non-combatants. No military advantage has been gained by these crimes. They have not even frightened the people generally. They have only aroused indignation at their purposeless cruelty, and this indignation has in England stimulated recruiting and strengthened the determination to pursue the war to the end. The killing of non-combatants by this sort of warfare has been a blunder as well as a crime.

The same retrogression toward barbarism is seen in the German conduct of war at sea. It had long been the rule and practice of civilized nations that when a merchant vessel is destroyed by a ship of war because it is impossible to carry the merchant vessel into the port of the captor, the crew and the passengers of the vessel should be taken off and their lives saved, before the vessel is sunk. Common humanity prescribes this, but the German submarines have been sinking unarmed merchant vessels and drowning their passengers and crews without giving them even the opportunity to surrender. They did this in the case of the *Lusitania*, drowning 1,100 innocent non-combatants, many of them citizens of neutral States, and they have since repeatedly perpetrated the same crime. The same thing was done quite recently (apparently by Austria) in the case of the Italian passenger ship *Ancona*. This is not war, but murder.

These facts raise an issue in which the interests of all mankind are involved. The German Government claims the right to kill the innocent because it suits their military interests. England denies this right, as all

countries ought to deny it. She is contending in this war for humanity against cruelty, and she appeals to the conscience of all the neutral peoples to give her their moral support in this contention. Peoples that are now neutral may suffer in future, just as those innocent persons I have referred to are suffering now, by these acts of unprecedented barbarity.

V

England stands for a Pacific as opposed to a Military type of civilization. Her regular army had always been small in proportion to her population, and very small in comparison with the armies of great Continental nations. Although she recognizes that there are some countries in which universal service may be necessary, and times at which it may be necessary in any country, she has preferred to leave her people free to follow their civil pursuits, and had raised her army by voluntary enlistment. Military and naval officers have never, as in Germany, formed a class by themselves, have never been a political power, or exercised political influence. The Cabinet Ministers placed in charge of these two services have always been civilian statesmen—not Generals or Admirals—until the outbreak of the present war, when, for the first time, under the stress of a new emergency, a professional soldier of long experience was placed at the head of the War Department. England has repeatedly sought at European Conferences to bring about a reduction of war armaments, as well as to secure improved rules mitigating the usages of war; but has found her efforts baffled by the opposition of Ger-

many. In none of the larger countries, except perhaps in the United States, are the people so generally and sincerely attached to peace.

It may be asked why, if this is so, does England maintain so large a navy. The question deserves an answer. Her navy is maintained for three reasons. The first is, that as her army has been very small she is obliged to protect herself by a strong home fleet from any risk of invasion. She has never forgotten the lesson of the Napoleonic wars, when it was the navy that saved her from the fate which befell so many European countries at Napoleon's hands. Were she not to keep up this first line of defence at sea, a huge army and a huge military expenditure in time of peace would be inevitable. The second reason is that as England does not produce nearly enough food to support her population, she must draw supplies from other countries, and would be in danger of starvation if in war time she lost the command of the sea. It is, therefore, vital to her existence that she should be able to secure the unimpeded import of articles of food. And the third reason is that England is responsible for the defence of the coasts and the commerce of her colonies and other foreign possessions, such as India. These do not maintain a naval force sufficient for their defence, and the mother country is therefore compelled to have a fleet sufficient to guarantee their safety and protect their shipping. No other great State has such far-reaching liabilities, and, therefore, no other needs a navy so large as Britain must maintain. In this policy there is no warlike or aggressive spirit, no menace to other coun-

tries. It is a measure purely of defence, costly and burdensome, but borne because her own safety and that of her colonies absolutely require it. Neither has Britain used her naval strength to inflict harm on any other countries. In time of peace she has not tried to use it to injure the commerce of her chief industrial competitors. It did nothing to retard the rapid growth of the mercantile marines of Germany and Norway, both of which have been immensely developed in recent years. The freedom of the seas has, in time of peace, never been infringed by her. In time of war she doubtless exercises those rights of maritime blockade, search, and capture which her naval strength enables her to exert. But rights of blockade and capture have always been exerted by every naval power in war time. They are a recognized method of war and were exerted in the American Civil War fifty years ago, in the war of France with China, in the war of Chile with Peru, and in the more recent war between Japan and Russia. They are not rights newly claimed by Britain, and they have been exercised with a constant respect for the lives of non-combatants.

So far from using her sea-power to the prejudice of other countries in peace time, and trying by its aid to promote her own commercial interests, Britain is the only great country which has opened her doors freely to the commerce of every other country. Sixty years ago she adopted, and has ever since consistently practised, the policy of free trade. She imposes upon imports no duties intended to protect her own agriculture or her own manufactures. She gives no advantages to her own shipping in her own ports, she pays no

bounties to her own shipping, she allows even coasting trade between her own ports to be open on equal terms to the ships of all nations. A Dutch or Swedish or Norwegian vessel may trade from Newcastle to London as freely as a British vessel. And this free trade policy has been carried out consistently in all the British colonial possessions. Neither in India, nor in those British colonies whose tariffs are controlled by the mother country, are duties imposed upon foreign imports, except for the purpose of raising revenue. Such self-governing dominions as Canada and Australia have control of their own tariffs and impose what duties they please—even against the mother country; but that is a part of the self-government which these dominions have long enjoyed.

The policy of free trade has been supported, and is valued, in Britain not only on economic grounds, but also because it is deemed to tend toward international peace. Richard Cobden, the first and most powerful champion of that policy, saw in that its highest value. He thought that it would so link the nations together, helping them to know one another, enriching them all, and making each interested in the prosperity of the other (each being both a producer and a consumer, each supplying the other's needs and profiting by the exchange), that all would be reluctant to break the peace with one another. This idea—although Cobden's hopes have proved to be too sanguine—has always had great weight in British commercial policy, which has sought for no exclusive advantages, but aimed solely at a field open to all competitors.

As an industrial people the English desire peace. They have never made military glory their ideal. They have regarded war, not like Treitschke and his school, as wholesome and necessary, but as an evil, an evil which, although it gives an opportunity (as Europe sees to-day) for splendid displays of patriotism and heroic valour, is the cause of infinite suffering and misery and ought, if possible, to be got rid of from the world. The killing of workers and the destruction of property are a hideous waste of human effort. War has done more than anything else to retard the progress of mankind.

Our English ideal for the future is of a world in which every people shall have within its own borders a free national government resting on, and conforming to, the general will of its citizens, a government able to devote its efforts to improving the condition of the people without encroaching on its neighbours, or being disturbed by the fear of an attack from enemies abroad. Legislators and administrators have already tasks sufficiently difficult in reconciling the claims of different classes, in adjusting the interests of capital and labour, in promoting health and diffusing education and enlightenment, without the addition of those tasks and dangers which arise from the terror of foreign war.

There is, of course, a certain chauvinistic element in England, as in all countries, which finds some expression in newspapers and books. There are some persons with a deficient respect for the rights of other nations—persons who indulge in sentiments of hatred, persons who believe in force, persons who, in fact, have

what is now known as the "Prussian view of the world," and the Prussian preference of Might to Right. But such persons are in England comparatively few; they are a diminishing quantity and they command little influence. The great bulk of the nation does not cherish hatreds, is satisfied with what it possesses, does not intend to aggress on its neighbours, does not seek to impose its own type of civilization on the world. Our English phrase "Live and let live" expresses this feeling. Though we prefer our own way of living for ourselves, we do not think it therefore the best for other peoples also, and no more wish to see the world all English than we wish to see it all Prussian. The British people did not enter the war for the sake of gaining anything for themselves. They have not now fixed their mind on gaining (so far as concerns objects specially dear to themselves*) anything except a vindication of the sanctity of treaties, a fuller security for the rights of neutral nations, compensation to Belgium for the injuries inflicted on her, and adequate guarantees of future peace for themselves and their colonies. To this one must now add—measures that will make impossible in the future cruelties and oppressions such as the Turks have practised upon the Eastern Christians.

In the foregoing pages I have sought to describe what I believe to be the principles and feelings and aims of the British people as a whole. Let me add a few words of a more personal kind to explain the sentiments of those Englishmen who have in time past

*I speak of course only of what regards Britain's own aims, not of what primarily concerns her Allies.

known and admired the achievements of the German people in literature, learning, and science, who had desired peace with them, who had been the constant advocates of friendship between the two nations. Such Englishmen, who do not cease to be lovers of peace because this war, felt to be righteous, commands their hearty support, are now just as determined as any others to carry on the war to victory. Why? Because to them this war presents itself as a conflict of principles. On the one side there is the doctrine that the end of the State is Power, that Might makes Right, that the State is above morality, that war is necessary and even desirable as a factor in progress, that the rights of small States must give way to the interests of great States, that the State may disregard all obligations whether undertaken by treaties or prescribed by the common sentiment of mankind, and that what is called military necessity justifies every kind of harshness and cruelty in war. This is an old doctrine—as old as the sophists whom Socrates encountered in Athens. It has in every age been held by some ambitious and unscrupulous statesmen. Many a Greek tyrant of antiquity, many an Italian tyrant in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, put it in practice. Cæsar Borgia is the most striking instance in the 15th century, Frederick the Great in the 18th, Napoleon Bonaparte in the 19th.

On the other side there is the doctrine that the end of the State is Justice, the doctrine that the State is, like the individual, subject to a moral law and bound in honour to observe its promises, that nations owe duties to one another and to mankind at large,

that they have all more to gain by peace than by strife, that national hatreds are deadly things, condemned by philosophy and by Christianity. In the victory of one or the other of these principles the future of mankind seems to us to be at stake.

I do not attribute to the German people an adherence to the former set of doctrines, for I do not know how far these doctrines are held outside the military and naval caste which has now unhappily gained control of German policy, and I cannot believe that the German people, as I have hitherto known them, ever since I studied at a German university more than fifty years ago, could possibly approve of the action of their Government if their Government suffered them to know the facts relating to the origin and conduct of the war as those facts are known to the rest of the world. We have had no hatred of the German people. We did not grudge them their prosperity. Neither have we any wish to break up Germany, destroying her national unity, or to interfere in any way with her internal politics. Our quarrel is with the German Government. We think it a danger to every peaceful country and believe that in fighting against its doctrines, its ambitions, its methods of warfare, we and our allies are virtually fighting the battle of all peace-loving neutral nations as well as our own. We must fight on till victory is won, for a government which scorns treaties and wages an inhuman warfare against innocent non-combatants cannot be suffered to prevail by such methods. A triumphant and aggressive Germany, mistress of the seas as well as of the land, would be a menace to every nation, even to

those of the western hemisphere. Be this as it may, the facts show that the present rulers of Germany have acted upon the former set of doctrines as consistently as ever did Frederick or Napoleon. They seem to us to be smitten with a kind of mental disease which has sapped honour, extinguished pity, and destroyed their sense of right and wrong. They invaded Belgium without provocation and slaughtered thousands of innocent non-combatants. They have persisted, against the protest of America, in drowning innocent non-combatants at sea. They look calmly on while the Turkish allies whom they have dragged into the war, and whose action they could restrain if they cared to do so, are exterminating, with every cruelty Turkish ferocity can devise, a whole Christian nation. These things are a reversion to the ancient methods of savagery which marked the warfare of bygone ages. They are a challenge to civilized mankind—to neutrals, as well as to the now belligerent States. Neutral nations would do well to recognize this, for they are themselves concerned. The same methods may be hereafter used against them as are being used now. They also ought to desire the defeat of any and every government which adopts such principles and practises such methods, for its victory would be a blow to morality and human progress which it would take centuries to retrieve.

Those Englishmen whose views I am seeking to express, recognizing the allegiance we all owe to humanity at large, and believing that progress is achieved more by coöperation than by strife, are, however, hoping for something more than the victory of their

own country. They desire to see the world relieved from the burden of armaments and from that constant terror of war which has been darkening its sky for so many generations. They ask whether it may not be possible, after the war has come to an end, to form among the nations an effective League of Peace, embracing smaller as well as larger peoples—under whose ægis disputes might be amicably settled and the power of the League invoked to prevent any one State from disturbing the general tranquillity. The obstacles in the way of creating such a League are many and obvious, but whatever else may come out of the war, we in England hope that one result of it will be the creation of some machinery calculated to avert the recurrence of so awful a calamity as that from which mankind is now suffering.

VI

ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE WAR

By GILBERT MURRAY

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VI

ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE WAR

An address delivered at the Triennial meetings of the National Conference of Unitarian, Liberal Christian, Free Christian, Presbyterian, and other non-subscribing or kindred congregations, in London, October 27, 1915.

I SHOULD like before I begin to express to you the very real gratitude I feel to a body like this in asking me to give this address, and in treating one whose religious views, freely expressed in books and lectures, are probably to the left of almost all those here present, not as an outsider, but recognizing that people in my position are also capable of a religious spirit, and of seeking after truth in the same way as yourselves. I believe that you and I are in real and fundamental sympathy both over religious questions proper, and over a question like this of the war, which test one's ultimate beliefs and the real working religion by which one lives. I think that we may say that probably all here do begin, in their own minds, by feeling the war as an ethical problem. Certainly that is the way it appealed to me, and it is from that point of view I wish to speak to-night.

Curiously enough I remember speaking in this hall, I suppose about fifteen years ago, against the policy of the war in South Africa. I little imagined then

that I should live to speak in favour of the policy of a much greater and more disastrous war, but that is what, on the whole, I shall do. But I want to begin by facing certain facts. Don't let us attempt to bind ourselves or be blinded by phrases into thinking that the war is anything but a disaster, and an appalling disaster. Don't let us be led away by views which have some gleam of truth in them into believing that this war will put an end to war—that it will convert Germany, and certainly convert Russia to liberal opinions, that it will establish natural frontiers throughout Europe or that it will work a moral regeneration in nations which were somehow sapped by too many years of easy living in peace. There is some truth, and very valuable truth, in all those considerations, but they do not alter the fact that the war is, as I said, an appalling disaster. We knew when we entered upon it that it was a disaster—we knew that we should suffer, and that all Europe would suffer.

Now let us run over very briefly the ways in which it is doing evil. Let us face the evil first. There is, first, the mere suffering, the leagues and leagues of human suffering that is now spreading across Europe, the suffering of the soldiers, the actual wounded combatants, and behind them the suffering of non-combatants, the suffering of people dispossessed, of refugees, of people turned suddenly homeless into a world without pity. Behind that you have the sufferings of dumb animals. We are not likely to forget that. There is another side which we are even less likely to forget, and that is our own personal losses. There are very few people in this room who have not suffered in that

direct, personal way; there will be still fewer by the end of the war. I don't want to dwell upon that question; the tears are very close behind our eyes when we begin to think of that aspect of things, and it is not for me to bring them forward. Think, again, of the State's loss, the loss of all those chosen men, not mere men taken haphazard, but young, strong men, largely men of the most generous and self-sacrificing impulses who responded most swiftly to the call for their loyalty and their lives. Some of them are dead, some will come back injured, maimed, invalided, in various ways broken. There is an old Greek proverb which exactly expresses the experience that we shall be forced to go through, "The spring is taken out of your year." For a good time ahead the years of England of most of Europe will be without a spring. In that consideration I think it is only fair, and I am certain that an audience like this will agree with me, to add all the nations together. It is not only we and our allies who are suffering the loss there; it is a loss to humanity. According to the Russian proverb "They are all sons of mothers," the wildest Senegalese, the most angry Prussian. And that is the state that we are in. We rejoice, of course we rejoice to hear of great German losses; we face the fact. We do rejoice; yet it is terrible that we should have to; for the loss of these young Germans is also a great and a terrible loss to humanity. It seems almost trivial after these considerations of life and death, but think too of our monetary losses; of the fact that we have spent 1,595 millions and that we are throwing away money at the rate of nearly five millions a day. Yet just

think what it means, that precious surplus with which we meant to make England finer in every way—that surplus is gone.

From a rich, generous, sanguine nation putting her hopes in the future, we shall emerge a rather poverty-stricken nation, bound to consider every penny of increased expenditure; a harassed nation only fortunate if we are still free. Just think of all our schemes of reform and how they are blown to the four winds—schemes of social improvement, of industrial improvement; a scheme like Lord Haldane's great education scheme which was to begin by caring for the health of the small child, and then lead him up by a great ladder from the primary school to the University! How some of us who were specially interested in education revelled in the thought of that great idea; but it was going to cost such a lot of money. It would cost nearly as much as half a week of the war! Think what riches we had then, and on the whole, although we are perhaps the most generous nation in Europe, what little use we made of them. We speak of spiritual regeneration as one of the results of war, but here too there is the spiritual evil to be faced. I do not speak merely of the danger of reaction. There will be a grave danger of political reaction and of religious reaction, and you will all have your work cut out for you in that matter. The political reaction, I believe, will not take the form of a mere wave of extreme Conservatism; the real danger will be a reaction against anything that can be called mellow and wise in politics; the real danger will be a struggle between crude militarist reaction and violent unthinking democracy. As

for religion, you are probably all anxious as to what is going to happen there. Every narrow form of religion is lifting up its horns again, rank superstition is beginning to flourish. I am told that fortune tellers and crystal gazers are really having now the time of their lives. It will be for bodies like yourselves to be careful about all that. But besides that there is another more direct spiritual danger. We cannot go on living an abnormal life without getting fundamentally disorganized. We have seen that, especially in Germany; with them it seems to be a much stronger tendency, much worse than it is with us; but clearly you cannot permanently concentrate your mind on injuring your fellow creatures without habituating yourself to evil thoughts. In Germany, of course, there is a deliberate cult of hatred. There is a process, which I won't stop to analyze, a process utterly amazing, by which a highly civilized and ordinarily humane nation has gone on from what I can only call atrocity to atrocity. How these people have ever induced themselves to commit the crimes in Belgium which are attested by Lord Bryce's Commission, even to organizing the flood of calculated mendacity that they pour out day by day, and last of all to stand by passive and apparently approving, while deeds like the new Armenian massacres are going on under their ægis and in the very presence of their consuls, all this passes one's imagination. Now we do not act like that; there is something or other in the English nature which will not allow it. We shall show anger and passion, but we are probably not capable of that organized cruelty, and I hope we never shall be. Yet

the same forces are at work. I do not want to dwell upon this subject too long, but when people talk of national regeneration or the reverse, there is one very obvious and plain test which one looks at first and that is the drink bill. We have made a great effort to restrain our drinking; large numbers of people have given up consuming wine and spirits altogether, following the King's example. We have made a great effort and what is the result? The drink bill is up seven millions as compared with the last year of peace! That seven millions is partly due to the increased price; but at the old prices it would still be up rather over two millions. And ahead, at the end of all this, what prospect is there? There is sure to be poverty and unemployment, great and long continued, just as there was after 1815. I trust we shall be better able to face it; we shall have thought out the difficulties more; we who are left with any reasonable margin of subsistence will, I hope, be more generous and more clear-sighted than our ancestors a century earlier. But in any case there is coming a time of great social distress and very little money indeed to meet it with. We shall achieve no doubt peace in Europe, we shall have probably some better arrangement of frontiers, but underneath the peace there will be terrific hatred. And in the heart of Europe, instead of a treacherous and grasping neighbour we shall be left with a deadly enemy, living for revenge.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I do not think that I have shirked the indictment of this war. It is a terrible indictment; and you will ask me perhaps after that description, if I still believe that our policy

in declaring war was right. Yes, I do. Have I any doubt in any corner of my mind that the war was right? I have none. We took the path of duty and the only path we could take. Some people speak now as if going on with the war was a kind of indulgence of our evil passions. The war is not an indulgence of our evil passions; the war is a martyrdom.

Now, let us not exaggerate here. It is not a martyrdom for Christianity. I saw a phrase the other day that we were fighting for the nailed hand of One crucified, against the "mailed fist." That description is an ideal a man may carry in his own heart, but, of course, it is an exaggeration to apply to our national position, to the position of any nation in international politics. We are not saints, we are not a nation of early Christians. Yet we are fighting for a great cause. How shall I express it? We are a country of ripe political experience, of ancient freedom; we are, with all our faults, I think, a country of kindly record and generous ideals, and we stand for the established tradition of good behaviour between nations. We stand for the observance of treaties and the recognition of mutual rights, for the tradition of common honesty and common kindliness between nation and nation; we stand for the old decencies, the old humanities, "the old ordinance," as the King's letter put it, "the old ordinance that has bound civilized Europe together." And against us there is a power which, as the King says, has changed that ordinance. Europe is no longer held together by the old decencies as it was. The enemy has substituted for it some rule which we cannot yet fathom to its full depth. You

can call it militarism or *Realpolitik* if you like; it seems to involve the domination of force and fraud, it seems to involve organized ruthlessness, organized terrorism, organized mendacity. The phrase that comes back to my mind when I think of it is Mr. Gladstone's description of another evil rule—it is the negation of God erected into a system of government. The sort of thing for which we are fighting, the old ordinance, the old kindliness and the old humanities—is it too much to say that, if there is God in man, it is in these things after all that God in man speaks?

The old ordinance is illogical. Of course it is illogical. It means that civilized human beings in the midst of their greatest passions, in the midst of their angers and rages, feel that there is something deeper, something more important than war or victory—that at the bottom of all strife there are some remnants of human brotherhood. Now, I do not want to go into a long list of German atrocities; much less do I want to denounce the enemy. As Mr. Balfour put it in his whimsical way: "We take our enemy as we find him." But it has been the method throughout this war—the method the enemy has followed, to go at each step outside the old conventions. We have sometimes followed. Sometimes we have had to follow. But the whole history of the war is a history of that process. The peoples fought according to certain rules, but one people got outside the rules right from the beginning. The broken treaty, the calculated ferocity in Belgium and northern France, the killing of women and non-combatants by sea and land and air, the shelling of hospitals, the treatment of wounded

prisoners in ways they had never expected; all the doctoring of weapons with a view to cruelty; explosive bullets; the projectile doctored with substances which would produce a gangrenous wound; the poisoned gases; the infected wells. It is the same method throughout. The old conventions of humanity, the old arrangements which admitted that beneath our cruelties, beneath our hatreds there was some common humanity and friendliness between us, these have been systematically broken one after another. Now observe; these things were done not recklessly but to gain a specific advantage; they were done as Mr. Secretary Zimmermann put it in the case of Miss Cavell, "to inspire fear." And observe that in many places they have been successful. They have inspired fear. Only look at what has recently happened and what is happening now in the Balkans. Every one of these Balkan States has looked at Belgium. The German agents have told them to look at Belgium. They have looked at Belgium and their courage has failed them. Is that the way in which we wish the government of the world to be conducted in future? It is the way it will be conducted unless we and our allies stand firm to the end.

All these points, terrible as they are, seem to me to be merely consequences from what happened at the very beginning of the war. There are probably some people here who differ from what I am saying and I am grateful to them for the patient way in which they are listening to me. To all these I would earnestly say: "Do not despise the diplomatic documents." Remember carefully that the diplomacy of July and

August, 1914, is a central fact. Remember that it is the one part of the history antecedent to this war which is absolutely clear as daylight. Read the documents and read the serious studies of them. I would recommend specially the book by Mr. William Archer, called "Thirteen Days." There is also Mr. Headlam's admirable book, "The History of Twelve Days," and the equally admirable book by the American jurist, Mr. Stowell. There the issue is clear and the question is settled. The verdict of history is already given in these negotiations. There was a dispute, a somewhat artificial dispute which could easily have been settled by a little reasonableness on the part of the two principals. If that failed there was the mediation of friends, that was a conference of the disinterested nations—there was appeal to the concert of Europe. There was the arbitration of The Hague —an arbitration to which Serbia appealed on the very first day and to which the Czar appealed again on the very last. All Europe wanted peace and fair settlement. The Governments of the two Central Powers refused it. Every sort of settlement was overridden. You will all remember that when every settlement that we could propose had been shoved aside one after another Sir Edward Grey made an appeal to Germany to make any proposal herself—any reasonable proposal —and we bound ourselves to accept it, to accept it even at the cost of deserting our associates. No such proposal was made. All Europe wanted peace and fair dealing except one Power, or one pair of Powers if you so call it, who were confident not in the justice of their cause but in the overpowering strength of their

war machine. As the semi-official newspaper said: "Germany does not enter conferences in which she is likely to be in a minority." By fair dealing they might have got their rights or a little more than their rights. By war they expected to get something like the supremacy of Europe. In peace, with their neighbours reasonable, in no pressing danger, Germany deliberately preferred war to fair settlement; and thereby in my judgment Germany committed the primal and fundamental sin against the brotherhood of mankind. Of course all great historical events have complicated causes, but on that fact almost alone I should base the justice and the necessity of our cause in this war. Other objects have been suggested: that we are fighting lest Europe should be subject to the hegemony of Germany. If Germany naturally by legitimate means grows to be the most influential power there is no reason for any one to fight her. It is said we are fighting for democracy against autocratic government. I prefer democracy myself, but one form of government has no right to declare war because it dislikes another form. It is suggested that we are fighting to prevent the break up of the Empire. In that case, from motives of loyalty, of course we should have to fight, and I think the break up of the Empire would be a great disaster to the world. But not for any causes of that description would I use the phrase I have used, or say that in this war we were undergoing a martyrdom. I do use it deliberately now: for I believe no greater evil could occur than that mankind should submit, or should agree to submit, to the rule of naked force.

Now I would ask again those who are following me, as I say, with patience, but I have no doubt with difficulty, to remember that this situation—in spite of particular details—is on the whole an old story. The Greeks knew all about it when they used the word "Hubris"—that pride engendered by too much success which leads to every crime. Many nations after a career of extraordinary success have become mad or drunk with ambition. "By that sin fell the angels." They were not so wicked to start with but afterward they became devils. We should never have said a word against the Germans before this madness entered into them. We liked them. Most of Europe rather liked and admired them. But as I said it is the old story. There have been tyrants. Tyrants are common things in history. Bloody aggression is a common thing in history in its darker periods. But nearly always where there have been tyrants and aggressors there have been men and peoples ready to stand up and suffer and to die rather than submit to the tyrant, and the voice of history speaks pretty clearly about these issues and it says that the men who resisted were right. So that, ladies and gentlemen, as with our eyes open we entered into this struggle, I say with our eyes open we must go on with it. We must go on with it a united nation, trusting our leaders, obeying our rulers, minding each man his own business, refusing for an instant to lend an ear to the agitated whispers of faction or of hysteria. It may be that we shall have to traverse the valley of death, but we shall traverse it until the cause of humanity is won.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, that being the cause, we are girt up in this war to the performance of a great duty; and there are many things in it which, evil as they are, can in some way be turned to good. It lies with us to do our best so to turn them.

If we take the old analogy from biology we are a community, a pack, a herd, a flock. We have realized our unity. We are one. I think most of us feel that our lives are not our own; they belong to England. France has gone through the same process to an even greater degree. Mr. Kipling, who used certainly to be no special lover of France, has told us that there "the men are wrought to an edge of steel, and the women are a line of fire behind them." Our divisions before the war it is a disgrace to think of. They were so great that the enemy calculated upon them, and judged that we should not be able to fight. These divisions have not been killed as we hoped; the remnants of them are still living. I cannot bear to speak of them. Let us think as little as possible about them, and lend no ear, no patience to the people who try to make them persist. As for the division of class and class, I think there, at least, we have made a great gain. I would ask you to put to yourselves this test. Remember how before the war the ordinary workman spoke of his employer and the employer of his workmen, and think now how the average soldier speaks of his officer and how the officer speaks of his men. The change is almost immeasurable. Inside the country we have gained that unity, outside in our relations with foreign countries we have also made a great gain. Remember we have allies now,

more allies, and far closer allies than we have ever had. We have learned to respect and to understand other nations. You cannot read those diplomatic documents of which I spoke without feeling respect for both the French and Russian diplomatists for their steadiness, their extreme reasonableness, their entire loyalty, and as you study them you are amused to see the little differences of national character all working to one end. Since the war has come on we have learned to admire other nations. There is no man in England who will ever again in his heart dare to speak slightingly or with contempt of Belgium or Serbia. It is something that we have had our hearts opened, that we, who were rather an insular people, welcome other nations as friends and comrades. Nay, more, we made these alliances originally about a special principle on which I would like to say a sentence or two. That is the principle of *entente*, or cordial understanding, which is specially connected with the name of our present Foreign Secretary, and, to a slighter extent, with that of his predecessor. The principle of entente has been explained by Sir Edward Grey several times, but I take two phrases of his own particularly. It began because he found that all experience had shown that any two great empires who were touching each other, whose interests rubbed one against another frequently in different parts of the world, had no middle course open to them between continual liability to friction and cordial friendship. He succeeded in establishing that relation of perfect frankness and mutual friendship with the two great empires with whom our interests were always rubbing. Instead of

friction, instead of suspicion and intrigue, we established with our two old rivals a permanent habit of fair dealing, frankness and good will. The second great principle of entente was this, that there is nothing exclusive in these friendships. We began it with France, we continued it with Russia, we achieved it in reality although not in actual diplomatic name with the United States, and practically also with Italy, and any one who has read the diplomatic history will see the effort upon effort we made to establish it with our present enemies. I think we have here some real basis for a sort of Alliance of Europe—that sort of better concert for which we all hope. One cannot guess details. It is very likely indeed that at the beginning Germany will stay outside and will refuse to come into our kind of concert. If so we must "take our enemies as we find them." The fact of there being an enemy outside will very likely make us inside hold together all the better for the first few years. When we are once thoroughly in harness, and most nations have the practice of habitually trusting one another and never intriguing against one another, then, no doubt, the others will come in.

Now I spoke at the beginning about the possible dangers of reaction, but there is a very good side also in the reaction. Part of it is right. It is a reaction against superficial things, superficial ways of feeling, and perhaps also superficial ways of thought. We have gone back in our daily experience to deeper and more primitive things. There has been a deepening of the quality of our ordinary life. We are called upon to take up a greater duty than ever before.

We have to face more peril, we have to endure greater suffering; death itself has come close to us. It is intimate in the thoughts of every one of us, and it has taught us in some way to love one another. For the first time for many centuries this "unhappy but not inglorious generation," as it has been called, is living and moving daily, waking and sleeping, in the habitual presence of ultimate and tremendous things. We are living now in a great age.

A thing which has struck me, and I have spoken of it elsewhere, is the way in which the language of romance and melodrama has now become true. It is becoming the language of our normal life. The old phrase about "dying for freedom," about "Death being better than dishonour"—phrases that we thought were fitted for the stage or for children's stories, are now the ordinary truths on which we live. A phrase which happened to strike me was recorded of a Canadian soldier who went down, I think in the *Arabic* after saving several people; before he sank he turned and said, "I have served my King and country and this is my end." It was the natural way of expressing the plain fact. I read yesterday a letter from a soldier at the front about the death of one of his fellow-soldiers, and the letter ended quite simply: "After all he has done what we all want to do—die for England." The man who wrote it has since then had his wish. Or again if one wants a phrase to live by, which would a few years ago have seemed somewhat unreal, or "high falutin'," he can take those words that are now in everybody's mind: "I see now that patriotism is not enough, I must die without hatred or bitterness toward any one."

Romance and melodrama were a memory, broken fragments living on of heroic ages in the past. We live no longer upon fragments and memories, we have entered ourselves upon a heroic age. As for me personally, there is one thought that is always with me as it is with us all I expect—the thought that other men are dying for me, better men, younger, with more hope in their lives, many of them men whom I have taught and loved. I hope you will allow me to say, and will not be in any way offended by the thought I want to express to you. Some of you will be orthodox Christians, and will be familiar with that thought of One who loved you dying for you. I would like to say that now I seem to be familiar with the feeling that something innocent, something great, something that loves me has died, and is dying daily for me. That is the sort of community that we now are—a community in which one man dies for his brother, and underneath all our hatreds, all our little angers and quarrels we are brothers who are ready to seal our brotherhood with blood. It is for us that these men are dying, for us the women, the old men and the rejected men, and to preserve the civilization and the common life which we are keeping alive and re-shaping, toward wisdom or unwisdom, toward unity or discord. Well, ladies and gentlemen, let us be worthy of these men, let us be ready each one with our sacrifice when it is asked. Let us try as citizens to live a life which shall not be a mockery to the faith these men have placed in us. Let us build up an England for which these men lying in their scattered graves over the face of the green world would have been proud to die.

VII

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

Interview Given by

The Rt. Hon. ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M. P.

First Lord of the Admiralty.

VII

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

THE phrase "freedom of the seas" is, naturally, attractive to British and American ears. For the extension of freedom into all departments of life and over the whole world has been one of the chief aspirations of the English-speaking peoples, and efforts toward that end have formed no small part of their contribution to civilization. But "freedom" is a word of many meanings; and we shall do well to consider in what meaning the Germans use it when they ask for it, not (it may be safely said) because they love freedom but because they hate Britain.

About the "freedom of the seas," in one sense, we are all agreed. England and Holland fought for it in times gone by. To their success the United States may be said to owe its very existence.

For if, three hundred years ago, the maritime claims of Spain and Portugal had been admitted, whatever else North America might have been it would not have been English-speaking. It neither would have employed the language, nor obeyed the laws, nor enjoyed the institutions, which, in the last analysis, are of British origin.

But the "freedom of the seas," desired by the modern German, is a very different thing from the freedom for which our forefathers fought in days of

old. How, indeed, can it be otherwise? The most simple minded must feel suspicious when they find that these missionaries of maritime freedom are the very same persons who preach and who practise upon the land the extremest doctrines of military absolutism.

Ever since the genius of Bismarck created the German Empire by Prussian rifles, welding the German people into a great unity by military means, on a military basis, German ambitions have been a cause of unrest to the entire world. Commercial and political domination, depending upon a gigantic army autocratically governed, has been and is the German ideal.

If, then, Germany wants what she calls the freedom of the seas, it is solely as a means whereby this ideal may receive world-wide extension. The power of Napoleon never extended beyond the coast line of Europe. Further progress was barred by the British fleets and by them alone. Germany is determined to endure no such limitations; and if she cannot defeat her enemies at sea, at least, she will paralyze their sea power.

There is a characteristic simplicity in the methods by which she sets about attaining this object. She poses as a reformer of international law, though international law has never bound her for an hour. She objects to "economic pressure" when it is exercised by a fleet, though she sets no limit to the brutal completeness with which economic pressure may be imposed by an army. She sighs over the suffering which war imposes upon peaceful commerce, though her own methods of dealing with peaceful commerce would have wrung the conscience of Captain Kidd. She

denounces the maritime methods of the Allies, though in her efforts to defeat them she is deterred neither by the rules of war, the appeal of humanity, nor the rights of neutrals.

It must be admitted, therefore, that it is not the cause of peace, of progress, or of liberty which preoccupies her when in the name of freedom, she urges fundamental changes in maritime practice. Her manifest object is to shatter an obstacle which now stands in her way, as more than a hundred years ago it stood in the way of the masterful genius who was her oppressor and is her model.

Not along this path are peace and liberty to be obtained. To paralyze naval power and leave military power uncontrolled is surely the worst injury which international law can inflict upon mankind.

Let me confirm this truth by dwelling for a moment on an aspect of it which is, I think, too often forgotten. It should be observed that even if the German proposal were carried out in its entirety it would do nothing to relieve the world from the burden of armaments.

Fleets would still be indispensable. But their relative value would suffer change. They could no longer be used to exercise pressure upon an enemy except in conjunction with an army. The gainers by the change would, therefore, be the nations who possessed armies—the military monarchies. Interference with trade would be stopped; but oversea invasion would be permitted. The proposed change would, therefore, not merely diminish the importance of sea power, but it would diminish it most in the case of non-military States, like America and Britain.

Suppose, for example, that Germany, in her desire to appropriate some Germanized portions of South America came into conflict with the United States over the Monroe Doctrine. The United States, bound by the doctrine of "freedom of the seas," could aim no blow at her enemy until she herself had created a large army and become for the time being a military community. Her sea power would be useless or nearly so. Her land power would not exist.

But more than this might happen. Let us suppose the desired change had been effected. Let us suppose that the maritime nations, accepting the new situation, thought themselves relieved from all necessity of protecting their sea-borne commerce, and arranged their programmes of naval ship-building accordingly. For some time it would probably proceed on legal lines. Commerce, even hostile commerce, would be unhampered. But a change might happen. Some unforeseen circumstance might make the German General Staff think it to be to the interest of its nation to cast to the winds the "freedom of the seas" and, in defiance of the new law, to destroy the trade of its enemies.

Could anybody suggest after our experience in this war, after reading German histories and German theories of politics, that Germany would be prevented from taking such a step by the mere fact that it was a breach of international treaties to which she was a party? She would never hesitate—and the only result of the cession by the specific Powers of their maritime rights would be that the military Powers would seize the weapon for their own purpose and turn it against those who had too hastily abandoned it.

Thus we are forced to the sorrowful recognition of the weakness of international law so long as it is unsupported by international authority.

While this state of things is permitted to endure, drastic changes in international law well may do more harm than good; for if the new rules should involve serious limitations of belligerent Powers, they would be broken as soon as it suited the interests of the aggressor; and his victim would be helpless. Nothing could be more disastrous. It is bad that law should be defied. It is far worse that it should injure the well disposed. Yet this is what would inevitably happen, since law unsupported by authority will hamper everybody but the criminal.

Here we come face to face with the great problem which lies behind all the changing aspects of this tremendous war. When it is brought to an end, how is civilized mankind so to reorganize itself that similar catastrophes shall not be permitted to recur?

The problem is insistent, though its full solution may be beyond our powers at this stage of our development.

But, surely, even now, it is fairly clear that if substantial progress is to be made toward securing the peace of the world and a free development of its constituent nations, the United States of America and the British Empire should explicitly recognize, what all instinctively know, that on these great subjects they share a common ideal.

I am well aware that in even hinting at the possibility of coöperation between these two countries I am treading on delicate ground. The fact that Amer-

ican independence was wrested by force from Great Britain colours the whole view which some Americans take of the "natural" relations between the two communities. Others are impatient of anything which they regard as a sentimental appeal to community of race, holding that in respect of important sections of the American people this community of race does not, in fact, exist. Others again think that any argument based on a similarity of laws and institutions belittles the greatness of America's contribution to the political development of the modern world.

Rightly understood, however, what I have to say is quite independent of individual views on any of these subjects. It is based on the unquestioned fact that the growth of British laws, British forms of government, British literature and modes of thought was the slow work of centuries; that among the co-heirs of these age-long labours were the great men who founded the United States; and that the two branches of the English-speaking peoples, after the political separation, developed along parallel lines. So it has come about that whether they be friendly or quarrelsome, whether they rejoice in their agreements or cultivate their differences, they can no more get rid of a certain fundamental similarity of outlook than children born of the same parents and brought up in the same home. Whether, therefore, you study political thought in Great Britain or America, in Canada or in Australia, you will find it presents the sharpest and most irreconcilable contrast to political thought in the Prussian Kingdom, or in that German Empire into which, with no modification of aims or spirit, the Prussian

Kingdom has developed. Holding, as I do, that this war is essentially a struggle between these two ideals of ancient growth, I cannot doubt that in the result of that struggle America is no less concerned than the British Empire.

Now, if this statement, which represents the most unchanging element in my political creed, has in it any element of truth, how does it bear upon the narrower issues upon which I dwelt in the earlier portions of this interview? In other words, what are the practical conclusions to be drawn from it?

My own conclusions are these:—If in our time, any substantial effort is to be made toward ensuring the permanent triumph of the Anglo-Saxon ideal, the great communities which accept it must work together. And in working together they must bear in mind that law is not enough. Behind law there must be power. It is good that arbitration should be encouraged. It is good that the accepted practices of warfare should become ever more humane. It is good that before peace is broken the would-be belligerents should be compelled to discuss their differences in some congress of the nations. It is good that the security of the smaller States should be fenced round with peculiar care. But all the precautions are mere scraps of paper unless they can be enforced. We delude ourselves if we think we are doing God service merely by passing good resolutions. What is needed now, and will be needed so long as militarism is unconquered, is the machinery for enforcing them; and the contrivance of such a machinery will tax to its utmost the statesmanship of the world.

I have no contribution to make to the solution of the problem. Yet this much seems clear. If there is to be any effective sanction behind the desire of the English-speaking peoples to preserve the world's peace and the free development of the nations, that sanction must consist largely in the potential use of sea power. For two generations and more after the last great war Britain was without a rival on the sea. During this period Belgium became a State, Greece secured her independence, the unity of Italy was achieved, the South American republics were established, the Monroe Doctrine came into being.

To me it seems that the lesson to be drawn from history by those who love peace, freedom, and security, is not that Britain and America should be deprived, or should deprive themselves of the maritime powers they now possess, but that, if possible, those powers should be organized in the interests of an ideal common to the two States, an ideal upon whose progressive realization the happiness and peace of the world must largely depend.

VIII

ALSACE UNDER GERMAN RULE

By PAUL ALBERT HELMER

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

MAÎTRE PAUL ALBERT HELMER was born in Alsace in 1874. He studied at the High School of Schlestadt, and afterward at the University of Strasburg, and graduated Doctor of Laws in 1895, and Doctor of Political Science in 1896.

In 1900-1901 he was Secretary to the Franco-Bulgarian Arbitration Commission relating to the Isker railway.

He was subsequently a magistrate at Colmar, and afterward, from 1902, an advocate in that town. He won distinction more especially as an advocate in political lawsuits in the numerous and very often notorious lawsuits which show what life was for the natives of Alsace-Lorraine under the harassing, malignant, and pitiless rule of the Germans. His essential qualities as a political advocate are the reliability of his documentation and the close reasoning of his arguments.

He was counsel for the *Souvenir Alsacien-Lorrain*, a society founded with the object of honouring the tombs and perpetuating the memory of the French soldiers who fell in 1870 in Alsace-Lorraine. The Society was dissolved, and an action was brought

against its members. Maître Helmer defended them with admirable vigour.

He was counsel in the so-called *Procès des Faméliques* for the *Nouvelliste d'Alsace-Lorraine* (the Abbé Wetterlé's newspaper), which had spoken of the immigrant officials as descendants of "the ravenous band which fell upon Alsace-Lorraine after 1870"! It was on account of the use of this expression, "les faméliques," that the Public Prosecutor instituted the proceedings.

He appeared against the Under-Secretary of State (Mandel), the bitter enemy of the Alsatians, in another Press action, when, to the great scandal of all the immigrants, he denounced Prince Joachim of Prussia as the author of the Pan-German threats against Alsace-Lorraine. (Maître Helmer, be it said, is the first authority in Alsace and in France on the history of pan-Germanism, to the progress, influence, and menace of which he has constantly called attention.)

He was counsel for the Abbé Wetterlé against the German General Keim, President of the Army League and responsible for the German Army Act of 1913. The General had offended gravely against the natives of Alsace-Lorraine; Maître Helmer succeeded in procuring his conviction.

He was counsel for Hansi, the caricaturist, in all his lawsuits. He was, in fact, his lawyer. It was he who defended him in the *Histoire d'Alsace* case, in the *Mon Village* case, and others.

The *Mon Village* case was first heard at Colmar. Magnificent speeches were made by Maître Preiss and Maître Helmer. But Hansi was condemned

beforehand. The tribunal sent him for trial before the Supreme Court of Leipzig on a charge of high treason, and he was immediately arrested. It was a tragic day in the political history of these last years in Alsace-Lorraine. A new era of severities and persecutions began under the auspices of the new Statthalter. The authorities were determined to suppress the French sympathies of the Alsatians by every possible means.

The trial for high treason took place at the Court of Leipzig a few weeks later—just a year ago. Maître Helmer again defended Hansi, regardless of the perils to which he thus exposed himself. Hansi was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment.

At the moment when the war broke out, the authorities were collecting evidence and initiating proceedings against Maître Helmer, with a view to prosecuting him in his turn for high treason. The Abbé Wetterlé was also to be prosecuted.

Fortunately Maître Helmer succeeded in getting away into France two days before the mobilization. He was able to render signal service in Alsace when it was re-occupied by the French troops by means of the political information he gave to the Command.

The German authorities seized his possessions at Colmar and decreed that whoever gave him refuge would incur capital punishment.

Maître Helmer has worked indefatigably ever since in the cause of French Alsace, contributing articles to the *Temps*, *La France de Demain*, *Le Correspondent*, *La Revue politique et parlementaire*, *Les Annales*, and many other papers and reviews, and giving lectures in-

numerable in Paris, Bordeaux ("Culture et Kultur"), and throughout France.

When the war is over, Maître Helmer will undoubtedly play a prominent part, together with Wetterlé, Preiss, Langel, and others, in the public life of an Alsace restored to France.

We may add that in 1911, Maître Helmer was responsible for the *Programme* of the National Union of Alsace-Lorraine, setting forth the claims of the annexed population, both national and political.

He has published *Ephémérides Alsaciennes* (a faithful record of the events of the German occupation during the war of 1870, and of the atrocities committed by the Germans at this period), and founded the review, *Nouvelles de France.*

THE question of Alsace-Lorraine has been at the root of the entire foreign policy of France for the last forty-four years. It was this question which created and kept alive the antagonism between the Republic and the German Empire. But for it, the two great neighbours might perhaps have come to terms. The defeat of the Imperial armies in 1870 would have been but a wound to self-esteem which the change of political régime would have quickly healed. The loss of five thousand million francs, and even of more than this, would soon have been compensated by renewed material progress.

But when Bismarck forced the nation to give up a population eager to remain French, he laid upon her the obligation of a war to the knife, such as the desire for revenge must entail. When he compelled

vanquished France to cede a million and a half of her children as the price of peace, he created a debt of honour for the mother country which a chivalrous people would have held it ignominious to forget.

It is true that France did not provoke the present war. But she foresaw and expected it. The enemy who had scorned the rights of nationalities in 1871, who had done violence to the formally and solemnly expressed will of the natives of Alsace and Lorraine, was incapable of stopping short in his career of crime. By his mad pride and arrogance, he was destined himself to bring about the inevitable day of imminent justice.

And Alsace, too, has been waiting patiently for this day for forty-four years. It was her consolation in present suffering to preserve piously as a sacred trust the memory of her French past, recollections of the period when, in communion with France, she had successively tasted the sweetness of life, liberty, glory, and fruitful civic prosperity.

It seems there were persons before the war who believed that Alsace was Germanized and contented with her lot. This is surprising to us. It was holding our sense of fidelity and our code of honour very cheap. We have only to recall the past of Alsace to make it evident that our little nation could not in little more than a generation renounce and forget the sentiments of affection and gratitude which the slow action of several centuries had inculcated in her race.

THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE ANCIENT RÉGIME

Alsace formed a part of those central provinces which, after the division of the Empire of Charle-

magne, were to have constituted an independent country, Lotharingia. In reality, throughout the course of history they were the object of continual struggles between the two nations they were intended to separate. Before belonging to France in modern times, Alsace had long been part of the ancient Empire of Germany. It is on this fact that the Germans base their claim to the province as German territory which ought to come back to them.

This affirmation is too simple to apply to the complex situation of a frontier country. As a fact, Alsace, even in the Middle Ages, though it spoke a German dialect, was in the orbit of French culture. The Gothic artists who built Strasburg Cathedral came from the Ile de France or had learnt their art there. The Alsatian authors who figure in German literature, such as Gottfried, of Strasburg, and Fischart, imitated French authors, or initiated their German readers into the courtly life of France. Alsatian scholars studied in Paris, and at all periods many persons conversant with the French tongue were to be found in the cultivated classes.

Alsace, thus attracted by the French genius, was bound to Germany only by the political constitution of the ancient Empire. Now this constitution ensured her all but complete independence in her different localities, without imposing any appreciable burdens upon her. But the Empire, though, on the one hand, it exacted little, on the other was not very lavish in its proffered benefits. It did not even guarantee public safety, and, in those days of incessant warfare, Alsace greatly needed protection.

Her rich plains attracted the troops of every chieftain. To say nothing of her innumerable internecine quarrels, Alsace, from the Hundred Years' War onward, had seen in her country the Armagnacs, the English, and the Burgundians; after the Reformation she saw there the Austrians, the Hungarians, the Spaniards, and the Swedes, who successively ravaged and ruined the country.

In the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years' War proved more conclusively than anything the impotence of the German Empire, and caused Alsace to seek aid and protection from a more powerful State. Such was the object of the conventions entered into by several Alsatian towns with Richelieu, the culmination of which was the reunion of Alsace with France by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Louis XIII, and afterward Louis XIV, took Alsace under their protection at her own request.

France succeeded in making herself beloved in the province. Anxious to preserve the sympathies she had inspired, she respected the immunities of the communes, and the traditions and customs of the inhabitants. Her policy was inspired by a generosity and breadth of view which persuaded them that their reunion with France had wrought no change in their lives.

French rule manifested itself only in beneficent effects. Never had Alsace been so tranquil, so securely defended against foreign armies. Trade and industry developed, thanks to an assured peace, and the skilful and benignant measures of the governors of the province, for France made it a point of honour to send her

best administrators to the frontier territory. She also instituted the Sovereign Council of Alsace in the province, a single legal court for the whole territory, which dispensed justice both swiftly and impartially.

For a century and a half, France had succeeded in making the Alsatians appreciate the benefits of a firmly-organized State, inspired by broad and benevolent views. Their attachment to France was solidly established when the Great Revolution broke out.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE EMPIRE

The *ancien régime*, as I have said, had scrupulously respected the institutions created in Alsace by the feudal system. The country had continued to be divided into an infinite number of little republics, principalities, and domains, the laws and territories of which were interwoven in the most complex fashion. But all these constitutions had outlived themselves. A local life no longer satisfied the Alsatians; in 1789 they sacrificed it gladly to take their share in the life of the nation. The complete fusion of the Alsatian people with the French people was the first effect of the Revolution. The province had disappeared; only Frenchmen remained.

And the Alsatians at once found their place in French political life. The parliamentary assemblies gave individual talent opportunities for attracting public attention. When the Republic adopted the directorial constitution, an Alsatian (Rewbel), a barrister of Colmar, became a member of the Directorate. The part he played was a prominent one; as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he directed the external policy of

France at the moment when, by the Treaty of Basle, Prussia recognized the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. Thus an Alsatian secured for France what she had desired for centuries—her natural frontiers.

The wars of the Revolution gave the people of Alsace opportunities of proving their French patriotism even greater than those offered by its political life. Many Alsatians won distinction in the Republican armies, from Kellermann, the victor of Valmy, to Kléber, the rival of Napoleon in Egypt. It was at this period that the military qualities of the Alsatian race manifested themselves most gloriously. The careers inaugurated by the Revolution were crowned by the Empire. Alsace contributed more men and generals to the Napoleonic epic than any other French province. Lefebvre, Rapp, Sirhanun, Berckheim, Hengel, and many others, down to the obscure defenders of Huningue, proved by their blood and their glorious exploits the depth of their attachment to their French fatherland.

A monument to this valiant Alsatian patriotism, this love for the nation, still survives. You all know it, but perhaps you do not know its Alsatian origin. When the first Revolutionary war broke out the Mayor of Strasburg asked Rouget de Lisle to compose a song for the troops who were marching to meet the enemy. This officer, in a moment of genius, contrived to express in his "War Song of the Army of the Rhine" all that was firing the martial population of Strasburg, and urging it on to conflict. The Alsatian hymn, adopted by all France, has become inseparable from the tricolour. For the last one hundred and

twenty years, on innumerable battlefields, every attack by French soldiers has been made to the strains of the "War Song of the Army of the Rhine," the *Marseillaise.*

THE PROTEST

Thus, when in 1870 Germany coveted Alsace, the latter had long proved herself as thoroughly French as any other province of France. She did her duty during the mournful days of the terrible year, as in past days of glory.

But in face of the German demands, our Deputies thought it their duty to make a solemn affirmation of their sentiments directly the National Assembly convoked to conclude peace met at Bordeaux. On February 17, 1871, they laid on the table a declaration in the following terms:

> Alsace and Lorraine are opposed to alienation. These two provinces, associated with France for more than two centuries in good and in evil fortune, and constantly exposed to hostile attack, have consistently sacrificed themselves in the cause of national greatness; they have sealed with their blood the indissoluble compact that binds them to French unity. Under the present menace of foreign pretensions, they affirm their unshakable fidelity in the face of all obstacles and dangers, even under the yoke of the invader. With one accord citizens who have remained in their homes and soldiers who have hastened to join the colours proclaim by their votes or by their action in the field to Germany and to the world the unalterable determination of Alsace to remain French.

In spite of the formally declared wishes of the Alsatians and Lorrainers, the National Assembly

ratified the treaty of peace of March 1, 1871. Then the Alsatians, before leaving the Chamber, read out the famous Protest of Bordeaux:

> We, who in defiance of all justice have been given over by an odious abuse of power to foreign domination, have a last duty to perform. We declare a compact which disposes of us without our consent nul and void. It will ever remain open to each and all of us to claim our rights in such manner and in such measure as conscience shall dictate. . . . Our brothers of Alsace and Lorraine, now cut off from the common family, will preserve their filial affection for the France now absent from their homes until the day when she returns to take her place there again.

THE ANNEXATION

On March 2, 1871, populations which had been French for centuries, and whose French patriotism had grown up in the course of a history the main current of which I have indicated to you in a few words, were suddenly called upon to become German. Germany demanded this change with such urgency that she immediately exacted military service in the Prussian army from men whose fathers and brothers had scarcely laid down their French arms. She hoped to obtain in a day what France had taken centuries to produce by a skilful and generous policy.

The Germans had not even a conception of the difficulties inherent in the task they had undertaken. They had made up their minds to ignore the sentiments of Alsace in spite of the violence with which they had been manifested during the war and at Bordeaux. They persisted in considering the attach-

ment to the French motherland as a mere veneer easy to remove, a factor with which it was unnecessary to reckon.

Their main argument was based on language. It is true that the lower classes in Alsace speak a dialect of Germanic origin. But this dialect differs so much from written German that when the Alsatian speaks the latter, he is distinctly sensible of speaking a foreign tongue. In any case, the use of the dialect has not created any elective affinity with the German nation. Accordingly the lower orders were not only wounded in their feelings, but conscious of material injury when Germany forbade the teaching of French in the primary schools.

Germany looked for the ripening of fruit she did not know how to cultivate. On two occasions certain Germans essayed a policy of conciliation, and on each occasion the outcome was a period of violent conflict and of rigorous repression.

Those who sincerely desired the pacification of the province—Manteuffel from 1879 to 1885, Koeller after 1901—ran counter to the general feeling of their compatriots. The majority of Germans believe only in the exercise of force, and will accept nothing short of servile submission. Incapable of adapting themselves to the mentality of others, Germans can neither respect honourable sentiments, nor gain the sympathy or even the esteem of their adversaries. It is owing to this psychological disability that all their attempts at Germanization have failed, and that they have succeeded not only in keeping alive the attachment of Alsace to France but in making the hostility

of Alsace to Germany more violent than ever after forty-four years of German rule.

Before giving a sketch of the political struggles that have taken place in Alsace-Lorraine and the ideas which have successively governed the various persons directing German policy in our country, I shall discharge a debt of gratitude by telling you that when the Germans proscribed the use of the French language among us, or prevented Alsatians from holding public office, we had one argument to which our adversaries were never able to find an answer. We used to say to the Germans that a great nation, conscious of its national greatness and power, could afford to be generous, and to leave to those it had brought into its fold their language, their customs and their legitimate influence; we quoted in illustration the manner in which Great Britain had treated Canada and the South African Republics. But the Germans were incapable of understanding generosity.

THE MANTEUFFEL RÉGIME

I will not dwell upon the early years during which German rule was established with all the harshness of Bismarckian policy. The whole country was thrown into confusion. Those who would not endure German domination emigrated. Their places were taken by a colony of Germans whom we call immigrants, and look upon as foreigners to this day.

When, after the first settlement of the country, the constitution of 1879 enabled the Government of Alsace-Lorraine to pursue a clearly defined policy,

the first Statthalter, Baron von Manteuffel, made it his object to win over the Alsatians to Germany by gentle methods. An old soldier, formerly Governor of the French departments until the payment of the war indemnity, he had a chivalrous disposition; he dared to admit that Alsace had once been French. Given this fact, he was willing to believe that it was not possible to change one's nationality in a day by a stroke of the pen on a treaty of peace. "I do not yet ask for your sympathy," he said one day, in one of those programme-speeches he was fond of making, "but I advise you to look upon the union of Alsace-Lorraine to the German Empire as definitive."

Thus not only did he not exact an affection which cannot be forced, but even as a question of law, he did not demand a formal recognition of the Treaty of Frankfort. He was content with advice couched in terms as far from arbitrary as possible. He respected the feelings and the dignity of those he governed.

In spite of the few demands he made upon the vanquished, he sought every occasion of coming into contact with them and doing them service. He was lavish with advice to those who came to ask for it, he listened to the complaints of all malcontents, and placed himself at the disposal of the population. Though he had declared that he did not ask for sympathy, he evidently sought to win it by his affability.

Baron von Manteuffel was a truly popular person, respected and liked even, and indeed more especially, by the adversaries of the nation he represented.

Yet his work failed.

The first Statthalter's successes were purely per-

sonal. His loyal and generous attitude was incomprehensible to his compatriots. Baron von Manteuffel's manner of approaching the Alsace-Lorraine problem, and the principles which inspired him in his efforts to win popularity, were contrary to the spirit of the German nation. Germany, which had tardily achieved unhoped-for power, knew nothing of chivalrous traditions, nor of respect for the personality, the rights, and the interests of others. The tact and delicacy of Manteuffel, the nobility of heart which made him defer to the sentiments of the vanquished, were foreign to the great majority of his people.

The Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine was accordingly repudiated by his German compatriots. He was accused of negotiating with the enemy, and of favouring native notabilities to the prejudice of the German immigrant officials in Alsace-Lorraine. On the one hand the trans-Rhenish press and the Government of Berlin demanded violent measures flagrantly opposed to his moderate and tolerant ideas, while on the other his own officials rebelled and were in open conflict with him.

Before even enquiring what effects the policy of conciliation and pacification inaugurated by the first Statthalter might have had upon the national sentiment of the Alsatians and Lorrainers, it must be insisted that Baron von Manteuffel stood alone, his policy was reprobated by his own compatriots, and his popularity in Alsace was of no advantage to the German Government.

In any case, Baron von Manteuffel's policy, if

not premature, could not have had any general and definitive effect until it had been steadily pursued for a considerable length of time.

The horrors of the war of 1870, the bombardment of Strasburg and the atrocities of Val-de-Villé were still fresh in the memory of the Alsatians. They had remained French in feeling. Before aspiring to be loved, the conquerors should have won forgiveness, and before even thinking of a reconciliation, they should have allowed time to soften facts by the insensible approach of forgetfulness. The Germans could not understand what the situation required of them. It was the business of the German nation to make itself esteemed and respected, and of the Empire to make itself acceptable by the material advantages it was in its power to bestow. But neither the people beyond the Rhine nor the Imperial Government faced the problem in the spirit of Manteuffel, whose sudden death cut short his work.

It was not likely that a smile from the Emperor's lieutenant would suffice to change the national sentiment of the Alsatians. In private, as in public life, they preserved an attitude consistent with their past.

When the Bishop of Metz, Monseigneur Dupont des Loges, was awarded the Prussian Order of the Crown, he expressed his regret to the Statthalter, and published his letter. The Reichstag elections in Alsace were persistently hostile to Germany, and provoked measures of repression, ordered by the Berlin Government.

Not long after the death of the first Statthalter,

in 1887, it was thought that war would shortly break out. The Boulangist movement, and the Schnaebele and the Donon incidents caused Alsace to presage an approaching war of liberation. In the face of such an eventuality the once popular figure of Manteuffel was eclipsed, and only the arrogant attitude of his nation remained in sight. In January, 1887, the elections in Alsace-Lorraine were more violently antagonistic than any which had taken place since the annexation.

Germanization by gentle methods, by the prestige and personal ascendancy of a man of high culture and great nobility of soul had not only proved a failure, but was forever discredited in German public opinion. Thenceforth the immigrant officials were masters of the situation. It was they who were to choose in future methods of Germanizing Alsace-Lorraine, in conformity with their ideas and their interests.

REPRESSION IN 1887

The first of these was violent repression.

The Germans could not understand the hostility of the Alsatians to them. Baron von Manteuffel had allowed that the Alsatians had been French and that it had been impossible for their feelings to change suddenly.

The proposition was too simple for the minds of his compatriots. Their psychology did not accept fidelity to the past, either in themselves or others. Their military successes had been so unexpected and unhoped for, the realization of their national unity

had come about so suddenly, that they could not but produce infatuation among a parvenu people. They felt a naïve admiration for themselves, and believed they had accomplished things of which no other people in the history of the world could boast.

This sentiment had rapidly stifled the individualism of the confederated States in Germany, the past seemed small, mediocre, and despicable. "The good old times" became a catchword in the satirical papers, which ridiculed the old German troops now replaced by the valiant and disciplined armies of Prussia. Very soon, in view of their economic development and the pretensions of their "world-politics," their ancient and glorious title: "a nation of poets and thinkers" sounded almost like an insult to German ears.

A nation which had thus turned its back upon its past could not understand that the Alsatian people would be faithful to its memories. To their arrogant self-sufficiency it was unthinkable that the Alsatians should not at the bottom of their hearts share their admiration for the great deeds of William I and his paladins. Alsace, according to them, might think herself highly privileged to be part of the mighty German Empire, and to see her sons received into the glorious ranks of the Prussian army. This sentiment seemed to them so natural that they cast about for some purely external reason to explain the persistent opposition of the annexed province. This they formulated in a very unexpected fashion:

If the Alsatians failed to acclaim the German Empire, as they should have been inclined to do,

according to the Germans, it was because they were *terrorized*. This terror was not the effect of the régime to which they were subjected—the German dictatorship, the exceptional laws, the systematic espionage, and the denunciations of immigrant officials. According to the Germans, it was France who terrorized German Alsace; it was through fear of French public opinion, of the judgment of friends and relatives who had remained French, that the Alsatians refused to be absorbed in the German Empire!

The Alsatians are recalcitrant because they are terrorized by France! This was the axiom obediently adopted by the German press in the days of the Statthalter von Manteuffel. The idea seems an extraordinary one, but paradox has no terrors for the trans-Rhenish journalist, whose lack of critical sense and whose rigid discipline it is impossible to exaggerate.

It was this idea, no doubt, which inspired the reaction against the conciliatory régime inaugurated by the first Statthalter. Since Alsace was terrorized by France, it was necessary that Germany should terrorize her still more. If the Alsatians feared the disapproval of their former compatriots, they must learn that their new masters were still more to be feared, because they had more violent measures at their disposal. This programme was duly carried out in 1887, the year of the Schnaebele affair and of the Donon incident.

Within the space of a few months Alsace was subjected to every kind of German brutality. Deputies were expelled and Alsatian societies were dissolved. Political prosecutions took place on every side, for

offences such as seditious cries or emblems, membership of the League of Patriots, high treason, etc. To safeguard the Alsatians against intimidation by their French relatives, intercourse with persons beyond the frontier was made impossible by a regulation prescribing the use of passports.

Bismarck even hoped, according to one of his successors, that there would be an insurrection, and that the régime of repression would culminate in bloodshed. This would have been the triumph of the principle of force.

He was disappointed; we possessed our souls in patience. Alsace gave up overt protestation; but a new Alsatian generation which adopted other methods of resistance grew up under the pressure of the brutal measures of 1887. Meanwhile, Germany succeeded in introducing the régime most congenial to her national spirit, no longer mitigated by a personality such as that of Manteuffel. This was the domination of immigrant Germans, exploiting the country as a foreign colony.

THE RÉGIME OF OFFICIALS

The period inaugurated by the violent reaction against the system of Manteuffel and the brutal repressions of 1887, lasted until 1901. During these years power was exclusively in the hands of the immigrant officials, who formed a close oligarchy, arrogant and meddlesome.

To this class of Germans, who had come into the country as conquerors, greedy for all the advantages of the situation, and who not only monopolized all

administrative functions, but even attempted on various occasions to obtain places in Parliament from the electors, Alsace and the Alsatians had no rights at all. The annexed territories were Imperial lands, and as such were to be classed with colonies rather than with the confederated States united under the Imperial crown. In relation to the central power at Berlin, they should be merely a sort of a province, not a State with well-defined rights and powers, like Bavaria or Würtemberg.

To justify this refusal of all rights to Alsace-Lorraine, the Germans insisted that had the country been united to Prussia it would have fared no better, and would have been in the position of a Prussian province. They also made capital of the fact that, prior to the annexation, the annexed country had enjoyed no autonomy under France, and had merely formed departments like the rest.

Such were the sophisms to which the Germans had recourse to justify their dictatorship and their exceptional laws, to keep Alsace-Lorraine in direct dependence upon Berlin and to refuse her any measure of independence and autonomy. But the conclusions they drew from these arguments did not only affect the political situation of the country: if Alsace-Lorraine, as territory of the Empire, had no rights, they, the Imperial officials, representing the central authority, were alone entitled to hold public office. This was their monopoly. Every Alsatian who solicited for a post was looked upon as an intruder, trying to snatch from some member of the ruling caste a right that was his due.

Thus the antagonism between the native Alsatians

and the immigrant Germans was perpetuated and even intensified. At this juncture it was no longer possible to speak of the terrorization of the annexed provinces by French opinion. It became necessary to find some other explanation of the fidelity of the Alsatians to the French idea. Those who would not rally to Germany were not *historisch denkend!*—they thought after the manner of persons who have had no historical education! This argument, reiterated for years by the German newspapers, implied a profound contempt; it emanated from the dogma of the superiority definitely acquired by Germany in the history of the world.

Those who did not acclaim the new Empire had not grasped the fact that the hand of history has consecrated Germany for all time, that the hegemony of Germany is assured and that no other nation will ever be able to undermine it, and, above all, that the country to which we proposed to remain faithful is old and decrepit, and doomed to inevitable decadence.

The Germans proposed to monopolize history. Their past—in the form taught by themselves—was to be the only one on record. At the word of command we were to forget over two centuries of our national life. The most vivid and glorious memories of our families and communes were to disappear. Subsequently, the immigrants showed to what depths of baseness they could descend by their actions against the guardians of military tombs, the *Souvenir Français* and the *Souvenir Alsacien-Lorrain.*

These were conditions we could not accept: even had we believed in Germany's mission in the future,

we could not have renounced our past without a loss of dignity and a failure in honour.

Our fidelity to our past necessarily led to conflicts. The German Empire—which has always been eager to celebrate its jubilees of twenty-five years, as if it had a presentiment that it would not celebrate those of fifty years—had commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battles of Alsace in 1895. A French journalist who had been present at these rejoicings contrasted them in *Le Petit Journal* with an interview he reported with one of our deputies to the Reichstag, M. Jacques Preiss. It contained the following passage:

> Not to speak of their rights, for which they claim respect, the *Alsacien-Lorrains* cannot believe that France has finally accepted the blows she has received—her defeat; that she has forgotten what has been taken from her, and certain humiliations, among others the entry of the German troops into Paris; if she were other than what we suppose, France would no longer be herself; she would lose all her prestige in the world, and abandon her *rôle* in history.

M. Preiss apparently did not accept the dogma of the historic mission definitely assigned to Germany; he believed that France has still a part to play in the world. M. Preiss was not *historisch denkend.* In German eyes, the passage I have just quoted was a crime, a crime which led to M. Jacques Preiss' prosecution on a charge of high treason.

A few months later, Germany celebrated the centenary of her first Emperor. The Government of Alsace-Lorraine organized great festivities, and the

official press insisted that the public schools, the municipalities, and the societies should take part in them. In the face of this campaign the *Colmarer Zeitung* declared in a categoric article that the Alsatians had no part in these rejoicings. *Wir machen nicht mit* —we will not make merry with them. And as the Government had also prescribed religious ceremonies the writer, Abbé Sipp, had added: "We will pray for the dead who fell in the wars made by William I, and we will also pray for this Emperor; for we remember that before God, the Supreme Judge, the Emperor is judged as well as the beggar, and that we find in the Scriptures these awful words bearing on rulers and their fate: 'Mercy will soon pardon the meanest, but mighty men shall be mightily tormented.'"

M. Sipp not only failed to recognize the mission of Germany on earth, but he dared to speak of terrors of divine justice in connection with the Emperor whom all Germans venerate. The Germans perfectly understood the allusion to the falsification of the Ems telegram which William I had condoned, and by which he had profited.

The newspaper was suppressed by a dictatorial decree, and was only saved from prosecution by the intercession of the Grand Duchess of Baden, daughter of William I.

The two incidents cited suffice to illustrate the new form assumed by the opposition of the annexed territories. A new generation was arising in Alsace in the last years of the nineteenth century. It had never known France; it had studied in Germany and served its term in the German army. As they

were obliged to live in a country which France had not been able to liberate, these young people might have been allowed more freedom in the choice of their country. They might have become reconciled to Germany without any rupture of personal ties.

But to win over this new generation, it should have been made possible for them to adopt Germany as their country. On the contrary, the official régime, anxious to uphold the privileges of the immigrants, seemed deliberately to do all it could to make adhesion to Germany impossible for them. To expect a people to blot out two centuries of its history, to ask sons to repudiate the past of their fathers, was to impose a loss of national dignity and an indifference to family tradition. Those who aspired to Germanize Alsace could not see that what they required was something base and vile, and that they would condemn all those who acquiesced to the contempt of Alsatians faithful to their past.

If the Germans had had any chivalry, they would have sought some means of allowing those who became German to retain their self-respect. They never understood this. Those Alsatians who went over to the Germans secretly put forward motives of material gain to excuse themselves to their compatriots. Germany could build no sure foundation on the adhesion of a few sordid and cowardly souls.

THE PIONEERS OF KULTUR

The ascendancy of the officials was brought to an end in 1901 by the personal intervention of William II. The Emperor disgraced Von Puttkammer, the

Secretary of State, who had been the leader of the party, and replaced him by M. von Koeller. Having received formal orders to inaugurate a system of conciliation, Von Koeller conscientiously carried out his mission, little as it seemed to accord with his past and with his reputation for harshness.

By a few authoritative measures he curbed the officials, confining them strictly to the exercise of their functions. The dictatorship and the exceptional laws were abrogated. The new Government interfered as little as possible in public life, leaving it to the free play of parties. It thus succeeded in disarming political opposition.

If the national question had been a mere outcome of the political situation, it might have been supposed that Germanization had now been achieved. Nothing could have been further from the fact. On the contary, in the place of the former political conflict, a new contest arose, more bitter, more violent, and more offensive than those which had preceded it, in that it affected questions and persons generally respected in political struggles.

Now that the Koeller régime no longer allowed the immigrant officials a preponderance in the direction of government, and they found themselves strictly confined to their professional tasks, while a place was made in the administration for the sons of the soil, they dreaded a restriction of their privileges. Their monopoly was attacked. As they did not dare to enter upon an overt campaign against the régime, they emphasized all the differences that separated them from the native population, and

posed as the representatives of *Deutschtum* in contrast to the *Welschlinge*, of Germanism as opposed to the *Francillons*. They incarnated German *kultur* in the sight of a population attached to French culture.

From this time forth, the German immigrants affected to look upon the native Alsatians as a reactionary and unenlightened mass. Persisting in their attachment to a vanished past, and faithful to a senile and decadent France, they had been unable to keep abreast of the progress represented in the world by the German Empire. Alsace lacked the moral maturity which would have entitled her to a place in the German fold; she was *unreif*. The immigrants had therefore a civilizing mission to accomplish among this inferior population: they announced themselves as *kultur-pioniers*, the pioneers of *kultur*.

Germany had taken possession of science at the outset, by creating a monopoly of teaching in favour of official methods and doctrines. She now claimed to inculcate her ideas of the good and the beautiful. We felt little admiration for the too numerous specimens of German art vouchsafed to us, in spite of the efforts made to cultivate our taste for these. The immigrants boasted of having introduced physical culture and love of sport among us. Their taste for excursions had led to the discovery of the Vosges, of which, it appeared, we had ignored the beauties if not the existence. But German pretensions went beyond all this: attached as we were to the shallow and superficial culture of France, we had no conception of duty, of the categoric imperative, of scruples of conscience and moral delicacy.

Our inferiority was caused by the defective education of our mothers. Brought up in French boarding-schools, the women of the Alsatian middle classes were even less accessible to German *kultur* than the men. The early education of children, family life, and social habits had accordingly remained French. The Germans wished to change our manner of life, and to this end they demanded that Alsatian girls should be prevented from going to school in France, and that they should be forced to submit to German education. The Germanization which had failed as applied to the men was now to be essayed with the women and young girls. Our private life, our family circle, were to be submitted to the control of the pioneers of *kultur*.

This new pretension was lacking alike in discretion and delicacy. It was an ignoble attempt to coerce the very personality of a people. The application of the principle by tactless persons could not fail to be insulting. I will give an instance.

At a pan-German Congress held at Wiesbaden, a German clergyman, Pastor Spieser, gave an account of his campaign in favour of German *kultur*. When visiting one of his colleagues, he had noticed that the latter talked French to his family. He tried by every means to persuade his friend to adopt the German language, but was met by the objection that the wife of his colleague insisted on speaking French. He then pointed out the weakness and cowardice of allowing oneself to be thus dominated by a woman. Finding his efforts unsuccessful, he sent his friend a book entitled "Ueber den biologischen Schwachsinn

des Weibes" (On the Biological Imbecility of Woman). The Pan-German Congress heartily applauded this courageous manifestation of German *kultur*.

The struggle took the most varied forms. On one occasion the German newspapers sought to bring William II himself into the field. They declared that during one of his visits to Urville he had said that the use of soap must be introduced into Lorraine!

The Germans did not foresee that in using such weapons they laid themselves open to counter-thrusts impossible to parry. It is dangerous to make arrogant claims to a superiority by no means indisputable. "Ready to wound," they forgot that they were ridiculous. Zisliu and Hansi reminded them of the fact by their caricatures.

The immigrants seemed unaware that arrogance and insult are not good instruments of political domination; they had no idea to what a trenchant and popular attack they exposed themselves in provoking the sarcasms of our caricaturists. A new warfare was waged with unprecedented vehemence and asperity. Politicians had to follow the movement, and the immigrants on their side had recourse to the law. A long series of political prosecutions chastened those who had dared to laugh at *kultur*.

The antagonism between culture and *kultur* had greatly widened the chasm that divided the native population and the immigrant officials. On the eve of the war, the two groups seemed as irreconcilable as on the morrow of the annexation. The resulting political struggles, the debates on the new constitution, the affairs of Graffenstaden and Saverne had

further embittered the situation. Herr von Jagow expressed the facts in a phrase: The Germans of Alsace-Lorraine were in an enemy's country in 1914.

All the methods directed to the Germanization of the inhabitants had failed. The Alsatians had remained unmoved by the amiability of Manteuffel and the political concessions of Koeller. Given over to the tyranny of the immigrant officials, they had endured the terror of 1887 with *sang-froid*, and had refused with dignity to forget their past. For the Alsatians who rallied to the masters from base or interested motives the people had nothing but contempt; for the Germans who offered them the blessings of kultur they had nothing but ridicule.

Germany, having set herself an impossible task, had used means directly opposed to the attainment of her object. She could not succeed; Germanization was foredoomed to failure.

I have now explained to you in a few words why Alsace considered herself an integral part of France, in spite of the dialect spoken by the lower classes, and why she has retained her affection for her mother country throughout forty-four years of German domination. It might seem from what has been said that the question of Alsace-Lorraine was that of a dispute which only concerned France and Germany.

But it is by no means the case. The question of Alsace-Lorraine was the first manifestation of that madness which invaded Germany after her victories, and has grown steadily ever since. As such, it concerned all Europe. The Alsatian and Lorraine deputies of the Bordeaux Assembly recognized this, for in

their declaration of February 17, 1871, they inserted a passage addressed to Europe at large:

"Europe cannot permit or ratify the abandonment of Alsace and Lorraine. The civilized nations, as guardians of justice and national rights, cannot remain indifferent to the fate of their neighbours, under pain of becoming, in their turn, victims of the outrages they have tolerated. Modern Europe cannot allow a people to be seized like a herd of cattle; she cannot continue deaf to the repeated protests of threatened nationalities, she owes it to her instinct of self-preservation to forbid such abuses of power. She knows, too, that the unity of France is now, as in the past, a guarantee of the general order of the world, a barrier against the spirit of conquest and invasion.

"Peace concluded at the price of a cession of territory could be nothing but a costly truce, and not a final peace. It would be for all a cause of internal unrest, a permanent and legitimate provocation to war."

Europe was unmoved, but our deputies were right. Since the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the world has been given over to militarism. Intoxicated by her lust for hegemony and world-domination, Germany threatened every other country, and when the moment seemed to her propitious, she let loose the terrors of war. But this time Europe understands, she has resisted the blow. Since the crime of the *Lusitania* even America is beginning to understand.

We await with confidence the reëstablishment of justice in the world and our speedy return to our French fatherland.

IX

THE SERVIANS AND AUSTRIA

By G. M. TREVELYAN

IX

THE SERVIANS AND AUSTRIA

IN AUGUST, 1914, hostilities commenced in four districts of Europe, corresponding to four great questions, each of which had directly or indirectly its part in causing the war.

These are:—

1. Belgium.
2. Alsace-Lorraine.
3. Poland (Russian, Prussian, and Austrian).
4. Servia.

I am asked to write about Servia. It is of interest to us all to know what sort of people are these Servians, and what are the hopes or ambitions with which they are now waging war.

I am afraid I can only give a superficial answer, but it will be at least first hand, for I was travelling last year in those parts and conversed with many Servians. They were then, as they are again at this moment, a nation in arms, a people encamped against its enemies. They sent on us travellers most hospitably, not from town to town, but from army to army, as they lay awaiting the onslaught of the Bulgarians, which came a week or two after we had left. They had just beaten the Turks, and they were, as they well knew, about to fight the Bulgarians, but they bore no animosity against the Bulgarians, much as they feared them—

and little even against the ancient Turkish enemy, now that they had just driven him from Macedonia. Their hatred was all for Austria. Again and again I heard said something of this sort:—

"This Turkish war that we have fought, and this Bulgarian war that we must fight, are only preludes to our real national war—the war against Austria. The armaments with which we conquered the Turks were made against Austria, and only directed against Turkey as an afterthought. We regret that we shall have to fight Bulgaria."

Even then, on the very eve of the Bulgarian war of last year, hatred of Austria was the dominant national sentiment.

Why this intense hatred of Austria?

It is because Servia is only one part of the great south Slav race, which is found in the provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia.

All those provinces are "under the mighty Austrian," and are most bitterly oppressed by him. The Austrians treat the south Slav race as they used to treat the Italians when Austria ruled Italy. And the Servians intend to liberate their brother Slavs, just as the little state of Piedmont liberated the rest of Italy. For this reason many of the young men in Servia belong to a party called the Piedmontese party, and the bookshops at Belgrade contained a surprising proportion of books about the rising of Italy against Austria in the time of Cavour and Garibaldi, because that was the model which the Servians set out to imitate.

But, just as little Piedmont required the France of Napoleon III to help her in order to expel the Austrians

from the other provinces of Italy, so Servia requires Russian aid before she can hope to expel the Austrians from Greater Servia. In this cause there is a generous feeling in Russia which has united all parties—Governmental, Conservative, Liberal, Revolutionary—in a "holy war" to liberate their brother Slavs. Yet there is no fear whatever that Greater Servia will afterward be unduly subservient to Russia. Bulgaria was created by Russia, but has shown her independence of outlook. So also will Servia. And the south Slav race, though united to the Russians in religion and akin in race and language, has distinct characteristics of its own. One of these is a love of independence. They spoke to me of the Russians as their blood-kindred and their friends, but they did not like the Russian form of government.

The Servians are an extremely democratic people, more so than the English, Americans, or any other people among whom there are great distinctions of rank or of wealth. The Servians are a nation of peasant-proprietors, each man with his own piece of land; 86 per cent. of the population belongs to this class. The feudalism of Hungary, the junkerism of Prussia, the landlordism of England, all better or worse manifestations of the same system of holding land in large blocks, finds no analogy in Servia. The Turks during their occupation of the country destroyed the old feudal class of Servia, so that now that the Turks have gone it is the purest democracy. The typical Servian peasant or soldier (who are one and the same) is a fine, upstanding type of humanity, who looks you in the face as an equal. They are also a very pleasant

and kindly people, as indeed are most of the inhabitants of the Balkans when they are not engaged in racial war. The Servians have lightness and gaiety, and have been called the French of the Balkans.

To such a people, thoroughly equalitarian in sentiment, and quite unaccustomed either to feudalism or Kaiserdom in any form, both the Russian and the Austrian systems of government are equally alien. If they win the great national war they are now waging, it is a democratic state that they will form out of the Serb and Croat provinces which they intend to liberate from Austria.

The Servians, like every one else, have the defects of their qualities. If they have the merit of equalitarianism, they lack leadership. They have very little in the way of an upper or even a middle class, the mercantile element being very slightly developed among them as yet. If they have the peasant's virtues, they have his limitation of outlook.

I saw a good deal of the army officers, and learned to like them from conversations carried on in French or a little English; they are not a "military caste," or even a class socially apart from their soldiers. They are many of them professional men, clerks, and better-to-do peasants. The army discipline is good, but they live on easy terms with their men. They can be seen dancing the kolo, the pretty national dance of interwoven steps, with their men hand-in-hand. In battle they say not "Forward, men!" but "Let us charge, my brothers," and they have not to say it twice; their army is truly a democracy in arms. They have fine French-made cannon and rifles, and have

RUSSIA
GALICIA
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
TRANSYLVANIA
ROUMANIA
Trieste
Agram
CROATIA SCLAVONIA
BOSNIA
Belgrade
Serajero
HERZEGOVINA
SERVIA
BULGARIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
TURKEY
GREECE

now in less than two years given a good account of themselves against Turk, Bulgarian, and Austrian.

The policy of Servia, like that of every other Balkan State, including Austria, has undoubtedly been grasping. Their treatment of subject races, Albanian or Bulgarian, has been no better than the treatment accorded to subject races by Greek, Bulgar, Serb, or Austrian, who have none of them much idea of generosity and liberality in dealings with alien subjects or foreigners. That may come later, but it will not come until the states-system of southeast Europe has been recast as far as possible on racial lines, and until none of the Balkan States any longer feels a bitter sense of injustice.

If Bulgaria had beaten Servia, Rumania, and Greece last year, she would have been unjust to them. She was beaten and they were unjust to her, not leaving her with enough territory. She ought to be compensated, and there will never be peace in the Balkans until she has been. But she cannot be compensated by Servia unless Servia is allowed her proper expansion to the north, into the provinces which are called Austrian, but are in reality southern Slav.

It was Austria who caused the fatal quarrel of Bulgaria with Servia last year. After the successful Balkan war against Turkey in 1912-3, Austria did her best to set the victors by the ears, being determined to prevent the formation of a Balkan confederacy. Furthermore, she has for a generation past prevented the legitimate expansion of Servia into the Slav north, so forcing her to fight for all she could keep in the Macedonian south, at the expense of Bulgaria.

If Servia can have her legitimate expansion northwest, she would be ready to give to Bulgaria some of those districts which she insisted on keeping last year. To bring about this reconciliation of the Christian States of the Balkans in the only possible way is an aim of British policy now that war has been forced upon us by the violation of Belgium. It is a just and liberal policy.

Closely allied to the Servians are the Montenegrin mountaineers, almost identical in race and language, but more primitive and merely warlike. They will some day form part of the Greater Servia, whether by complete union or federation. In all her recent wars the Montenegrins have acted as if they were Servians.

The push northwest of Servia, if it takes place owing to Russian victories, will not be the swamping of "Teuton culture" by Slav barbarism. It will be the liberation of Slav provinces most cruelly oppressed by the Austrians. There are two main branches of the south Slav race in these provinces—the Serbs and Croats. Together with the Slovenes, another kindred race, the south Slavs in Austro-Hungary number seven millions. The Serbs belong generally to the Orthodox Church, the Croats are generally Roman Catholics. The Austrians count on this division in religion, which undoubtedly makes some division in sentiment. But now that the matter is put to the test, even in Croatia, the Austrians are only able to hold the country by imprisoning the leading men and terrorizing the inhabitants.

In Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, there is the most absolute reign of terror, and indeed so

there was for many years before the war. It is only now intensified.

The Austrian rule there, as in Italy of old, has its two well-known characteristics—material efficiency and political tyranny. They can make excellent roads and railways, and have done much to bring material civilization into places as backward as Bosnia and Herzegovina were when the Turk quitted them. But politically they have no idea save repression. The German-Austrians were indeed forced, after their defeat in 1866, to take the Magyars of Hungary into partnership with them on equal terms. Since that date the Austrians and Hungarians have combined to oppress the Slavs.

It is said that the Archduke, murdered at Sarajevo, intended to do something to liberalize the system in these Slav provinces when he came to the Austrian throne. That adds another reason why we must all regret that murder in blood and tears. Whether such a scheme was not too late, whether such a reversal of Austrian policy could have been carried through by the will of one man, we shall, alas! never know. But the Austrian assertion that the Archduke's murder was prepared or instigated in Servia is utterly unproven and in the highest degree unlikely. It is unproven, for Austria had every reason to advance the proofs if she had them, and she has advanced none. It is unlikely, because Servia was engaged in various delicate negotiations at home, among other things a negotiation with Montenegro, and it is absurd to suppose that she would have chosen that moment to force on a crisis, even if she were held capable of doing so by so base a crime. The act needs no such explanation;

it was the unfortunate outcome in a few desperate minds of the fierce discontent of the Slav provinces under Austrian and Hungarian tyranny.

The charge against Servia of murdering the Archduke has nothing more in its favour than the countercharge against the high Austrian party of leaving the Archduke unguarded in order that he might be assassinated. The one charge is worth the other. Yet, without proof and against likelihood, Austria stated that Servia was implicated in the murder. And by a forty-eight hours' ultimatum, demanding that Servia should surrender its sovereign rights and abase herself to the dust before Austria, that country has forced on a European war. By action equally unjustifiable toward Belgium, Germany has involved England in this conflict that sprang from these old blood-spots in the East.

England cannot be said to be fighting for Servia, but in so far as she has been drawn into this quarrel, she is fighting for justice and liberty, and to bring about by the only possible means a tolerable state of things in southeastern Europe and peace in the Balkan Peninsula. This can only be done by the expansion of Servia northward into the Slav provinces that long to be liberated by her, and the compensation of Bulgaria which will then be rendered possible.

The rearrangements would necessarily involve the equally just advance of Italy into the Italian districts which were only kept from her by the Austrian sword. When eastern Europe is divided as far as possible on racial and national lines, there may at last be peace and content in those unhappy regions.

X

WHY THE ALLIES WILL WIN

An Interview with

The Rt. Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE,

Minister of Munitions,

By The Editor of the "Secolo" of Milan.

X

WHY THE ALLIES WILL WIN

THE British Minister of Munitions started the conversation with that simple directness of manner and natural confidence of the man who knows his own mind and has no difficulty in seeing into the mind of his interlocutor. He asked me at once many questions. "Have you come from Milan?" "How are things going on in Italy?" "What is the state of public opinion?" "What is Giolitti doing?" "What about munitions?" "Are you making good progress in producing shells?"

The reader must not imagine that all this was the common manœuvre of the man in a high and responsible position who, when speaking to a journalist, prefers asking to answering questions. Mr. Lloyd George seemed to me sincerely interested in the information and opinions he was eliciting from me, as he undoubtedly was conversant with our affairs and political situation before and after the war. I spoke freely to him on several points, and he freely opened his mind.

He seemed particularly well informed as to our financial and economic position, and he entirely concurred with my view that English capitalists and merchants should not lose this opportunity of displacing German influences by getting a firm foothold in our

country, and establishing with us larger commercial and financial relations.

As to our war—

"Oh!" said Mr. Lloyd George, "I know what your war is like. I received some time ago, from an English officer, a photograph taken on your fighting line. I could hardly believe my eyes. The photograph reproduced a moving scene among some Alpine peaks.

"To think that fighting is going on at such heights, among insuperable rocks, on eternal snows, that you are dragging your guns up there, that you have to approach your enemy by hand over hand, is something amazing. And I have been told what the Carso plateau is. Why, it is like a rocky wall which bars the gate of Italy. And your soldiers are fighting well.

"England appreciates the unconquerable tenacity which the brave Italian troops are showing, and hopes soon to congratulate them on driving the enemy from all the unredeemed territory, and to witness further triumphs of their gallantry on behalf of the Allies.

QUESTION OF FREIGHTS

"We always were true friends of Italy, since the Garibaldian days—and now those days have come back again to you with the old glory. What I say of the country I may say of the Government. Our relations are excellent. There may be occasionally incidents and misunderstandings, but there never was and there never will be any ill will on our side.

"Now, for instance, I know you have difficulties and misgivings as to the question of freights. But as

to that you cannot blame either the Government or the nation as a whole. Why, we are experiencing the same difficulties and hardships ourselves. The rise in freights is a natural, though deplorable, consequence of the situation. There is a great scarcity of available ships of all countries, and this scarcity is bound to react on the freights.

"However, something must be done, and will be done, even now, and you may be sure that within reasonable limits our Government will do all that is within its power to better things, also to the advantage of Italy."

At this point the conversation turned from Italy to Great Britain, and I asked Mr. Lloyd George whether he was pleased with the progress of munition work.

"Yes," he said. "We woke up slowly to it. But I am now perfectly satisfied with what we are doing.

PATRIOTIC MINERS

"We have now 2,500 factories, employing one and a half million men, and a quarter of a million women. We have adapted old plants and established new ones on modern lines. We are not only satisfying the requirements of our own army, but we are also supplying our allies, particularly Russia. One cannot have an idea of the tremendous work going on in Britain just now unless one can see it.

"Some French journalists and politicians have come over here to inspect our factories, and they have been greatly impressed by what they have seen. We expect soon a party of Russians for the same purpose. I hope the Italians, too, will visit us. They would see

with their own eyes, they would come in contact with us, and would form a better idea of how things are going on in Britain, and I am sure that many misconceptions and misapprehensions would thus be dissipated, to our common advantage."

"What people in Italy do not understand," I said, "is why the trade unions did not accept the modification of their rules as purely a measure for the war only."

Mr. Lloyd George said: "Naturally the great trade unions are jealous of their rights and customs. It was through them that the British workmen have won their industrial birthright and their liberties which they enjoy as workers; the wages they receive and the regulation of hours are the outcome of organized effort."

He counselled me not to be alarmed about the resolution of the miners. "The miners," he said, "are among the toughest fighters in the British army, and so many were eager to enlist that we had to stop them."

The Minister of Munitions' son, by the way, Major Richard Lloyd George, is in a regiment composed almost entirely of South Wales miners. Mr. Lloyd George's second son, Lieutenant Gwilym Lloyd George, is in the same division.

"Our voluntary army," said Mr. Lloyd George, "exceeds 3,000,000, and the men now being trained and going to the front are the flower of the nation's manhood. They are the classes between nineteen and thirty years of age, who are largely exhausted in the armies of the enemy. They are just coming on with us, and they are splendid material.

"I am absolutely confident," declared Mr. Lloyd George.

"But on what ground do you base your confidence?"

"First of all, on the fact that now the Allies are at last taking counsel together. We have made mistakes in the past, all of us, and we all suffered alike. We were acting independently from one another. Great Britain was waging her war. So were France, Russia, and Italy. Only lately we have steered a better course.

WHAT UNION MEANS

"There is now, through the councils we have formed, a constant exchange of views between the Allies, and all-important decisions are taken by common accord. The relations between Great Britain and France are perfectly harmonious. Italy, too, is united in our councils. My friend, M. Thomas, the French Under-Secretary of State for Munitions, has just suggested to me that our next meeting should take place in Rome, or in some other Italian city. I should be delighted at that if time and distance permitted. Now you know what union means. But we are and shall be stronger, not only because we are united, but also because we shall have really more men and more munitions, and this is the second fact on which I base my confidence.

"By next spring we shall have turned out an immense amount of munitions. We shall have for the first time in the war more than the enemy. Our superiority in men and materials will be unquestioned, and I think the war for us is beginning only now.

"We were all caught unprepared. The French, Russians, and Italians had to organize their armies. We had to create a new one. We have now three millions under arms; by the spring we shall have a million more. You have seen our soldiers. They are strong, fit, and well equipped."

"Yes," I said, "I was really struck by their appearance. But what about officers?"

GERMANY'S LOSSES

"We have made them. Young men from public schools and universities do not take long to learn. They are not professional. But are there many professional officers left anywhere? I am afraid that a great many of them have been killed. Germany, too, cannot be well off by this time as to professional officers, and not only as to that.

"Her economic and financial conditions are getting worse every day. And that is the third fact on which I base my confidence. The riots in Berlin and other cities must mean something. She can still import things, but not on a scale to enable her to go on successfully for a long period. The army will be the last to feel the distress in Germany, but it, too, will feel it."

"Do you think," I asked, "there is any danger of the war ending in a military deadlock?"

"That would not be the end," he replied; "the victory must be a real and a final victory. The long line, extending to 2,000 miles, held by the enemy must be broken. You must not think of a deadlock. You must crack the nut before you get at the kernel. It may take a long time, but you must hear the crack.

"Wearing down the outside by attrition is too long, and would not be a smashing and pulverizing victory. The pressure on the enemy is becoming greater; they are spreading their frontiers temporarily, but they are becoming weaker in a military sense. The process of strangulation is going on, and will squeeze more and more the material resources of the enemy.

"This is a war of democracy," continued Mr. Lloyd George. "If it were not a war of democracy I would not be in it. I was against the last war in which Great Britain was engaged, but on this occasion the whole future of democracy—in Britain, France, Russia, Italy, all over the world—is involved. It is a final test between military autocracy and political liberty.

"It is a grim struggle, but we are going to win; of that I am quite confident. The enemy has gone beyond the height of his power, and is on the down grade. We and our allies are gaining strength every day. The Central Empires have lost their opportunity of victory, and they know it.

"Our whole country is united on the war. If there were an election now there would not be one member returned who is against the war. I do not foresee any difficulty with regard to compulsion.

"No fewer than six millions have offered themselves for the Army. Some were unfit, many were required for munition works, for railways, for mines—national work which is just as essential as services in the field. The number who would come under compulsion was at the most 320,000, and that number is diminishing every day by enlistment.

"Make no mistake about it. Great Britain is

determined to fight this war to a finish. We may make mistakes, but we do not give in. It was the obstinacy of Britain that wore down Napoleon after twenty years of warfare. Allies broke away one by one, but Britain kept on. Our allies on this occasion are just as solid and determined as we are."

XI

THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK ON THE WAR IN BELGIUM

A Commentary

By PROFESSOR A. A. H. STRUYCKEN.

XI

THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK ON THE WAR IN BELGIUM

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THE charges made against the German army of misconduct at the time of the invasion of Belgium during the months of August and September, 1914, which have occupied so large a place in the public press, received official confirmation in the reports of the Belgian Committee. ("La Violation du Droit des Gens en Belgique," Berger-Levrault, Paris, and Libraires-Editeurs, Nancy. An English translation has been published as a Parliamentary Paper: "Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium," Harrison and Sons, London.) This has been supplemented by the important evidence collected in this country among the Belgian refugees, and published as the report of the Commission on Alleged German Outrages.

Charges of this kind when made officially by the Government of the country could not be ignored or

left unanswered, and in May, 1915, the German Government, which had hitherto confined itself to vague and general repudiation of the accusations, published their official reply.* Those who wish to investigate one of the most lamentable episodes in the whole history of war are therefore now able to compare the case for what we may call the prosecution and the defence. But this comparison requires a trained legal mind, it can only be made by one who is accustomed to weigh, analyze, and test evidence. It is a comparison which, moreover, can be better undertaken by the citizen of a neutral State than by one whose country is a participant in the war. This is the task which Professor Struycken has undertaken. No one could be better suited for the work. For many years a distinguished professor in the faculty of law at the University of Amsterdam, and now a member of the Council of State, he belongs to a country which has from the time of Grotius associated itself with the effort to bring international relations and the conduct of war under the influence of law and justice. In the following pages he has submitted the German case to a close investigation; it is a work that deserves to be more widely known than it could be so long as it was accessible only in the Dutch magazine in which it originally appeared, and this translation has been issued in the belief that it will be of material assistance to those English-speaking readers who would desire to understand the nature of the defence put for-

*It should be noted that the report of the English Commission did not appear till after the publication of the German White Book, which, therefore, contains no reference to it.

ward by the German Government against the charges brought against the German army.

1.—OBJECTS OF THE WHITE BOOK, AND THE LEGAL POSITION

THE Governments of the belligerent States continue zealously to collect and publish material with regard to the manner in which the war has been conducted by their enemies; and apparently, so far as the rules of law and humanity are concerned, importance is still attached to the opinion of the great public. To a particular degree, attention continues to be focussed on the question of the respective behaviour of the German armies and the civilian inhabitants in Belgium in the first months of the war. For many people the reports on these points were decisive in determining the side to which their sympathies were to be attached during the war, and perhaps after it, too. The Belgian Official Committee of Inquiry has already published many batches of depositions to prove that German troops conducted the war in a needlessly cruel manner, destroying the lives, honour, and property of innumerable defenceless civilians, and many of the scientific and artistic monuments of the Belgian people. The German Government has now replied to this in an impresive folio of more than 325 pages bearing the title "Die Völkerrechtswidrige Führung des belgischen Volkskrieges" (Offences against international law in the conduct of the war by the Belgians), consisting of an extensive collection of evidence, mostly on oath, which is intended to prove that the numerous executions, burnings, and acts of devasta-

tion carried out by the German troops in Belgium were a *Kriegsnotwendigkeit* (necessity of war), necessary as a deterrent in view of the treacherous and criminal behaviour of the civil population, which, both at the time of and after the invasion, transgressed against all rules of law and humanity.

It is clear that, owing to the failure to entrust the investigations to neutral commissions, we must despair of ever learning the *whole* truth with regard to what happened in Belgium in August and September of last year. The evidence collected is already extensive enough, but is in many respects contradictory, and each side pours contempt on the investigations of their antagonists and on the trustworthiness of the witnesses examined by them. It would be rash, however, to infer from this that all neutral investigation is superfluous, and that the study of the atrocity books published on either side is a waste of time. On the contrary the impartial looker-on may find much that has already been definitely established and which will go down as historical truth whatever the end of the war may be; and, if we are not mistaken, the above-mentioned publication of the German Government will, in many respects, give considerable assistance in forming a true view of the attitude adopted by the German troops toward the population.

This book is entirely different in character from the reports of the Belgian, French, and English Commissions. The latter purport to be indictments of the German army, and with that in view present in an almost monotonous and unbroken series the declarations of victims and witnesses of German out-

rages. The German book, on the other hand, is a defence, not designed primarily to deny the outrages which are the subject of this charge—to some extent they are described therein in all their details—but to justify them in the very words of those actually responsible. In it are given the statements of the officers and soldiers who took part in the proceedings against the Belgian civil population. The book, therefore, enables one to obtain insight into the state of mind in which officers and soldiers ordered and carried out the innumerable executions and acts of destruction which took place. We learn, from their own mouths, how the troops conceived their attitude to the inhabitants to be justifiable according to the law of nations, on what grounds they thought themselves entitled to carry out their cruel deeds, what evidence they regarded as sufficient to establish the so severely punished offences of the citizens, what relation they established between punishment and crime, and what procedure was followed for the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. So regarded, this book offers interesting material for the investigation of the criminologist, moralist, and psychologist. Here we can only make a few general observations presenting themselves on a first perusal.

The work opens with a "Denkschrift" (memorandum) by the German Government which can be regarded as a summary of the conclusions drawn by them from the evidence in the Appendices. In the eyes of the German Government it is an established fact that a wilder Volkskampf (savage people's war), against the German army, broke out in Belgium immediately

after the invasion, and that this must be regarded as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. Civilians of every station in life—workmen, manufacturers, doctors, teachers, priests, women, and children—were taken with weapons in their hands. From houses and gardens, from roofs and cellars, from fields and woods, civilians fired upon the German troops; the soldiers were exposed to a most despicable ill-treatment; hot tar and boiling water were poured upon them; eyes were gouged out, ears, nose, and fingers were cut off, bellies cut open, &c., &c.; all this following on an apparently friendly reception on the part of the inhabitants.

In face of this the German army was not only justified in taking, but obliged to take, the severest measures (schärfsten Massnahmen); the guilty had to be treated not as soldiers and prisoners of war, but as criminals and murderers; the innocent had to suffer with the guilty, hostages were taken in great numbers to be killed if necessary as a deterrent, houses had to be burned down, villages and towns devastated, &c.

In forming a judgment on all this, the German Government takes up the standpoint that its troops as well as the Belgian population were subject to The Hague Convention of 1907 as to the laws of war. It therefore makes no use of the formally correct excuse, first made by Professor F. R. von Liszt, that since States have come into this war which did not accept that convention, it is, according to its own rules, not binding upon any party. Indeed, whether this excuse is relied upon or not, it makes little difference to the consideration of the behaviour of the

army toward the civilian population, for this would in that case be regulated by the convention of 1899 which was signed by all States, and contains the same rules on this subject as that of 1907.* In accordance, therefore, with article 2 of the convention, the German Government distinguishes between fighting by the inhabitants in territory already occupied by the troops (as in Aerschot, Andenne, and Louvain), in which the unorganized population taking part in hostilities can never, according to the laws of nations, claim to be treated as combatants—that is as soldiers—and the forcible resistance of the population to the invading troops in territory hitherto unoccupied as in the frontier places and in Dinant and its neighbourhood, where the unorganized population, provided that they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war, must, according to the convention, be regarded as combatants, if on the approach of the enemy they take up arms spontaneously to resist the invading troops, without having had time to organize themselves.

A perusal of the evidence of the various witnesses, however, fails to show that the officers ever took this legal distinction into account, or even that it was present to their minds. Civilians supposed to have taken part in the fighting were never treated as soldiers, but always as criminals. One is inclined to seek the reason for this in the circumstance that the book "Kriegsbrauch in Landkriege" (*i. e.*, the German War Book) by means of which the officers are educated

*The Convention of 1899 is rather more favourable to the civilian population in so far as it does not, like that of 1907, require that they should carry weapons openly if they are to be regarded as combatants.

in the law of nations, does not make this distinction, or rather, bearing in mind what was settled at The Hague, rejects it, requiring that, in all cases, in all hostilities in which the people take part, there should be a military organization and military emblems openly worn.

The passage runs as follows: "But the organization of irregulars in military bands and their subjection to a responsible leader are not by themselves sufficient to enable one to grant them the status of belligerents; even more important than these is the necessity of being able to recognize them as such and of their carrying their arms openly. . . .

"This condition must also be maintained if it becomes a question of the *levée en masse*, the arming of the whole population of the country, province, or district; in other words the so-called people's war or national war. Starting from the view that one can never deny to the population of a country the natural right of defence of one's fatherland, and that the smaller and consequently less powerful States can only find protection in such *levées en masse*, the majority of authorities on international law have, in their proposals for codification, sought to attain the recognition on principle of the combatant status of all these kinds of people's champions, and in the Brussels declaration and The Hague Regulations the aforesaid condition is omitted. As against this one may nevertheless remark that the condition requiring a military organization and a clearly recognizable mark of being attached to the enemy's troops, is not synonymous with *a denial of the natural right of defence of one's*

country. It is therefore not a question of restraining the population from seizing arms but only of compelling it to do this in an organized manner. 'Subjection to a responsible leader, a military organization, and clear recognizability cannot be left out of account unless the whole recognized foundation for the admission of irregulars is going to be given up altogether and a conflict of one private individual against another is to be introduced again, with all its attendant horrors, of which, for example, the proceedings in Bazeilles in the last Franco-Prussian War affords an instance. If the necessary organization does not really become established—a case which is by no means likely to occur often—then nothing remains but a conflict of individuals, and those who conduct it cannot claim the rights of an active military status. The disadvantages and severities inherent in such a state of affairs are more insignificant and less inhuman than those which would result from recognition.' (Professor Dr. C. Luder, Das Landkriegsrecht, Hamburg, 1888.)"* The German Government, however, gives another reason why the troops in unoccupied territories must treat resisting inhabitants in the same manner as in occupied territories, that is, as criminals. Listen to this: "But the unorganized people's war was also impermissible in those places which had not yet been occupied by German troops, and particularly in Dinant and the neighbourhood, as the Belgian Government had sufficient time for an organization of the people's war as required by international law. For years the Belgian

*Translator's Note. The version of the passage from German War Book here given is from Professor Morgan's translation, pp. 62–63.

Government has had under consideration that at the outbreak of a Franco-German war it would be involved in the operations; the preparation of mobilization began, as can be proved, at least a week before the invasion of the German army. The Government was, therefore, completely in a position to provide the civil population with military badges and appoint responsible leaders, so far as they wished to use their services in any fighting which might take place."

One has some reason to be astonished at such scornful remarks addressed to the Belgian Government by a Government which was a co-guarantor of Belgian neutrality, and had repeatedly in recent times, before the invasion, given the assurance that this would be respected. In any case, it reveals a misunderstandng as regards the aims of The Hague Convention. In the first place it by no means follows from Article 2 of the convention that the population taking up arms without fulfilling the conditions contained therein is acting in conflict with the law of nations, and at the Conference at Brussels and at the first Peace Conference it was precisely the Belgian delegates who took the lead in obviating the possibility that any such inference should be drawn from the convention. Armed resistance not in accordance with The Hague Convention does not enjoy the protection of the law of the nations; those who take part in it have not the *right* to be regarded as soldiers, but it does not by any means follow that their actions are to be regarded as in conflict with the law. In the second place, it is not a question whether the Belgian *Government* was in

a position to organize civilian population for warlike purposes—this Government did not desire it. No, the convention is designed to protect the *population* in places where they have, on their own initiative, taken up arms to repel the enemy, and therefore the question that must be put is whether the *population* had had sufficient time to give themselves a military organization. If one is to assume that, in the given circumstances, the population in the Belgian frontier villages and Dinant had, in fact, sufficient time for this, one can without hesitation strike out the provisions of Article 2 of the convention on the ground that they are never applicable.

However that may be, whether because they had never been taught anything else, or because the explanation of the convention now given by the German Government was then before them, the German officers had no hesitation in applying the same methods both to occupied and unoccupied territories whenever they imagined themselves to be confronted by forcible resistance on the part of the civilian inhabitants. What that meant may be illustrated by the events at Dinant, as given in the German White Book.

On the 23d August Dinant was stormed by the German troops. They were under the impression that the part of the town lying on the right-hand side of the Meuse had already been evacuated by the Belgian troops. As they entered they were in fact fired upon from all sides, and, as they thought, out of the houses. In the conviction that the civilian inhabitants were responsible for this, house after house was stormed and cleared of inhabitants. As it ap-

peared impossible to obtain control of the town in this way it was then destroyed by artillery.

What had now to be the fate of the civilian inhabitants who—in the opinion of the German troops—had offered forcible resistance? On the 23d August, even according to the judgment of the German Government, the town did not form part of the occupied territory. The population, so the German troops were convinced, had organized armed resistance, and had taken up arms on their own initiative to resist the invading troops. That the latter, in this belief, stormed the houses in order to overcome the resistance, is clear. Had they met with armed resistance in the course of this, and repelled it by force, the victims thereof would have had nothing to complain of. But—by hundreds and hundreds, men, women, and children, were taken prisoners in the houses, on suspicion of having fired. What was their fate to be? If they fell under the protection of Article 2 of the convention they should have been treated as combatants, as soldiers, *i. e.*, they should have been made prisoners of war and in accordance with Article 4 of the convention, have been treated with humanity. What happened to them? *They were all "niedergemacht" (slaughtered).* How? One deposition out of many, that of "stabsarzt" (staff-surgeon) Dr. Petrenz, shows how. He tells us of his experiences on the morning of the 24th August, the day after the assault:—"On the bank of the Meuse between the river and a garden wall directly to the left of the pontoon bridge lay a heap of civilians who had been shot; I do not know how many, I estimate about thirty to forty. I do not

know who had shot them. I have heard that the Grenadier Regiment No. 101 carried out an execution there. *Among the people who were shot were some women, but by far the greater number were young lads. Under the heap I discovered a girl of about five years of age, alive and without any injuries.* I took her out and brought her down to the house where the women were. She took chocolate, was quite happy, and was clearly unaware of the seriousness of the situation. I then searched the heap of bodies to see whether any other children were underneath. But we only found *one girl of about ten years of age who had a wound in the lower leg.* I had her wound dressed and brought her at once to the women."

II.—THE PUBLISHED EVIDENCE

The German White Book consists of an "Auslese" (selection) from the comprehensive material at the disposal of the German Government. It does not by any means deal with the whole course of the war in Belgium, nor with the long series of charges which have been made against the German troops by the Belgians. It merely deals, by way of example, with the events in the places concerning which the most serious charges have been made, especially the frontier villages and Aerschot, Andenne Dinant and Louvain.

In what spirit has this "selection" been put together? Has the collection of the most important data concerning the various events been made in an impartial manner? Or have all the documents tending to inculpate the Germans been put on one side and the choice been limited to the reports and declarations

which, it was hoped, would throw a favourable light on the German troops? To be in a position to form a considered judgment on this it would be necessary to know the unpublished documents as well. Nevertheless, it may be said that the German Government, however much it may assert its conviction that its troops are innocent, at any rate of any more serious excesses than such as are unavoidable in the best regulated armies invading an enemy country, must, in the compilation of its White Book, have perceived that its perusal was not likely to produce the same conviction in the mind of every reader. In one respect, indeed, impartiality has been exhibited by Berlin, for the White Book is by no means limited to such declarations as place beyond doubt the guilt of the civilian inhabitants, and the right of the troops to take forcible steps against them; on the other hand, however, a one-sided character has been given to the published material by excluding from it important documents which are indispensable for the knowledge of the whole truth. With regard to this we are not referring to the peculiar fact that the sworn depositions are almost exclusively those of Protestant witnesses, and only in exceptional cases those of Catholics—that may be a mere coincidence—but to the fact that the book contains none of the numerous depositions made before the German Commissioners of Enquiry in the occupied territories by Belgian and neutral citizens, although, surely, no better means could have been chosen to establish the truth than to have the events described by the military also described and explained by peaceful citizens. Only two such

reports are included, and it is not apparent why precisely these two have been chosen out of the many that are available.

The first relates to the examination by a lieutenant of the Burgomaster and some inhabitants of the little town of Andenne, where, according to the report, 200 citizens were killed on the 20th August. The witnesses examined, who indeed were nearly all prisoners, or wounded, or hiding in their cellars on the day in question, have, generally speaking, very little of importance to impart; in particular none of them support the statement of the Military Commander that the citizens had fired, and had used machine-guns, bombs, and hand-grenades, too. With regard to the Burgomaster, the report indeed says: "He only knew that at 7 P. M. on the 20th August a murderous fire was opened on our troops who wished to cross the bridge at Seilles." But, when it comes to the point, it does not add that he declared that this shooting was by *civilians*. The observation of the manufacturer Debrun that at about 7 o'clock an aeroplane appeared above the town, whereupon the German troops immediately opened fire, as to which fact nothing is found in the military evidence, is the only one which is worthy of remark. The witness adds that immediately thereon firing commenced in all parts of the town. Comparing this statement with the military reports—only two of these are inserted—one cannot escape the inference that the shooting at the airmen by some of the troops was thought by the others to be shooting by the civilian inhabitants, and that this mistake gave occasion to the cruel massacre. When one thinks of the

bullets fired at the airmen falling to earth again the complaint of shooting from "Dachoffnungen" (holes in the roof) is explained, as is also the remark of the General: "Wonderfully enough our losses were slight; the *franctireurs* aimed very badly."

The other report is of the examination of Professor Albert Lemaire, director of the St. Peter's Hospital at Louvain. Why his statement is inserted is not clear. He expressly says that he did not see "that civilians fired into the streets from the houses." On the other hand, shots were repeatedly fired upon himself when he went into the garden of his house in the evening. That this was done by Belgian citizens can hardly be supposed. The remainder of his declaration—"Nearly all the houses of the doctors and professors in Leopold Street were burned. On the following day for safety's sake I had my family taken to the hospital by two German soldiers. On Thursday, 27th August, the bombardment and destruction of the town was announced. I went with my family into the country. On my return I found that my house also had been burned down"—does not assist the Germans in justifying their conduct in Louvain.

The gap caused by the absence of depositions of peaceful Belgians and more important still, of neutral citizens, must be filled, if the White Book is to be entirely convincing. There is all the more reason for the German Government to do this, for the fact that they more than once lay stress on communications and expressions of opinion from such quarters which were transmitted to the Committee of Enquiry by German witnesses, shows that they themselves ap-

parently attach great importance to the evidence and opinion of these citizens. Such a reference, for instance, was made by a captain of cavalry in his evidence with regard to the events at Aerschot. He had picked out the "am intelligentesten Aussehenden" (the most intelligent looking) from a troop of civilian prisoners —he appeared to be a "Seminarlehrer" (seminary teacher)—and informed him that all the guilty prisoners should be shot but that he (the captain) would take steps to save the professor's life provided that he would betray the truth with regard to the alleged attack by the citizens, whereupon he is said to have been told: "that it was a great mistake on the part of the citizens of Aerschot to have received fugitive Belgian soldiers, kept them in hiding and put them in civilian clothes. These had without question united with the *Garde Civique* and an attack had then been undertaken by them." What would it not be worth to have the statements made by such an intelligent witness himself before a judge, under oath, not as a ransom for his life but given in entire freedom! So too, Herr Sittart, a member of the Reichstag, who makes the following remarkable statement under oath: "On the 31st August at Louvain, a number of women of the town complained to me in tears of the trouble which had come upon them owing to the bombardment of the town. They expressly admitted that our troops had been fired upon from houses and cellars. One of these, a widow of a doctor, said indeed that those who had done it belonged to the *Garde Civique*. When she heard, however, that in Aix-la-Chapelle there were wounded who had been seriously injured by small

shot, she had to admit that civilians had taken part in the shooting as well. She agreed with me, too, when I said that neither the *Garde Civique* nor the regular troops deserve any consideration when they fire from an ambush, from cellars and roofs instead of in open and honourable combat. The Vice-Rector of the University of Louvain, Mgr. Coenraets, told me that he, as a hostage, had been ordered to read a proclamation to the people, to the effect that the hostages would be shot and the town bombarded if the troops were treacherously fired upon. He had scarcely read this in one street when in fact shots were fired upon the German soldiers accompanying him."—How much more value would it not have had to hear, not what an unnamed woman had "admitted" to a member of the Reichstag, not what an unnamed doctor's widow had finally to "admit" to him, and in what respect she had to "agree" with his view, but the direct evidence given by civilian inhabitants before a judge concerning the facts that they had observed. And so, further, what would it not have been worth to hear directly what the hostages could tell us with regard to the shooting of which they were witnesses, and whether they really observed that German soldiers were fired upon by citizens and out of houses. Various professors of the University, including some neutrals, have been examined by the German administration. To their direct evidence one would certainly attach more weight than to the hearsay of a member of the Reichstag, who had not been himself a witness of the incidents, though, nevertheless, he had not been able to find any better consolation for the sorrowing women of

Louvain than to use them for the purpose of obtruding his *opinion* that the guilt lay exclusively at the doors of their husbands and children.

III.—THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

In considering why the German White Book has in many respects so little convincing power, one discovers the chief reason in the fact that in justifying the cruel punishments administered to the citizens of Belgium so little direct evidence with regard to events observed by the witnesses themselves has been collected or, at any rate, published. What we have before us consists far too much of suppositions, guesses, assurances, for the truth of which no satisfactory grounds are given. It is inconceivable that the persons charged with the investigation—a "Kriegsgerichtsrat" or "Oberkriegsgerichtsrat," sometimes an "Amtsrichter" or "Oberamtsrichter"—could have been satisfied with it; at every desposition there rises to the lips of the reader of their report question after question, the answer to which appears to be indispensable to the forming of a correct judgment, but which, nevertheless, were not put to the witnesses. One would gladly have had the direct evidence of many of the soldiers concerned, which, being that of eye-witnesses, would have the greatest importance—but their evidence is not found in the White Book. The possibility of guilt on the part of the civilian population is certainly not excluded, but the fact that the military authorities in Berlin are satisfied with this method of investigation, and apparently regard the evidence now published as satisfactory, makes us shudder at the

thought of the evidence on which, in the confusion of the fighting, in the witches' cauldron of Dinant, in burning Aerschot and in so many other places in unhappy Belgium, sentence of death was carried out on thousands of citizens by officers and by soldiers of lower rank.

"Man hat geschossen" (there has been firing), was the ordinary signal for death and destruction. One would expect to find in this dossier abundant and direct proof of the fact that civilians had fired; in such a furious contest as that between the citizens and the army would have been, there must have been hundreds of witnesses available who observed the facts themselves. Relatively few witnesses, however, are produced who make a direct statement on this; moreover, their observation frequently took place under such circumstances as to magnify the chances of error: as for instance, when forms were seen in the darkness, shooting down from the upper storeys of houses, or out of holes in the roof, or out of trees, or firing took place from cellars, or loopholes near the ground, on passing soldiers, &c. With regard to Andenne and Aerschot not a single direct statement is given. As a rule the charge rests on hearsay statements, or on suppositions, such as: "firing took place out of the houses, shooting from cellar-holes and openings in the roof"; "the sound of the shot was not that of a German weapon"; "apparently small shot was fired"; "light smoke and dust clouds rose above the roof"; "there were no further Belgian or French soldiers in the place"; or "could not have been in the place," &c., &c. If one takes into account that the German

troops lived in a state of constant fear of shooting by civilians, as to whose treachery and cruelty the wildest rumours were in circulation; that many places had only very recently or only partly been evacuated by the Belgians and the French; that German soldiers were frequently billeted in the houses; that a single shot and the rumour that it was fired by a civilian instigated the soldiers to a furious bombardment of the houses with rifles and machine guns, which the officers were often unable to stop, one can attach no great importance to such evidence even though it was also stated that "Es waren bestimmt Zivilisten" (it was certainly done by civilians), and one must still ask for *direct* evidence.

And this all the more since there is so much, in the story of the resistance by the population, to arouse astonishment and compel suspicion. If the stories are true, the Belgian population in various places has made an incomprehensible display of insane heroism. Although the town is occupied by the Germans, and as a punishment for the supposed firing on the troops is set on fire in all directions and blown to ruins; although hundreds of citizens are taken prisoners and shot; although every citizen knows what his fate will be if the merest suspicion arise that his house has been fired from; nevertheless, they continue, day after day, day and night—greybeard, men, women, priests, children, down to little girls of ten—without hesitation, to fire on the troops as they pass by, although they know with certainty that it can only lead to their own destruction. But—and the contrast is remarkable—whenever the houses in which

the firing took place are stormed and the soldiers force their way in, all their courage appears to vanish: there arises no hand-to-hand fight between civilians and soldiers in which many are killed on either side; no, the civilians are merely "niedergemacht" (cut down), or, indeed, defenceless and helpless, taken prisoner and driven along, with upraised hands, into the market place or square to meet their fate.

And how bad the shooting of the civilians was! Various officers themselves were amazed at this; *the losses of the Germans were always very small.* In narrow winding streets the citizens opened fire on the troops as they marched past; from the surrounding houses they fired on the columns which were halted on the square, not in single shots, no, a "lebhaftes Schnellfeuer" (lively rapid firing)—a "sehr heftiges (very violent), "kolossales" "rasendes" (furious), "mörderisches" (murderous), "wütendes" (fierce), rifle fire —a "mad," "devastating" "Schieszerei" (firing)— "es krachte von allen Seiten, aus allen Häusern wurde geschossen, von allen Hängen blitzte es auf" (it burst from all sides, all the houses were fired from, it flashed from every slope); they fired with pistols, sporting guns, rifles, machine guns, bombs, and hand grenades. One would have expected an innumerable list of victims—but hardly any are heard of. In some places they are not referred to at all, in other cases only few are mentioned.

The Belgian civilian population was guilty of cruel outrages on German wounded and therefore deserved no consideration. As an example one might instance the fact, which has attracted much attention and

has been exploited by the German press to arouse hatred against the Belgians who were defending their country, and which also occasioned a cry of horror from many neutrals—the gouging out of the eyes of the wounded, even by women and young girls. The White Book declares this fact to be established, and speaks of the "bestialische Verhalten der Bevölkerung" (bestial behaviour of the population); many neutrals believed it, too. One refers to the report expecting to find the depositions of doctors, especially in military hospitals, or the depositions of those who themselves had been maltreated, and *nothing* of the sort is to be found. Has no single wounded or dead man whose eyes may have been gouged out, been examined by a medical man? Has no single one of the many who were maltreated survived so as to be able to give evidence of his maltreatment? As long as such evidence is not published it cannot seriously be imagined that the allegation is proved. The only evidence is that of about eight soldiers and an officer that they saw wounded men or corpses on the ground whose eyes had been gouged out. How they knew that the eyes had been *gouged out* and not destroyed by shell splinters, by birds of prey, or by decay, is not stated. A reservist, whose calling is that of a bookkeeper, declares indeed positively "the nature of the wound showed with certainty that the eyes had been gouged out deliberately and not in the course of fighting," and without hesitation the "Kriegsgerichtsrat" accepts his statement without any enquiry as to why this bookkeeper possessed such remarkable knowledge. He will blush for it some day.

For the ascertainment of the nature and cause of wounds of that kind expert investigation is indispensable. The charge that the eyes of wounded have been gouged out has been circulated both in the west and in the east, but we have never heard that the fact has been scientifically established; on the contrary, we have repeatedly seen the accusation repelled by experts as deliberately untrue.* In the absence of further evidence, the repetition of such charges can only be indulged in at the risk of being guilty of calumny.

As may be conceived, strong measures were taken whenever the German troops believed that firing by the civil population had taken place. On what principle did they act in such cases? Did the officers act in accordance with The Hague Convention which, with special reference to the measures to be taken with regard to combatant civilians, admonishes belligerents that the population, even where the convention does not protect them, "remains under the protection and governance of the principles of the law of nations, derived from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience," a warning which enabled many States to join in the convention which otherwise in their opinion did not afford sufficient protection to the population? Did they, in particular, bear in mind Article 50 of the convention, which expressly prescribes that "no collective penalty . . .

*The case of the wounded in hospital at Aix-la-Chapelle is known to every one. With regard to the hospitals at Vienna, Prof. Lammasch reports in the *Deutsche Revue* that he has investigated several cases, in which maltreatment of this kind has been alleged, but that investigation revealed that the loss of the soldier's eyes was attributable to shell splinters.

shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible?" Or did they remember the lessons given them by the great General Staff by means of the German War Book, in which they were warned against the "humanitären Anschauungen" (humanitarian views) of the day which not seldom degenerate into "Sentimentalität" (sentimentality) and "weichlicher Gefuhlschwärmerei" (flabby emotion), and are in entire opposition (volkommenem Widerspruch) to the nature and object of war, and which have already found moral recognition in some of the rules of The Hague Convention?* And did the fact that Article 50 of the convention is not referred to in the booklet issued by the General Staff and that, on the contrary, the suppression of armed resistance by the population by means of the most ruthless mea-

*In the modern usages of war one can no longer regard merely the traditional inheritance of the ancient etiquette of the profession of arms, and the professional outlook accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the *currents of thought which agitate our time.* But since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion (Sentimentalität und weichlicher Gefuhlschwärmerei) there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences. Moreover, the officer is a child of his time. He is subject to the intellectual tendencies which influence his own nation; the more educated he is the more will this be the case. The *danger that, in this way, he will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of.* The danger can only be met by a thorough study of war itself. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war—nay, more, that *the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them.* (German War Book. *See* Professor Morgan's translation, pp. 54-55 *ib.*)

sures and terrorism is recommended by reference to Napoleon and Wellington,* give them the impression that the considerations referred to above apply to this Article also?

The White Book gives a few instances of humane treatment, especially of women and children, and no one will doubt that many other instances could have been given—the German soldier is still a man—nevertheless it does not appear from these instances that the many acts of inhumanity with which the Germans are accused, in the Belgian, French, and English reports, did not take place. But if one asks

*By war rebellion is to be understood the taking up of arms by the inhabitants against the occupation; by war treason, on the other hand, the injury or imperilling of the enemy's authority through deceit or through communication of news to one's own army as to the disposition, movement, and intention, etc., of the army in occupation, whether the person concerned has come into possession of his information by lawful or unlawful means (*i. e.*, by espionage).

Against both of these only the most ruthless measures are effective. Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph, when, after the latter ascended the throne of Naples, the inhabitants of lower Italy made various attempts at revolt: "The security of your dominion depends on how you behave in the conquered province. Burn down a dozen places which are not willing to submit themselves. Of course, not until you have first looted them; my soldiers must not be allowed to go away with their hands empty. Have three to six persons hanged in every village which has joined the revolt; pay no respect to the cassock. Simply bear in mind how I dealt with them in Piacenza and Corsica." The Duke of Wellington, in 1814, threatened the South of France; "he will, if leaders of factions are supported, burn the villages and have their inhabitants hanged." In the year 1815, he issued the following proclamation: "All those who after the entry of the (English) army into France leave their dwellings and all those who are found in the service of the usurper will be regarded as adherents of his and as enemies; their property will be used for the maintenance of the army." "These are the expressions in the one case of one of the great masters of war and of the dominion founded upon war power, and in the other, of a commander-in-chief who elsewhere had carried the protection of private property in hostile lands to the extremest possible limit. Both men as soon as a popular rising takes place resort to terrorism."—J. von Hartmann, *Kritische Versuche*, II, p. 73. (German War Book. *See* Prof. Morgan's version, pp. 121-122. Translator.)

what system was followed in suppressing the actual or supposed resistance of the civil population, the answer can only be that it was one of "*terrorism,*" *slaughter and destruction of both the guilty and the innocent, on a large scale utterly disproportionate, to the measure of guilt found or thought to be found, and designed not only for the suppression of the supposed resistance but as a deterrent for the future.* Clearly the humanitarian principle contained in Article 50 of the convention was not regarded as binding.

In conclusion, we may test the general observations given above by reference to a particular instance, namely, the series of events at Aerschot.

IV.—AERSCHOT

Aerschot is an old town of about 8,000 inhabitants, and lies to the north of Louvain. On the morning of the 19th of August there took place in its immediate neighbourhood, an engagement between German and Belgian troops, as a result of which the former entered the town.* In the course of the day the place became crowded with soldiers—infantry and cavalry, supply artillery and ammunition columns. About five o'clock the staff arrived. Colonel Stenger, commanding the brigade, together with his adjutant, Captain Schwarz, and his orderly officer, Lieutenant Beyersdorf, took up quarters in the house of the Burgomaster on the market square. Captain Karge, of the military police, went to the house of the Burgo-

*For all that follows the White Book is the exclusive source. Even where we give our own explanation of the facts this is exclusively founded on the German statements. The use of statements from other sources would lead one to a conclusion not wholly coincident with this.

master's brother, situated in a narrow street, which ran toward the market place in a northerly or northwesterly direction. Captain Folz, of the 49th Infantry Regiment, arrived at the same time as the latter, and shortly after came Colonel Jenrich, who acted as local commandant, and Captain Schleusener, with his machine gun company.

With the exception of Colonel Stenger, who was killed, these are the witnesses whose statements are contained in the White Book. The book contains no evidence given by citizens of Aerschot.

The troops were well received by the inhabitants. Immediately after his arrival, Colonel Jenrich summoned the Burgomaster, warned him against any hostile behaviour on the part of the inhabitants, and impressed upon him "that he would suffer the penalty of death if an attack were made on the German troops by the population."

At 8 o'clock in the evening shots were suddenly heard in the neighbourhood of the market place. The first shots were followed by volleys, and then by lively rapid firing. The soldiers, who filled the narrow winding streets and the market place, fell into great disorder and fired without intermission; the mounted men and drivers left their horses in the lurch, the horses bolted and the wagons ran into each other. The officers hurried out, attempted by orders and signals to make the soldiers cease firing, a task in which they only succeeded with difficulty.*

*"I, too, with Captain Schwarz, left the room at the first shot in order to restore order in the market place among the troops, who had fallen into disorder owing to the shooting" (*Beyersdorf*).

"The drivers and artillery soldiers had in the meantime left their horses and

The houses were fired upon with rifles and machine guns, some were stormed and set on fire, the fleeing townsfolk were taken prisoners and a large number of them shot.

Did the *townspeople* fire? Not one of the witnesses examined deposes to having seen this; not one of them found a citizen with arms in his hands; not one of them had heard from any one else that he had done this. Nevertheless they were convinced of it. On what did their conviction rest?

Captain Schwarz and Lieutenant Beyersdorf, when, in the house of the Burgomaster, they heard the first shots, were of opinion, to begin with, that these emanated from the enemy, who had been reported in the north. This appeared to be incorrect. Soon shots fell in their immediate neighbourhood; and the Burgomaster's house itself was fired upon. By citizens or soldiers? Both officers state positively "Von den eigenen Truppen rührten die Schüsse nicht her" (the shots did not come from our own troops). How could they know that? All the other witnesses declare that their own troops fired without intermission, and principally on the market square itself. It follows, therefore, that the statement of the two officers, posi-

wagons and taken cover from the shots in the entrances of the houses. The wagons to some extent had run together, because the horses, becoming restless, had sought their own way without the drivers" (*Karge*).

"After a short time I seemed to notice that the firing was being answered by our troops from the direction of the market place. Soon after signals and shouts 'Cease fire!' were heard. The firing then ceased for a time, but was reopened apparently from both sides, though not so heavily" (*Karge*).

"Near the Mairie, which was to be used as an artillery depot, there stood a captain of the Infantry Regiment No 140, who had the signal 'Halt!' blown continuously. Clearly, this officer desired, in the first place, to stop the shooting of our men" (*Folz*).

tively as it is expressed, is, in its sweeping terms, certainly not correct. And how, in the given circumstances, the streets and the market place being full of thousands of disordered soldiers, horses and wagons, could they, whether from their room in the Burgomaster's house, or from the street itself, ascertain with certainty that, neither from the side streets nor on the market place, firing by their own soldiers had taken place?

It first occurred to Captain Karge that there had been some carelessness on the part of a soldier in the baggage train, but he soon changed his mind. On what grounds? When, at the first shot, he looked out of the window, he noticed in the distance near the roof of the house, which stood at the corner of the market place and the street in which his quarters were situated, "leichte Rauch- und Staub-wolken aufsteigen" (light clouds of smoke and dust rising), a phenomenon which was repeated at the next volley. No firing took place from the windows, and hence he inferred from the dust and smoke clouds that firing had taken place through openings in the roof. Apparently he regarded this inference as obvious. When the rapid firing followed the first volleys, it *appeared* to him that it came from other houses also. On what grounds he made this inference is not stated by him.

That is all. Further evidence, that *townspeople* fired on and near the market place, is not given. Serious doubts are indeed raised, that the soldiers themselves were guilty of it.

There arose a rumour, also mentioned by Captain Schwarz, that Belgian troops made an attack on

the town. This rumour originated among the troops at the northern gate of the town, who thereupon retired to the market place in disorder, firing as they came. Is it possible that the soldiers in the market place, and in the narrow winding streets around it, hearing that shooting, but being unable to see who fired, took it for firing by the townspeople? This is, at any rate, made likely by the evidence of Captain Folz, who thus describes the first incidents:—"It was between three and four o'clock in the afternoon when we rode into the place.* Of German troops the 3d Infantry Division had before this partly come through, and the whole of the narrow and angularly built little town was full of provision, artillery, and ammunition columns. We had been about three hours in the town when suddenly mad firing began. This firing came from about the northwest entrance of the village. Immediately afterward the Ambulance Company—I think it was the 2d—with a part of the transport of the 3d Division, came to us and reported that they had been fired upon; and that a Belgian battalion was approaching."

There was, accordingly, a double rumour by which the soldiers were brought into a state of excitement, both that the town was being attacked by the Belgians and that the townsfolk were firing on the soldiers. The houses were now stormed and fired upon from all sides, a part were set on fire, and the townspeople driven or dragged out of them. It is conceivable

*This must be a mistake. Captain Folz entered the town contemporaneously with the Staff Officers and Colonel Jenrich, all of whom declare that it was five o'clock.

that during these proceedings in the narrow winding streets of the town, firing took place in and through the houses, and that thus the impression was produced that firing was taking place *from* the houses. Captain Folz, who at the beginning of the firing refers only to firing by soldiers, declares now—about an hour later—that he had heard or seen shots coming from houses. Captain Schleusener also makes the same observation at this stage. There is nothing to show that the shots emanated from *citizens*, and not from soldiers in the streets and in the houses. How great was the confusion appears from the evidence of Captain Schleusener himself. On the rumour that the Belgians were approaching, he with difficulty assembled his machine gun company and marched through the village to the open country. Captain Folz went with him. About three kilometres from the village it was perceived that no trace of the enemy was anywhere to be found, and they immediately returned. Captain Folz returned on foot, and therefore came back later than the others. As Captain Schleusener with his company entered the town he heard firing; he met "the cavalry battalions dashing backward and forward and the transport wagons of the 3d Infantry Division which were trying to turn round," and were firing hard. He sought to stop the firing, was of opinion that he had succeeded, and heard further shots coming from the houses. On this he ordered "the machine guns to be unlimbered and the house fronts on the left to be fired upon." He is told "that shots had also been fired from a house on the right." What does he do? "I had the guns turned round to open

fire when a medical officer indicated that wounded were lying in that house." For this reason the house was not fired upon. It can well be conceived that Captain Folz, when he entered the village just afterward, was also of opinion that firing was taking place from the houses and indeed can distinguish "that the firing was from both rifle and machine guns."

Apparently the losses of the Germans, even with all this, were very slight. Only one is mentioned as being killed. This was Colonel Stenger, who was found shot dead in his room in the Burgomaster's house with wounds in the face and chest. The balcony doors were open; on the wall opposite them traces of bullets were found; window panes were smashed. Probably, therefore, the colonel was killed by bullets from outside.

Was this done by civilians, or by the German soldiers who had been firing wildly on the houses? An autopsy was made on the following day by an army surgeon, but neither his evidence nor his report on the post mortem is included in the documents. Captain Folz, indeed, declares that he heard from this doctor that the wound in the colonel's face was not attributable to an infantry bullet, and that he himself is of the opinion that the breast wound must have been caused by a shot from a muzzle loader. But is one, on this statement alone, without even hearing the medical man, to assume that the colonel was killed by the citizens of Aerschot?

How did the military proceed in the suppression of the supposed insurrection of the populace? How many citizens were killed by the continuous firing on

the houses is not mentioned. The manner in which they went about it is best shown in the vivid narrative given by Captain Karge. This officer, as above mentioned, had suspicion of the red corner house by the market place, on account of the light smoke and dust clouds near its roof. During a short "Feuer-pause" (interval in the firing), he left his house, in order to communicate his discoveries to a colonel standing in the market place, and at the same time asked for permission to set the house in question on fire, since in his opinion "the ringleaders of the whole affair were collected in this house." The colonel refused to give his consent. Thereupon, so he himself tells us, "I now took some soldiers who were near me and went with them toward the house from which the shooting had first taken place, and in the loft of which I still presumed the originators and leaders to be. In the meantime, a lieutenant of the regiment also came up, and having taken the officer and men under my command I ordered the doors—the house had a house door and a shop door—and the windows of the ground floor, which were securely locked, to be broken in. Thereupon I pushed into the house with the others, and using a fairly large quantity of turpentine—which was found in a can of about twenty litres capacity, and which I had poured out partly on the first storey and then downstairs and on the ground floor—succeeded in setting the house on fire in a very short time. Further, I had ordered the men not taking part in this to guard the entrances of the house and to arrest all male persons escaping from it."

How many of the citizens thus taken prisoner were shot, does not appear. The above-named captain caused at least eighty-eight to be shot down. What investigation was made? What proofs were there of their guilt? He tells, himself, how it happened: "When I left the burning house several civilians, including a young priest, had been arrested from the adjoining houses. I had these brought to the market place, where in the meantime my company of field gendarmes had collected. I then put the columns on the march out of the town, took command of all prisoners, among whom I set free the women, boys, and girls. I was commanded by a staff officer (a Section Commander of the Field Artillery Regiment No. 17) to shoot the prisoners. Then I made my gendarmes arrange the columns and keep some of them in motion out of the town. I ordered the rest to escort the prisoners and take them out of the town. Here, at the exit, a house was burning, and by the light of it I had the culprits—eighty-eight in number, after I had separated out three cripples—shot."

On the following day many others were shot dead. On this we get nothing beyond the statement of Colonel Jenrich, which speaks for itself: "In the meantime the houses were searched by the troops, and a considerable number of inhabitants arrested, whose complicity in the attack on the troops was proved. Of the arrested male inhabitants the Burgomaster, his son, the brother of the Burgomaster, and every third man were shot on the following morning."

From the foregoing declaration it appears that the Burgomaster also was shot, the colonel thus carrying

out his threat, although there was nothing to show any guilt or complicity on the part of the Burgomaster in the supposed insurrection of the population. Why were his son and his brother also killed? The depositions give only slight indications on this point.

After Captain Schwarz had found Colonel Stenger dead in his room, he thought it necessary to institute a search of the house in the presence of the wife and the daughter of the Burgomaster, the last named not being present. In the course of this they forced their way into the cellar, and there found, in front of the window opening on to the street, an "auffälliges Gestell" (a remarkable stand) while the window pane was shattered. The captain concluded from this that firing must have taken place from the cellar. We are not told what the stand was like, and still less are we informed why the pane must have been broken by a shot from within and not by a shot from without. It is true that Captain Karge declares that coming to the market place in the evening, he saw a rifleman standing in a "Toreingang" (porch), who assured him that he had just distinctly seen that a shot had come from a house situated on the opposite side, and pointed in the direction of the Burgomaster's house. Assuming that the observation was accurate, was accurately communicated and accurately understood, then it would by no means follow that firing had taken place from the cellar of the house; indeed, it is very improbable that the rifleman, standing on the opposite side of the market place, which was crowded with soldiers and carts, could have perceived that the shot came from the *cellar*.

However that may be, the captain in the further course of his search of the house found the son of the Burgomaster, a lad of fifteen, in one of the living rooms, and handed him over to the guard in the market place. On the following day this youth together with his father and his uncle were shot.

With regard to these shootings there is undeniably a serious omission in the depositions. The "Militär-Untersuchungs-stelle fur Verletzungen des Kriegsrechts"* (Military Department for Inquiry into Breaches of the Laws of War), apparently felt this, too, and therefore in their "Zusammenfassender Bericht" (Summary) they have to some extent "clothed" the subject matter. The summary justifies the shooting of the Burgomaster together with his son and his brother as follows: "That the family of the Burgomaster himself not only had knowledge of the hostile acts, but also took part in them, was established by the immediate search of the house; there had been firing into the street from the locked cellar† the key of which the family pretended to have lost‡ and which had to be forced open, a trestle had even been pushed up to the cellar window to make a convenient position for a rifleman§; a musketeer had observed with the greatest distinctness a shot fired from the house. The son of the Burgomaster who had been concealed by the

*Major Bauer and Kammergerichterat Dr. Wagner sign in its name.

†This was observed by nobody.

‡The witness merely said "Zu der der Schlüssel angeblich night zu finden war" (the key of which it was alleged could not be found). It will be remembered that the Burgomaster was not at home.

§Free rendering by the Commission of the words "ein auffälliges Gestell" (a remarkable stand).

family* and had been dragged out of a dark room† was the only person who could possibly be held guilty of this.‡ As the family were in all respects accomplices in the murder of the colonel§ who had been "hospitably" received according to the Belgian story, father and son were shot on the following day, August 20th. The brother of the Burgomaster in whose house Cavalry Captain Karge, in command of the 2d Company of Field Gendarmes had been billeted, on the proposal of the chief magistrate of the town, and who had been attacked** shared this fate.

In this way the matter is reconstructed by a commission in Berlin, which was neither present when the events took place, nor heard the witnesses themselves. The climax of the report of the commission is reached in the final conclusion—"The complicity of the whole of the Burgomaster's family proves how systematically the Belgian officials coöperated in this treacherous treatment of the German troops, which was so regrettably frequent."

Nothing is given beyond a supposition based on very unreliable grounds, that the Burgomaster's son fired a shot; and there is no evidence of the complicity of the father. Nevertheless, according to the view of

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*Statement by the Commission, not made by any of the witneses.

†The witness said: "Beim Absuchen der Wohnzimmer kam mir der Sohn des Bürgermeisters aus einen dunklen Rimeau entgegen." (In the course of searching the living rooms the son of the Burgomaster came toward me out of a dark room.)

‡The Commission's inference, not made by any of the witnesses.

§In taking this view is not the Commission closer to the blood feud of the ancient Germans than to Article 50 of The Hague Convention?

**The witness himself said merely that "Schüsse einschlugen" (shots fell) near him.

the commission the whole family had to suffer. And *because* they all had to suffer for it, it is assumed that they all took part in the attack, and this amounts to a proof that the Belgian "officials" "systematically" coöperated in such plots.

It has on many previous occasions in the course of the war been noticeable that the Germans have apparently formed a low estimate of the insight and critical judgment of the neutrals whom they seek to convince of the justice of their cause. The German White Book furnishes a fresh instance of this. If neutrals are to be convinced that the extreme severities carried out against the population in Belgium were justified, it will be necessary for much clearer evidence to be brought forward than that contained in this book. We are anxious to receive enlightenment as to the events which have occurred, and do not wish to found our judgment solely on Belgian, French, and English reports into which exaggerations may easily have found their way, but desire that the Germans, too, may bring forward evidence which will stand the test of criticism, and will in fact prove that which it is desired to prove, instead of proving the exact opposite.

XII

THE VALUE OF SMALL STATES

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XII

THE VALUE OF SMALL STATES

UPON the old controversy between Brutus and Cæsar the last two generations in Germany have had no difficulty in coming to a decision. The republic is decidedly out of fashion, and with it the whole fabric of idealism upon which in 1848 republican conclusions were wont to be erected. The modern German is all for Cæsarism, for a big state, a big army, a big navy, and for a long course of progressive national expansion under the dazzling guidance of the Hohenzollern house. Of the old gentle cosmopolitan feeling, which suffused the literature of the classical period, there is now not a trace surviving. *Weltbürgertum* has given place to the *Nationalstaat*, just as the delicate melodies of Mozart have been succeeded by the obstreperous and clashing brilliance of Strauss. The eloquence of Schiller is still popular, but the sentiment which inspired such a piece as the History of the Revolt of the United Netherlands is as dead in Germany as Kant's famous dream of universal peace. Realism is the fetish of the hour. Politics must be real or they are despised as shadows; and when a German speaks of *Realpolitik* he means a policy based on material interests, supported by brute force and liberated from the trammels of the moral conscience.

It is not surprising that the triumphs of German

Cæsarism in the world of fact and idea have led to a very general disparagement of the value and utility of small states. The argument may be gathered from the pages of Treitschke or indeed from any of the numerous journalists who have drawn their political sustenance from that bitter and uncompromising apostle of imperial methods. It runs very much as follows. In a small state civic life must necessarily be petty, humble, unambitious. The game of politics must centre round small issues, and thus circumscribed in scope, loses the ethical value of scale. Great affairs envisaged on a large horizon have a power of stirring the passionate and imaginative elements in man, which are apt, save in the rarer cases, to respond to stimuli in proportion to their magnitude. Existence in a small state may be elegant, charming, idyllic, compatible with the production of literature and art, but it can never be swept by the great passions which move the world. A small state may create among its members a mild, humdrum kind of affection for its history and institutions, but can never be a source of that triumphant pride and hope which lifts citizenship up to the plane of heroism. In a sense it may be said that the history of small states is wound up. They may linger on, preserved by the mutual jealousies of rival Powers, or because it is worth nobody's while to attack them, but their bodies will be starved and anæmic and their souls mere echoes of the great movements of mind and emotion which are liberated, almost automatically, by the diurnal movement in great and powerful nations of the social and political machine. Sooner or later the small states will go. They will be absorbed in larger

political aggregates. They will follow the line of historical development which has created the large modern states of Europe out of a mosaic of tiny and warring fiefs. And nobody will regret their demise, least of all the citizens themselves.

Indeed, from the point of view of peoples like the Belgians or the Dutch, the moment of inevitable absorption cannot be too rapidly hastened. Only then will they be compelled to discard trifles and to "think imperially" of serious things. Their geography, political and intellectual, will be enlarged. The art of war will be earnestly practised. The spectator will suddenly become an actor. Great tides of national passion and aspiration will sweep into the tiny state, chasing away impurities, like the majestic ocean suddenly admitted in overwhelming might into a network of landlocked and stagnant pools.

The disciples of Cæsarism will even proceed to contend that patriotism in its fullest sense is only possible to large nations. Great states march on, little states mark time. The movement of the great state is continuous and imposing, and, as in the case of other orderly developments, its future can be forecast with a certain degree of exactitude. Guided by the hand of God, the mighty organs which are the chosen vessels of the highest culture upon earth take up, one after another in due sequence, each item of their sacred and providential programme. Thus we have a long historic process ending in the formation of the Prussian kingdom, succeeded by another process leading to the establishment of the German Empire, and to be followed by a third process in the course of which the

German Empire will become a world-power, not only supreme on the continent of Europe but exercising a predominant political influence over the whole surface of the globe. Great states have a destiny of which their citizens are conscious. *Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt.* Men come and go, the seasons wax and wane, but each generation in its own brief allotment of life is sustained by the consciousness that it works on a providential plan, fulfilling one of the grand and mysterious processes of God for the improvement of the world by the spread of German culture. So did the divines of the Dark Ages applaud the forced conversions of Charlemagne.

Even in matters of technical equipment Destiny is said to have decided in favour of the big battalions. It is freely argued in Germany that a perfect organization of educational machinery is only possible to the opulence and minute articulation of a great nation, for the more powerful the state, the richer will be the fund available for museums, art galleries, and libraries, and the larger the class capable of enjoying them. Great states, in fact, resemble great businesses which on a given expenditure of capital realize a higher rate of profit than their smaller rivals, command wider markets, and exercise a stronger power in barter and sale.

It is easy to understand how the Germans have arrived at this confident and unqualified conclusion as to the worthlessness of small states, seeing that their own late arrival into the circle of the Great Powers was due to the long continuance of that *Kleinstaaterei*, that small-state system, which attracts so much hostile fire from the ranks of the Prussian historians. The humilia-

tions suffered by Germany at the hands of Napoleon, the glory of the War of Liberation, which may be called the first common act of the German people, the fatal relapse into the old system of loose impotent federation, and finally the foundation of the German Empire under Prussian hegemony—these sharply contrasted periods of national history all point to the same lesson, the paralysis bred of disunion and the power generated by unity.

Even now the disciplinarian conscience of Prussia judges that the unity of Germany is all too imperfectly achieved. There are the separate states, there are the suppressed nationalities, there are the active and contentious political parties whose struggles impair the majesty of the Reichstag, and whose criticism weakens and perplexes the direction of imperial policy. When the Social Democrats, or the Poles, or the Catholics of the Centre embarrass the Government, good German imperialists look with envy at the social and religious cohesion of Great Britain. There is then no ground for wonder if, to the patriotic German of modern times, a contracted spirit of localism, only to be eradicated by a strenuous effort of the national will, seems to be the principal flaw in the political character of the German race, as it has undoubtedly been the chief source of German political impotence in the past. And we can easily see how Germans, realizing the evils of past disunion, and exercising that tendency to generalize which is inveterate in the Teutonic intelligence, come to the conclusion that the happiness and advance of mankind are bound up in the expansion of great states and in the disappearance of small ones.

It must be confessed that this general attitude is affected by considerations of a different order. Outside the limits of the German Empire lies a *Germania irredenta*, a line of small states inhabited in whole or part by men of German stock and once included in the imperial orbit.

Doctor Rohrbach writes:

Of the territory, which belonged to the German Empire five hundred years ago and was inhabited by men of German stock, more than a third has been abstracted from modern Germany—the German lands of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. If you add in the Livonian territories from the Memel to the Gulf of Finland—where it is true the mass of the peasantry was not German, but where the townsfolk and the knights were German and the princes and nobility members of the Holy Roman Empire—then modern Germany is only half the size of Germany at the end of the Middle Ages. We leave out of our consideration those territories which at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century were only bound to the Empire by a loose connection and belonged naturally to France and Italy, like the Free County of Burgundy, the duchies of Savoy, Milan, Mantua, Verona, and confine ourselves in the first place to territories inhabited by ancient German settlements, and secondly to the Slavonic lands of the East which were comprised in the German colonizing movement. To these Bohemia at that time belonged, for its penetration by German influence was only checked by the counter reformation. It was not till about 1400 that the Kingdom of Poland pushed the German frontier farther west. Posen and a piece of West Prussia and Schleswig, though not entirely inhabited by Germans, constitute the only territorial gain which the modern German Empire has to show in comparison with the old Empire. But what are these gains in comparison with the losses! The ring of territories encircling modern Germany, inhabited by more than 20,000,000 men of German stock, politically and even in national sentiment estranged from German thought.

To a person imbued with a belief in the historical mission of Germany this contraction of the imperial orbit, so accurately described by Dr. Rohrbach, is one of those disagreeable facts only to be fitted into a rational scheme of the universe if they are destined to be speedily reversed. Sooner or later Providence must intend that the broken unity of the mediæval German Empire should be reunited to the parent stock. And so the argument descends from the high plateau of general ideas to the low ground of political appetite which is watered by the streams of national memory.

In view of this interpretation it is pertinent to ask what the world has gained from small states in the past, how far they justify their existence in the present, and whether they are likely to perform any valuable function in the economy of the future.

Almost everything which is most precious in our civilization has come from small states, the Old Testament, the Homeric poems, the Attic and the Elizabethan drama, the art of the Italian Renaissance, the common law of England. Nobody needs to be told what humanity owes to Athens, Florence, Geneva, or Weimar. The world's debt to any one of these small states far exceeds all that has issued from the militant monarchies of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of the present Emperor of Germany. It may, perhaps, be objected that the apparition of artistic, literary, or scientific genius is an incalculable matter of hazard unaffected by the size of the political community in which the great man happens to be born, and that we are only entitled to infer from these examples that a small state may provide an atmosphere in which genius may thrive.

It is, however, a relevant answer to much of the criticism now levelled in Germany against small states, to remind ourselves that in the particular points of heroic and martial patriotism, civic pride and political prudence, they have often reached the highest levels to which it is possible for humanity to attain, and that from Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as from the illustrious school of Florentine historians and publicists, the world has learned nine tenths of its best political wisdom. America has particular reasons for gratefully recognizing one of the smallest and most illustrious of the city states of Europe. The seed of modern democratic theory was sown in Geneva, and being scattered on the hither shore of the North American continent by small communities, organized on the model of Calvin, burgeoned into the great Republic of the West.

Nor is it fanciful, in estimating the causes which contributed to the peculiar brilliance first of the Greek and then of the Italian city state, to attribute some weight to the question of size. Indeed, if we do this, we shall only be echoing the voice of antiquity itself. In the famous passage in which he depicts the lineaments of the ideal state, Aristotle gives the opinion that a city so large that its citizens are unable to hear the voice of a single town-crier has passed the limits of wholesome growth. This conclusion was based on the view that every citizen must take a direct part in the political deliberations of the state to which he belongs. Indeed, had the states of antiquity exceeded the limits compatible with direct government, the world would have lost a good part of its political education. As it

was, the contracted span of these communities carried with it three conspicuous benefits. The city state served as a school of patriotic virtue, not in the main of the blustering and thrasonical type, but refined and sublimated by every grace of instinct and reason. It further enabled the experiment of a free direct democratic government to be made, with incalculable consequences for the political thinking of the world. Finally, it threw into a forced and fruitful communion minds of the most different temper, giving to them an elasticity and many-sidedness which might otherwise have been wanting or less conspicuous, and stimulating, through the close mutual competition which it engendered, an intensity of intellectual and artistic passion which has been the wonder of all succeeding generations and such as can never be reached in great states organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war.

So much at least will be generally conceded. The question for us, however, is not to assess our debt to the city states of the past, but to consider what arguments may be found for safeguarding the existence of the smaller nation states of the modern world. And first of all it is relevant to ask whether there may not be some advantage to humanity at large arising from the fact that certain communities are withdrawn by reason of the scale from the competition of armaments. To certain military minds in Germany it seems to be a lamentable thing that any community of human beings should be organized on a basis of peace, or that the policy of any Government should be steadily directed toward the preservation of its subjects from the horrors of war. Let us assume for a moment that

this extravagant proposition is true, and that the Swiss, the Danes, the Dutch, and the Belgians would be greatly improved in their general morality if they were thrown into some big military empire with an aggressive world-policy and a providential destiny to impose its culture on the world, and all the other familiar paraphernalia of the Potsdam philosophy. We have still to ask ourselves the question whether, even from the selfish point of view of the Great Powers who are blessed with the moral luxury of a conscript army, there may not be some convenience attaching to the continued existence of small oases of peace in a world nervously equipping itself for Armageddon? Has Italy no cause to be grateful to the Swiss Confederation? Would the Scandinavian kingdoms preserve their unruffled neutrality if the Danish peninsula were swallowed up by Germany? And has the disappearance of Poland really benefited the two greatest partitioning Powers whose past appetites have brought them the heritage of restless anxiety which belongs to the vigil of coterminous states? Indeed it is not easy to measure the injurious consequences which have grown from the disappearance of that middle kingdom of Lotharingia which once served as a buffer between France and Germany, or from the extinction of the Polish nation at the close of the eighteenth century. By common confession European diplomacy suffers from nerves; and the nervous tension is necessarily increased with every addition to the ranks of the rivals. The entanglements likely to give rise to conflict are proportionate to the number and weight of the Powers which stand inside the ring. Every

ally who joins one or other of the coalitions brings with him a whole cluster of new interests which the coalition is bound to defend, and thereby increases the chance of war. Every Power which stands aside lessens the general strain and contracts the area of inflammable controversy.

But the advantages to be derived from the existence of small buffer states are subject to the clear condition that their independence and neutrality are respected. Let us consider for a moment what the world would have gained if the German Emperor and his advisers had all along regarded the violation of Belgian neutrality as an unthinkable crime. Not only would Great Britain be now at peace, but no general European war would have taken place at all. The challenge to Russia was thrown down by Germany because it was calculated in Berlin that by marching through Belgium the Germans could easily crush France before the Russian peril became insistent. It is absurd to speak of the violation of Belgian neutrality as a "bitter necessity" forced upon a reluctant country in an unforeseen emergency. It was, on the contrary, the deliberate groundwork for a careful edifice of aggressive diplomacy. The entire plan of the campaign against France was framed on the supposition that the Germans would march through Belgium. The whole scheme of operations against Russia was based on the belief that the total weight of the German military power could be thrown on the eastern frontier by reason of the rapid and crushing success which a German army, advancing through the Belgian gateway, would be able to achieve in France. And upon these

two military calculations the ambitious edifice of German world-policy was built. All the plans of the General Staff were secretly framed on the supposition that Belgium would be treated as part of the German Empire in the event of war. It was with this prospect in view that Germany thought it safe to defy Russia in 1909 and to repeat the defiance in 1914. And though it would be difficult to set bounds to the military presumption of Germany, it may be safely assumed that if the Belgian doorway had been patently barred, the diplomacy of the German Empire would have been tuned to a more modest key. The moral of all this is clear enough. The small states should not be abolished: on the contrary, their neutrality should be supported by a guarantee so formidable that the strongest Power would never be tempted in future to infringe it.

We may test the value of these communities by another criterion. The Hague Tribunal has been the object of much silly depreciation, and the military parties in the world are never tired of giving voice to the contempt in which they involve the whole principle of arbitration. It is true that the belief in the value of pacific solutions chiefly flourishes in small unmilitary states like Holland, or in that large and imposing aggregate of small civilian states which goes by the name of the United States of America. And it is equally true that no nation has yet consented or, in the present state of public ethics, is likely to consent to refer matters affecting its "vital interests, independence, or honour" to an international tribunal. Nevertheless a considerable number of arbitration treaties have been concluded

agreeing to refer differences to The Hague Tribunal; and in the course of the North Sea incident of 1904 the strained relations between England and Russia were greatly eased by the fact that The Hague Conference had already provided a method of procedure by which the dispute might be adjusted without loss of dignity to either side. Arbitration cannot banish war, but it can diminish the accumulation of minor grievances which, if untended, are apt to create that inflamed state of public opinion out of which wars easily arise; and in the case of larger disputes recourse to arbitration has at least the advantage of gaining time. Now the condition of mind which supports the principle of arbitration, and which provides facilities for recourse to it, is only made possible by the existence of communities organized for peace, and standing outside the armed and vigilant rivalries of the great continental Powers.

It is symptomatic of the Prussian spirit to disparage any manifestation of natural feeling which runs counter to the assumed necessities of a militant Empire; and so in books written even by such eminent and moderate men as Prince von Bülow, the late Chancellor of Germany, we find a fixed intention to suppress, so far as may be, the national characteristics of the Poles, Danes, and men of Latin race who have been incorporated in the Empire. We in England, who have some experience of minor nationalities, cannot read of the recent developments of Prussian policy in Poland without feeling how unintelligent and oppressive it is, and how much better it would be in the interests of internal peace and consolidation, if Germany would throw her mind into

a generous and liberal attitude toward the men of alien type whom she has absorbed by conquest. But it is part of the Prussian genius—if a drillmaster can have genius—to regard all variety, not only as troublesome, which it often may be, but as injurious, which it very seldom is. Indeed, one of the principal arguments in favour of the preservation of the small states of Europe (and the same argument applies to the preservation of the state system in America) lies in the fact that these small communities do vary from the set type which is imprinted by steady and powerful governments upon the life and behaviour of the larger Powers. The mere fact of this variety is an enrichment of human experience and a stimulus to self-criticism and improvement. Indeed, the existence of small states operates in the large and imperfect economy of the European system very much in the same way as the principle of individual liberty operates in any given state, preventing the formation of those massive and deadening weights of conventional opinion which impair the free play of individuality, and affording a corrective to the vulgar idea that the brute force of organized numbers is the only thing which really matters in the world.

The critic of small states may also fairly be asked what he means by the word "civilization." If civilization is a phrase denoting the sum of those forces which help to bind men together in civil association; if it means benevolence, dutifulness, self-sacrifice, a lively interest in the things of the mind, and a discerning taste in the things of the sense; then there is no reason to think that these qualities are the special prerogative

of great states. Indeed, there is a certain type of harsh and stoical patriotism which, by reason of its austere and arrogant exclusiveness, is inimical to the growth of civilized feeling. It is not confined to big states, for it was present in ancient Sparta; nor is it the necessary accompaniment even of huge military monarchies. But it is the spirit of modern Prussia, a spirit consistent indeed with the heroic qualities of the barbarous ages, but lacking the sane and temperate outlook of civilized life. All through history the great enemy of human reason has been fanaticism. And there is no reason to believe that the fanaticism of a military state, served by the most destructive artillery in the world, is any bit less injurious to mankind than the spirit which for many centuries of history condemned the religious heretic to the torments of the stake.

It is difficult rightly to assess the contributions which the smaller states of Europe have made during the past century to the sum of human culture. Nor would a mere list of eminent men such as Ibsen and Maeterlinck —of whom every cultivated person has heard—or Gramme, the Belgian inventor of the dynamo, or Van 't Hoff, the famous Dutch chemist, prove more than the indisputable fact that intellectual life of the highest quality may be carried on in such communities. It is of course possible that, if Holland were forced into the German confederation, Dutch painting, which has now reached a level far higher than any attained in recent years in Germany, would suffer no eclipse, and that the Dutch universities would persevere in their work of scholarly theological exegesis. It is possible

that, under the same conditions, the wonderful perfection to which the little kingdom of Denmark has brought the arts of dairy-farming and agriculture would still be maintained. But it would depend entirely upon the degree of liberty and autonomy which a German emperor might be willing to concede, whether this would be so or not, whether the natural currents of hopeful energy would continue to flow or whether they would be effectually sealed up by the ungenial fiat of an alien taskmaster. Upon this it is unnecessary to speculate. But it is strictly pertinent to the argument to remember that the three small states, whose existence is closely and specially threatened by the expansion of Germany, have each developed not only a peculiar and strongly marked economy, but certain special excellences and qualities such as are most likely to be developed in an atmosphere of comparative tranquillity. Thus, apart from the school of landscape painting, the Dutch have set a model to the world in all that pertains to the scientific classification and management of archives, vanquishing in this particular even the French, whose organization of historical learning is so justly famed. Denmark, too, has its own specialty in a very perfect organism for coöperative production in agriculture.

Indeed, one of the advantages flowing from the existence of smaller states consists in the fact that they serve as convenient laboratories for social experiment—a point likely to be appreciated in America, in view of the great mass of material for the comparative study of social and industrial expedients which is provided by the enterprise of the American State legislatures.

Such experiments as women's suffrage, or as the State prohibition of the public sale of alcoholic drink, or as a thoroughgoing application of the Reformatory theory of punishment, would never be seriously discussed in large, old, and settled communities, were it not for the fact that they have been tried upon a smaller scale by the more adventurous legislatures of the New World. Man is an imitative animal, and a study of such an organ as the *Journal of Comparative Legislation* exhibits the increasing uniformity of the problems which confront the legislator, and the increasing monotony of the solutions which he finds to meet them. All over the world industrial, educational, penal legislation tends to conform to type. And within limits the tendency is the necessary and wholesome consequence of the unifying influence of modern industrial conditions. But our enlarged facilities for imitation present obvious dangers, and among them the fatal temptation to borrow a ready-made uniform which does not fit. Small states may fall into this pitfall as well as big ones, but at least their continued existence presents some guarantee for diversity of life and intellectual adventure in a world steadily becoming more monotonously drab in its outer garment of economic circumstance.

No historical state can be driven out of its identity without suffering a moral impoverishment in the process. The evil is not only apparent in the embitterment and lowering of the citizens of the conquered community, whether they are compelled to the agonies of a Polish dispersion, or linger on nursing their rights and wounded pride in the scene of their former inde-

pendence, but it creates a problem for the conqueror which may very well harden and brutalize his whole outlook on policy. It is never good for a nation to be driven to the employment of harsh measures against any portion of its subjects.

Upon whatever plausible grounds of immediate expediency such measures may be justified, they invariably harden the tone of political opinion, and create an atmosphere of insensibility which spreads far beyond the sphere of the special case and occasion. The acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is a case in point. The result of the forcible incorporation of these provinces in the German Empire has been bad for the governed and equally bad for the governors. Coercion is a virus which cannot be introduced into any part of the body politic without risk of a general diffusion of the poison.

It is no idle fancy to suppose that the kind of policy which the Prussian Government has thought fit to adopt toward the alien nationalities of the German Empire has reacted upon its treatment of those German parties whose views do not accord with the strict official convention. No Conservative English statesman would ever dream of denouncing English socialists as Prince von Bülow denounces the social democrats of Germany. But then no English statesman, Liberal or Conservative, would dream of treating any portion of the British Empire as Prince von Bülow treated the German Poles.

It is impossible accurately to assess the value to a nation of the self-esteem which is the legacy of its history. People who weigh everything in material

scales may find nothing worth preserving in the historical consciousness of the small nations of Europe. They will argue that the Dutch, the Belgians, the Danes, the Swiss, might be incorporated in the German Empire not only without pain but with a positive accession of material comfort and wealth, and a larger political outlook in the future.

They will even deny that there need be any moral impoverishment in an exchange of historical memories, under which the incorporated Dutchman would hook himself on to the German pedigree and count Bismarck and Moltke among his deities, while the Dutch sea-dogs of the heroic age would give their names to the cruisers and submarines of the incorporating Empire. In all such reasoning there is very little allowance for the facts of human nature or for the working of the moral principle in man. As no individual can break violently with his past without a moral lesion, so, too, the rupture of the historical continuity of a state carries with it an inevitable weakening and abasement of public ideals, which may continue for several generations. We need not labour to establish a principle which is grounded on such obvious facts of individual consciousness. But one historical instance may be adduced in support. When in 1580 Portugal was annexed to Spain, then reputed to be the most formidable empire in the world, she suffered a moral as well as a political eclipse from which she has never since recovered. Her nerve seemed to go and by swift stages she sank into listlessness and decay.

Nowhere is the shaping power of this historical consciousness more evident than in the peasant nations of

the Balkan Peninsula. These rude and valiant democracies live upon the memories of the past to an extent of which sophisticated peoples have little notion. The great ballad which commemorates the battle of Kossovo fought against the Turks more than five hundred years ago, is still one of the most important political influences among the southern Slavs. Nor has the memory of the empire of Stephen Dushan, under whom Serbia was the leading Power in the Balkans, ever been allowed to fade among the Serbs, despite tragedies sufficient to break the spirit of a less stalwart race. To rob the Serbs of their political independence according to the present plan of the German Powers would be a measure difficult to surpass for cruel and purposeless futility. A race which had succeeded in preserving its historical consciousness through centuries of grinding Turkish tyranny would not be likely to renounce its past or its future under the guns of Austria. And even if the improbable came to pass, and a conquered Serbia were to become an obedient and contented fraction of the Austrian Empire, forgetful of heroic ballads and of a long tradition of hardiness and valour, would there be no loss of moral power in the process? To those who measure all virtues by the standard of civic virtue, by intensity of emotional and practical patriotism, the loss would be beyond dispute. A great incentive to the performance of unselfish action would be destroyed, a source of heroic and congenial activity would disappear never to be replaced. Under the hypothesis the Serbs would sink below the level of their blood kinsmen the Slovaks, who, despite the manifold oppressions of their Hungarian masters, still nurture a flame

of protesting nationalism. From such political apostasy no nation could ever expect to make a complete moral recovery.

It may be objected that the whole process of European history is summed up by the absorption of the smaller in the larger states; and that if Hanover is reconciled to absorption there is no reason why Holland, Denmark, and Belgium should lodge a protest in advance against their impending fate. To this contention there is a simple answer. These outlying nations can only be brought into the German fold under compulsion. Their frame of mind is not German, their habits are not German, their history for the last four centuries has served to multiply points of difference from Germany. They have no desire to submit themselves either to the military or to the financial system of the German Empire. They are not ashamed of their present condition, and are singular enough to hold that human happiness and goodness do not depend upon the size of an army or navy or a budget. It is enough that the citizen of each of these states can call his country his own. Patriotism has nothing whatever to do with spatial extent nor are emotions to be measured by square miles. Great empires are generally full of the variances of unassimilated and discontented men; and though a country may be weak and small, it may yet be capable of inspiring among its inhabitants the noblest and purest forms of affectionate devotion.

Indeed, the supreme touchstone of efficiency in imperial government lies in its capacity to preserve the small state in the great union. If the British Empire

has succeeded in retaining the affections of its scattered members, the result has been due to the wise and easy tolerance which has permitted almost every form of religious, political, and social practice to continue unchecked, however greatly they may vary from the established traditions of the English race. Thus in the Province of Quebec we suffer the existence of a French ultramontane state based on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and preserving even to this day many of the social features of a French colony in the age of Louis XIV, a community more extreme in its ecclesiastical rigour than any Roman Catholic state in Europe, and in language, religion, and social habits presenting the sharpest contrast to the English provinces of the Dominion of Canada. The same careful deference to the preëxisting conditions is shown in every part of our Indian administration, which carries tenderness to the religious scruples of the Mohammedans and the Hindus to a point of delicate solicitude, which no Government in the world has ever before attempted, and only the most practised experience can supply. These, however, are not the methods of the German Empire, nor can they be the methods of any empire which practises a uniform and universal system of military conscription As soon as the words State and Army become coterminous, a philosophy of violent unification is set up within the body politic, which sooner or later carries everything before it, save the spiritual forces which cannot be broken by any machinery, however despotic and powerful. The Germans have not succeeded in winning either the Poles or the Danes or the Alsatians to their rule,

because they have repeated the mistake which England made in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which England has never since ceased to lament. They have attempted to manufacture German citizens by violence; and the history of Alsace-Lorraine under imperial rule has shown how little the policy of violence, however carefully it may be masked by specious political concessions, is availing to change the spiritual allegiance of a people. Indeed the case of Alsace-Lorraine supplies a fair indication of the misfortunes which would ensue upon the compulsory annexation of any one of the small states of Europe by a big military Power. It is not to be imagined that the forced union of these two provinces with Germany has been productive of material injury. On the contrary, they have shared in the expanding industry and commerce of the Empire, and any loss in population due to the emigration of the French has been more than compensated by an influx of Germans. Nevertheless, they have been and continue to be unhappy under the Prussian yoke, Alsace more unhappy than Lorraine, but both sensible of the fact that while material interest binds them to Prussia, the voice of spiritual affinity unites them with the French Republic.

Statistics indeed prove that, even allowing for immigration, the Germans are still in a minority in the two provinces; but this fact in itself is not sufficient to account for the continuing attraction of the French Republic, despite the strong material inducements offered from the other side. The phenomenon indeed is worthy of attention. Here are two provinces which

have never enjoyed political independence or the sense of cohesion which such independence confers. For the greater part of their history they have counted as members of the German confederation; for Alsace only became part of France in 1648, and Lorraine was not effectively incorporated in the French monarchy till 1764. And yet, though they have been replaced in their original German connection, the natives remain French at heart. The explanation is simple. The French Revolution initiated these two provinces into the democratic ideals of the modern world, which the majority of the inhabitants still continue to prefer to the Prussian doctrine of blood and iron and to the methods of the Prussian garrison at Zabern.

The truth is that the quantitative estimate of human values, which plays so large a part in modern political history, is radically false and tends to give a vulgar instead of a liberal and elevated turn to public ambitions. There is no virtue, public or private, which cannot be practised as fully in a small and weak state as under the sceptre of the most formidable tyrant who ever drove fifty army corps of conscripts to the slaughter. There is no grace of soul, no disinterested endeavour of mind, no pitch of unobtrusive self-sacrifice of which the members of small and pacific communities have not repeatedly shown themselves to be capable. These virtues indeed may be imperilled by lethargy, but they are threatened even more gravely by that absorbing preoccupation with the facts of material power in which the citizens of great empires are inevitably involved.

The great danger of Continental Europe is not revolution but servitude. This war could never have been

possible if the intellect of Germany had been really free, if a servile Press supported by a system of State universities had not instilled into the vast mass of the German people ruthless maxims of Cæsarism, for the most part repugnant to their real temperament and nature. There are other military autocracies besides Germany, and other countries in which political thought is fettered by the Government. But whatever may be their several shortcomings, the smaller states of Europe are not among the despots. Here at least men may think what they please, and write what they think. Whenever the small states may come up for judgment the advocate of human freedom will plead on their behalf.

XIII

THOUGHTS ON THE WAR

XIII

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I

"Not much news: Great Britain has declared war on Austria." The words fell quite simply, and with no intention of irony, from the lips of a friend of mine who picked up the newspaper on the day when I began to write down these thoughts, August 13. So amazingly had the world changed since the 4th. And it has changed even more by the time when I revise the proofs.

During the month of July and earlier, English politics were by no means dull. For my own part, my mind was profoundly occupied with a number of public questions and causes: the whole maintenance of law and democratic government seemed to be threatened, not to speak of social reform and the great self-redeeming movements of the working class. In the forefront came anxiety for Home Rule and the Parliament Act, and a growing indignation against various classes of "wreckers"; those reactionaries who seemed to be playing with rebellion, playing with militarism, recklessly inflaming the party spirit of minorities so as to make parliamentary government impossible; those revolutionaries who were openly preaching the class

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war and urging the working man to mistrust his own leaders and representatives and believe in nothing but some helpless gospel of hate.

And now that is all swept away. We think no more of our great causes, and we think no more of our mutual hatreds. Good and evil come together. Our higher ideals are forgotten, but we are a band of brothers standing side by side.

This is a great thing. The fine instinctive generosity with which the House of Commons, from Mr. Bonar Law to Mr. Redmond, rose to the crisis has spread an impulse over the country. There is a bond of fellowship between Englishmen who before had no meeting-ground. In time past I have sometimes envied the working men who can simply hail a stranger as "mate": we dons and men of letters seem in ordinary times to have no "mates" and no gift for getting them. But the ice between man and man is broken now.

I think, too, that the feeling between different classes must have softened. Rich business men, whom I can remember a short time ago tediously eloquent on the vices of trades unionists and of the working classes in general, are now instantly and without hesitation making large sacrifices and facing heavy risks to see that as few men as possible shall be thrown out of work, and that no women and children shall starve. And working men who have not money to give are giving more than money, and giving it without question or grudge. Thank God, we did not hate each other as much as we imagined; or else, while the hatred was real enough on the surface, at the back of our minds we loved each other more.

And the band of brothers is greater and wider than any of us dared to believe. Many English hearts must have swelled with almost incredulous gratitude to hear of the messages and the gifts which come flooding in from all the dominions overseas: the gold, the grain, the sugar, the tobacco; its special produce coming from each State, and from all of them throngs of young men offering their strength and their life-blood. And India above all! One who has cared much about India and has friends among Indian Nationalists cannot read with dry eyes the messages that come from all races and creeds of India, from Hindu and Moslem societies, from princes and holy men and even political exiles. . . . We have not always been sympathetic in our government of India; we have not always been wise. But we have tried to be just; and we have given to India the best work of our best men. It would have been hard on us if India had shown no loyalty at all; but she has g ven us more than we deserved, more than we should have dared to claim. Neither Indian nor Englishman can forget it.

II

And there is something else. Travellers who have returned from France or Belgium—or Germany for that matter—tell us of the unhesitating heroism with which the ordinary men and women are giving themselves to the cause of their nation. A friend of mine heard the words of one Frenchwoman to another who was seeing her husband's train off to the front: "*Ne pleurez pas, il vous voit encore.*" When he was out of sight the tears might come! . . . Not

thousands but millions of women are saying words like that to themselves, and millions of men going out to face death.

We in England have not yet been put to the same test as France and Belgium. We are in the flush of our first emotion; we have not yet had our nerves shaken by advancing armies, or our endurance ground down by financial distress But, as far as I can judge of the feelings of people whom I meet, they seem to me to be ready to answer any call that comes. We ask for 200,000 recruits and receive 300,000, for half a million and we receive three quarters. We ask for more still, and the recruiting offices are overflowing. They cannot cope with the crowds of young men who cheerfully wait their turn at the office doors or on the pavement, while fierce old gentlemen continue to scold them in the newspapers. Certainly we are a quaint people.

And in the field! A non-combatant stands humbled before the wonderful story of the retreat from Mons—the gallantry, the splendid skill, the mutual confidence of all ranks, the absolute faithfulness. One hardly dares praise such deeds; one admires them in silence. And it is not the worshippers of war who have done this; it is we, the good-natured, un-militarist, ultra-liberal people, the nation of humanitarians and shopkeepers.

Our army, indeed, is a professional army. What the French and the Belgians have done is an even more significant fact for civilization. It shows that the cultured, progressive, easy-living, peace-loving nations of western Europe are not corrupted, at least as far as courage goes. The world has just seen them, bourgeois

and working men, clerks, schoolmasters, musicians, grocers, ready in a moment when the call came; able to march and fight for long days of scorching sun or icy rain; willing, if need be, to die for their homes and countries, with no panic, no softening of the fibre . . . resolute to face death and to kill.

III

For there is that side of it, too. We have now not only to strain every nerve to help our friend—we must strain every nerve also to injure our enemy. This is horrible, but we must try to face the truth. For my own part, I find that I do desperately desire to hear of German dreadnoughts sunk in the North Sea. Mines are treacherous engines of death; but I should be only too glad to help in laying a mine for them. When I see one day that 20,000 Germans have been killed in such-and-such an engagement, and next day that it was only 2,000, I am sorry.

That is where we are. We are fighting for that which we love, whatever we call it. It is the right, but it is something even more than the right. For our lives, for England, for the liberty of western Europe, for the possibility of peace and friendship between nations; for something which we should rather die than lose. And lose it we shall unless we can beat the Germans.

IV

Yet I have scarcely met a single person who seems to hate the Germans. We abominate their dishonest Government, their unscrupulous and arrogant diplomacy, the whole spirit of blood-and-iron ambition

which seems to have spread from Prussia through a great part of the nation, but not the people in general. They, too, by whatever criminal folly they were led into war, are fighting now for what they call the right. For their lives and homes and their national pride, for that strange Culture, that idol of blood and clay and true gold, which they have built up with so many tears. They have been trebly deceived: deceived by their Government, deceived by their own idolatry, deceived by their sheer terror. They are ringed about by enemies; their one ally is broken; they hear the thunder of Cossack hoofs in the east coming ever closer; and hordes of stupid moujiks behind them, innumerable, clumsy, barbarous, as they imagine in their shuddering dread, treading down the beloved fatherland as they come. . . . What do Germans care for punctilios and neutrality treaties in the face of such a horror as that?

No: we cannot hate or blame the people in general. And certainly not the individual Germans whom we know. I have just by me a letter from young Fritz Hackmann, who was in Oxford last term and brought me an introduction from a Greek scholar in Berlin: a charming letter, full of gratitude for the very small friendliness I had been able to show him. I remember his sunny smile and his bow with a click of the heels. He is now fighting us. . . . And there is Paul Maass, too, a young Doctor of Philosophy, recently married. He sent me a short time back the photograph of his baby, Ulf, and we exchanged small jokes about Ulf's look of wisdom and his knowledge of Greek and his imperious habits. And now of course Maass is

with his regiment, and we shall do our best to kill him, and after that to starve Ulf and Ulf's mother.

It is well for us to remember what war means when reduced to terms of private human life. Doubtless we have most of us met disagreeable Germans and been angry with them; but I doubt if we ever wanted to cut their throats or blow them to pieces with lyddite. And many thousands of us have German friends, or have come across good straight Germans in business, or have carried on smiling and incompetent conversations with kindly German peasants on walking tours. We must remember such things as these, and not hate the Germans.

"A little later it may be different. In a few weeks English and Germans will have done each other cruel and irreparable wrongs. The blood of those we love will lie between us. We shall hear stories of horrible suffering. Atrocities will be committed by a few bad or stupid people on both sides, and will be published and distorted and magnified. It will be hard to avoid hatred then; so it is well to try to think things out while our minds are still clear, while we still hate the war and not the enemy."

So I wrote three weeks ago. By the time I revise these lines the prophecy has been more than fulfilled. No one had anticipated then that the nightmare doctrines of Bismarck and Nietzsche and Bernhardi would be actually enforced by official orders. "Cause to non-combatants the maximum of suffering: leave the women and children nothing but their eyes to weep with. . . ." We thought they said these things just to startle and shock us; and it now appears that

XIII

THOUGHTS ON THE WAR

the Powers that they would accept the settlement made by the Congress and would, in future, wage collective war against the first breaker of the peace. The second object, which he succeeded in gaining, was, curiously enough, an international declaration of the abolition of the slave trade.

The principle of legitimacy—of ordinary law and right and custom—as against lawless ambition: a concert of Powers pledged by collective treaty to maintain and enforce peace; and the abolition of the slave trade! It sounds like the scheme of some new Utopia, and it was really a main part of the political programme of the leaders of the Congress of Vienna—of Castlereagh, Metternich, Talleyrand, Alexander of Russia, and Frederick William of Prussia. . . . They are not names to rouse enthusiasm nowadays. All except Talleyrand were confessed enemies of freedom and enlightenment and almost everything that we regard as progressive; and Talleyrand, though occasionally on the right side in such matters, was not a person to inspire confidence. Yet, after all, they were more or less reasonable human beings, and a bitter experience had educated them. Doubtless they blundered; they went on all kinds of wrong principles; they based their partition of Europe on what they called "legitimacy"—a perfectly artificial and false legitimacy, rather than nationality; they loathed and dreaded popular movements; they could not quite keep their hands from a certain amount of picking and stealing. Yet, on the whole, we find these men at the end of the great war fixing their minds not on glory and prestige and revenge, not on conventions

and shams, but on ideals so great and true and humane and simple that most Englishmen in ordinary life are ashamed of mentioning them; trying hard to make peace permanent on the basis of what was recognized as legitimate or fair; and, amid many differences, agreeing at least in the universal abolition of the slave trade.

VII

Our next conference of Europe ought to do far better if only we can be sure that it will meet in the same high spirit. Instead of Castlereagh, we shall send from England some one like Mr. Asquith or Sir Edward Grey, with ten times more progressive and liberal feeling and ten times more insight and understanding. Even suppose we send a Conservative, Mr. Balfour or Lord Lansdowne, the advance upon Castlereagh will be almost as great. Instead of Talleyrand, France will send one of her many able republican leaders, from Clémenceau to Delcassé, certainly more honest and humane than Talleyrand. And Germany, who can say? Except that it may be some one very different from these militarist schemers who have brought their country to ruin. In any case it is likely to be a wiser man than Frederick William, just as Russia is bound to send a wiser man than Alexander.

And behind these representatives there will be a deeper and far more intelligent feeling in the various peoples. In 1815 the nations were sick of war after long fighting. I doubt if there was any widespread conviction that war was in itself an abomination and an outrage on humanity. Philosophers felt it, some

inarticulate women and peasants and workmen felt it. But now such a feeling is almost universal. It commands a majority in any third-class railway carriage; it is expressed almost as a matter of course in the average newspaper.

Between Waterloo and the present day there has passed one of the greatest and most swiftly progressive centuries of all human history, and the heart of Europe is really changed. I do not say we shall not have Jingo crowds or that our own hearts will not thrill with the various emotions of war, whether base or noble. But there is a change. Ideas that once belonged to a few philosophers have sunk into common men's minds; Tolstoy has taught us, the intimate records of modern wars have taught us, free intercourse with foreigners has educated us, even the illustrated papers have made us realize things. In 1914 it is not that we happen to be sick of war; it is that we mean to extirpate war out of the normal possibilities of civilized life, as we have extirpated leprosy and typhus.

VIII

What kind of settlement can we hope to attain at the end of it all?

The question is still far off, and may have assumed astonishingly different shapes by the time we reach it, but it is perhaps well to try, now while we are calm and unhurt, to think out what we would most desire.

First of all, no revenge, no deliberate humiliation of any enemy, no picking and stealing.

Next, a drastic resettlement of all those burning problems which carry in them the seeds of European

war, especially the problems of territory. Many of the details will be very difficult; some may prove insoluble. But in general we must try to arrange, even at considerable cost, that territory goes with nationality. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine has disturbed the west of Europe for forty years; the wrong distributions of territory in the Balkan peninsula have kept the spark of war constantly alive in the east, and have not been fully corrected by the last Balkan settlement. Every nation which sees a slice of itself cut off and held under foreign rule is a danger to peace, and so is every nation that holds by force or fraud an alien province. At this moment, if Austria had not annexed some millions of Servians in Bosnia and Herzegovina she would have no mortal quarrel with Servia. Any drastic rearrangement of this sort will probably involve the break-up of Austria, a larger Italy, a larger Servia, a larger Germany —for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, of Danish Schleswig, and the Polish provinces would be more than compensated by the accession of the Germanic parts of Austria—and a larger Russia. But it is not big nations that are a menace to peace; it is nations with a grievance or nations who know that others have a grievance against them.

And shall we try again to achieve Castlereagh's and Alexander's ideal of a permanent Concert, pledged to make collective war upon the peace-breaker? Surely we must. We must at all costs and in spite of all difficulties, because the alternative means such unspeakable failure. We must learn to agree, we civilized nations of Europe, or else we must perish. I believe that the chief counsel of wisdom here is to be sure to

go far enough. We need a permanent Concert, perhaps a permanent Common Council, in which every awkward problem can be dealt with before it has time to grow dangerous, and in which outvoted minorities must accustom themselves to giving way. If we examine the failures of the European Concert in recent years we shall find them generally due to two large causes. Either some Powers came into the council with unclean hands, determined to grab alien territory or fatally compromised because they had grabbed it in the past; or else they met too late, when the air was full of mistrust, and not to yield had become a point of honour. Once make certain of good faith and a clean start, and surely there is in the great Powers of Europe sufficient unity of view and feeling about fundamental matters to make it possible for them to work honestly together —at any rate, when the alternative is stark ruin. . . . It is well to remember that in this matter, from Alexander I onward, Russia has steadily done her best to lead the way.

And the abolition of the slave trade! It is wonderful to think that that was not only talked about but really achieved; the greatest abomination in the world definitely killed, finished and buried, never to return, as a result of the meeting of the Powers at the end of the great war. What can we hope for to equal that? The limitation of armaments seems almost small in comparison.

We saw in the first week of the war what a nation and a government can do when the need or the opportunity comes. Armies and fleets mobilized, war risks assured, railways taken over, prices fixed . . .

things that seemed almost impossible accomplished successfully in a few days. One sentence in Mr. Lloyd George's speech on the financial situation ran thus, if I remember the words: "This part of the subject presents some peculiar difficulties, but I have no doubt they will be surmounted with the utmost ease." That is the spirit in which our Government has risen to its crisis, a spirit not of shallow optimism but of that active and hard thinking confidence which creates its own fulfilment. The power of man over circumstance is now—even now in the midst of this one terrific failure—immeasurably greater than it has ever yet been in history. Every year that passes has shown its increase. When the next settling day comes the real will of reasonable man should be able to assert itself and achieve its end with a completeness not conceivable in 1915.

IX

This is not the time to make any definite proposals. Civilization has still many slave trades to abolish. The trade in armaments is perhaps the most oppressive of all, but there are others also, slave trades social and intimate and international; no one can tell yet which ones and how many it may be possible to overthrow. But there is one thing that we must see. This war and the national aspiration behind the war must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the militarists. I do not say that we must not be ready for some form of universal service: that will depend on the circumstances in which the war leaves us. But we must not be militarized in mind and feeling; we must keep

our politics British and not Prussian. That is the danger. It is the danger in every war. In time of war every interest, every passion, tends to be concentrated on the mere fighting, the gaining of advantages, the persistent use of cunning and force. An atmosphere tends to grow up in which the militarist and the schemer are at home and the liberal and democrat homeless.

There are many thousands of social reformers and radicals in this country who instinctively loathe war, and have only been convinced with the utmost reluctance, if at all, of the necessity of our fighting. The danger is that these people, containing among them some of our best guides and most helpful political thinkers, may from disgust and discouragement fall into the background and leave public opinion to the mercy of our own Von Tirpitzes and Bernhardis. That would be the last culminating disaster. It would mean that the war had ceased to be a war for free Europe against militarism, and had become merely one of the ordinary sordid and bloody struggles of nation against nation, one link in the insane chain of wrongs that lead ever to worse wrongs.

One may well be thankful that the strongest of the neutral Powers is guided by a leader so wise and upright and temperate as President Wilson. One may be thankful, too, that both here and in France we have in power not only a very able Ministry but a strongly liberal and peace-loving Ministry. In the first place, it unites the country far more effectively than any ministry which could be suspected of Jingoism. In the second place, it gives us a chance of a permanent settlement, based on wisdom and not on ambition.

It is fortunate also that in Russia the more liberal elements in the Government seem to be predominant. Some English liberals seem to be sorry and half ashamed that we have Russia as an ally; for my own part I am glad and proud. Not only because of her splendid military achievements, but because, so far as I can read the signs of such things, there is in Russia, more than in other nations, a vast untapped reservoir of spiritual power, of idealism, of striving for a nobler life. And that is what Europe will most need at the end of this bitter material struggle. I am proud to think that the liberal and progressive elements in Russia are looking toward England and feeling strengthened by English friendship. "This is for us," said a great Russian liberal to me some days ago, "this is for us a *Befreiungskrieg* (war of liberation). After this, reaction is impossible." We are fighting not only to defend Russian governors and Russian peasants against German invasion, but also, and perhaps even more profoundly, to enable the Russia of Turgenieff and Tolstoy, the Russia of many artists and many martyrs, to work out its destiny and its freedom. If the true Russia has a powerful voice in the final settlement it will be a great thing for humanity.

Of course, all these hopes may be shattered and made ridiculous before the settlement comes. They would be shattered, probably, by a German victory; not because Germans are wicked, but because a German victory at the present time would mean a victory for blood-and-iron. They would be shattered, certainly, if in each separate country the liberal forces abandoned the situation to the reactionaries, and stood aside

while the nation fell into that embitterment and brutalization of feeling which is the natural consequence of a long war.

To prevent the first of these perils is the work of our armies and navies; to prevent the second should be the work of all thoughtful non-combatants. It may be a difficult task, but at least it is not hideous; and some of the work that we must do is. So hideous, indeed, that at times it seems strange that we can carry it out at all—this war of civilized men against civilized men, against our intellectual teachers, our brothers in art and science and healing medicine, and so large a part of all that makes life beautiful. When we remember all this it makes us feel lost and heavy-hearted, like men struggling and unable to move in an evil dream. . . . So, it seems, for the time being we must forget it. We modern men are accustomed by the needs of life to this division of feelings. In every war, in every competition almost, there is something of the same difficulty, and we have learned to keep the two sides of our mind apart. We must fight our hardest, indomitably, gallantly, even joyously, forgetting all else while we have to fight. When the fight is over we must remember.

XIV

ECONOMIC GERMANY

"German Industry considered as a factor making for War."

By M. HENRI HAUSER,

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Translated by P. E. Matheson

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XIV

ECONOMIC GERMANY*

ONE of the favourite arguments used by pacificists in recent years was that the development of industrial civilization made all war henceforward impossible, and so to say unthinkable. The ties formed between modern peoples by industry and commerce are so manifold and so subtle, that interest, even in the absence of sentiment, makes it impossible to break them.

Nevertheless war has broken out. More than that, war has been declared by a people whom we were pleased to consider the most remarkable creation of industrial civilization. And we are bound to recognize that, in the unanimous enthusiasm with which this people has welcomed the dawn of bloodshed, among the most eager voices have been those of the commercial and manufacturing classes. Financiers, managers of works, working men themselves, have all figured in the front ranks of the defenders of imperialism.

How are we to explain this paradox? And first let us get rid of a possible misunderstanding. Certain thinkers tell us:† "It is not true that economic causes played a preponderant part in the explosion

*A lecture given on April 10, 1915.

†Landry: "Les origines, les causes, les lendemains de la guerre actuelle." (*Scientia*, 1915, II.)

of last July. Germany was not threatened by over-population, she had no urgent need of colonies." But the truth is that what counts in the history of humanity is not the actual facts, but the form in which men picture them to their minds. Political economy and history are in their essence psychological sciences. What we are concerned to know is not whether Germany was actually suffocating: Germany thought she was suffocating, she yielded—to use the very words of one of those who contradict us—to the haunting fear of aggressive "encirclement," which she felt bound to shatter at all costs. It is this "pathological phenomenon of collective psychology" which we must attempt to explain.

I.—THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN INDUSTRY

What strikes us at the very outset in the evolution of German industry is the actual greatness of the phenomenon. There is something impressive in the spectacle of this people, which forty years ago scarcely counted at all in economic geography, and yet had become on the eve of the war one of the great forces of the world. With her 900 to 1,000 millions* of foreign commerce Germany reckoned in the second rank of mercantile nations, after England. Outstripping England herself she had achieved the second place in the smelting and production of iron and the second also in the manufacture of steel. Her mercantile marine, inferior to ours in 1870, was in 1913 surpassed only by those of England and the United States.

* The figures given by M. Hauser in *milliards* (= 1,000 millions of francs) are here given in millions of pounds sterling.

All this won our admiration. Are we to disavow the admiration we have expressed, because Germany has dishonoured herself by crimes? No! For Frenchmen the truth is always the truth. History will certainly record the prodigious effort of will by which Germany, victorious on the battlefield, has won her place by main force in the economic world. I do not know whether it is true that Friedrich Karl said, on the night of the surrender of Metz: "We have just conquered in the military sphere: our task is now to fight and conquer in the industrial sphere." It matters little whether the words are apocryphal: they express a profound and symbolic truth, and admirably render the thought of an entire nation.

We do not hesitate then to recognize that the German people, since the foundation of the Empire, have given proof of remarkable qualities. First and foremost they have worked with intense energy, not with the feverish excitement which raises mountains in a few days, but with persistent and patient everyday labour, regular and methodical. Ostwald is right when he attributes to the Germans the faculty and genius for organization. They have carried to perfection the art of making use of men, of putting every man in his place and of getting the maximum of output from each individual. If the genius for great discoveries seems in recent times to have deserted Germany, the Germans are past masters in the application of the discoveries of science to industry. The statement has often enough been made: It is the union of the laboratory and the workshop which is the foundation of German wealth. This truth was emphasized in 1897 by a

member of your society, M. Raphael Georges Lévy. In an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, which was a revelation to many Frenchmen, he wrote: "The sphere in which science wins its triumphs is that of industry. It is difficult to find a more striking demonstration of this truth than that furnished by the chemical industry of Germany. That industry came from the laboratories of great men of science such as Liebig and Hoffmann, and its continued prosperity is due to the incessant coöperation of hundreds of chemists who come every year from the universities. . . . Germany is covered with laboratories, several of which have cost £25,000, and the yearly upkeep of which requires hundreds of thousands."*

Again, in one point this analysis was incomplete. Side by side with the union between laboratory and workshop, it is necessary to call attention to the union between the office of the business director and the library of the economist, the geographer and the historian. For the method which the Germans applied to the production of a new aniline colour they also carried into their search for commercial outlets, and their organization of channels of commerce. The German chemist and the German commercial traveller marched in step to the conquest of the globe.

This rise of Germany was a great and, we are prepared to say, in a certain sense, a fine spectacle; but its very rapidity contained an element which gave some ground for anxiety.†

*M. Hauser says, "Half a million marks . . . millions of marks." A *mark* is here taken as = a shilling.

†Lévy-Bruhl: "Causes économiques et politiques de la conflagration européenne." (*Scientia*, 1915, I.)

The evolution of Germany has borne a startling and almost catastrophic character. From the complex of agricultural states, dotted with industrial patches, which constituted the *Zollverein* in 1870, the industrial Empire has sprung up in a few years by a sort of historical "right-about-face," without any of that slow and secular preparation which marked the rise, for instance, of the English power. Time has had no share in producing industrial Germany: like nearly everything else in modern Germany it is an upstart. A few dates and figures will bring this out clearly. Karl Lamprecht* has noted the fact that toward 1880 the infant industry of Germany still needed protection against its older rivals, and this protectionist movement started, by reaction, the French movement of 1892. In the midst of the internal struggle over the question of canals in 1894-1901 it is still a matter of debate "whether the majority of occupations and interests in the Empire is still agricultural or has become industrial and commercial." But facts give the answer: In 1893 the consumption of raw iron *per caput* of the population did not rise to 99kg.† a year; in 1899 it amounted to 155 kg.† The consumption of coal rises from 1,940 to 2,740 kg. a head. In the same period the production of iron and pig-iron rises from five million to more than eight million tons, that of coal from 95 million to 136 million. In these six years the fate of Germany was decided by an increase in production so intensive that it seemed "unwholesome," and was destined to lead to the crisis

*Zur jüngsten deutschen Vergangenheit. 1904. Vol. II.

†218 lb. and 341 lb. (kilogramme = 2½ lb.).

of 1901. The country which was poor had suddenly become very rich. In 1895 the income from the fortunes of the Empire was estimated at 21 milliards*; in 1913 the estimate varied from 40 to 50 milliards†, while the wealth of Germany was estimated at 320 milliards,‡ of which nearly 9.5 consisted of deposits in banks and 18 in savings banks§ (*caisses d'épargne*). Such are the figures proudly produced by Dr. Helfferich, Director of the Deutsche Bank, the present Minister of Finance of the King of Prussia, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accession of William II.

This sudden increase in German wealth had very serious consequences for the character and distribution of the population of Germany. The two most notable results were the progressive disappearance of the rural population and the abrupt cessation of emigration. It is repeatedly stated that the Germans were forced into a policy of expansion and conquest by the increase in their population. This was indeed the excuse they put forward to justify their attempts to create colonies of settlement in Morocco and Asia Minor. A pitiless Malthusian law had forced them, it was said, to find for themselves a "place in the sun." Now there could be no idea more false than this of Germany as an over-populated country. It is quite true that since 1871 the population of the Empire has increased from 40 to nearly 70 millions. It is quite

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*840 million pounds (taking £1 = 25 francs).

†1,600 to 2,000 million pounds.

‡12,800 million pounds.

§See Bonnefon: "Les causes économiques de la guerre" (*Revue de Paris*, January 15, 1915.

true that in spite of a decline in the birth rate, the increase in the population of Germany was 800,000 a year: that is, 800,000 more births than deaths, 800,000 more mouths to feed. But this increase was far from being excessive, for every year 700,000 Slav labourers came in to work on the great estates of the east, not to mention the Italian, Croatian, Polish, etc., labour employed in towns, mines, and works.*

As for German emigration it is no longer more than a memory. Between 1880 and 1883 it exceeded 200,000 a year; to-day it does not reach 20,000—very much the same figure as our own, and the French are regarded as a people who emigrate very little. The number of arrivals far exceeds that of departures: Germany has ceased to be a country of emigration and is becoming a country of immigration.

There is indeed an emigration in Germany, but it is an internal emigration, from the country to the town, from the agricultural regions to the industrial districts. Since 1895 the population living on the land has ceased to be half of the total population: at the present time it is not 44 per cent.

Out of 67 million Germans scarcely 17 millions are agricultural or live on agriculture. Every year an enormous number of peasants quit the land and rush into colossal factories. It is thus that the number of towns with a population over 100,000 exceeds 45; it is thus that armies of labour are formed which put

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*Ashley, "The economical side of the European conflagration" (*Scientia*, 1915, I). The idea that Germany is over-full, that the German people is choking for want of room is cherished by theorists, but has little basis in fact. Constant decline in rate of emigration since 1891: it is not a sixth of what it was then.

15,000 workmen at the disposal of a firm like Mannesermann, more than 30,000 under Thyssen, 73,000—nearly two army corps—under Krupp. In these figures I include all the works belonging to one firm.

Germany has definitively passed from the type of the agricultural state to that of the industrial state, from the *Agrarstaat* to the *Industriestaat*. The equilibrium between the land and the workshop has been upset.*

II.—THE INDUSTRIAL STATE AND ITS NEEDS

The industrial state has very imperious needs and requirements, which are not shared by the agricultural state; the agricultural state lives on itself and for itself, and can live within its own limits.† The industrial state, to use the phrase of Lamprecht, is a "tentacular" state.‡

To begin with, it has need of supplies of food. It is

*Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, put the question to himself: "Is Germany already an *Industriestaat* or still an *Agrar-und Industrie Staat*, an intermediate form?" But he showed that the startling rapidity of its industrial development was already giving rise, ten years ago, to a general tendency to the "Industrial State, World-policy and Imperialism." It is to be regretted that this work of Lamprecht, the last of his historic series, was not more read in France. It would have given us more exact information on the ideas and intentions of Germany than a dozen interviews. The same philosophy and the same appetite for empire are to be found as in Treitschke, but in a more agreeable and not unattractive form.

†G. Stresemann, "La politique mondiale de l'Allemagne" (*Revue économique internationale*, 1913. III, p. 85 foll.). "The Prussia of Frederick William III was from the economic point of view a self-sufficing state."

‡Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, II, p. 593. "The Empire, as a body politic, is not bounded by its frontiers." Elsewhere he writes: "The people press outward over the borders." Paris, he reminds us, has been called a "tentacular" city because it strangles the whole country and absorbs its strength. (It was really in a different and much more general sense that Vandervelde used this striking phrase of "tentacular cities.") In a far better sense "the Empire may be described as the Germanic 'tentacular state.'"

calculated that 20 millions of the 67 millions of Germany depend for their maintenance on foreign harvests and foreign cattle. A dangerous position, since it compels Germany to secure for herself at all times not only free passage over her land frontiers, but, above all, freedom of communication by sea. We know what it costs Germany to-day to be cut off from receiving the wheat of Russia, America, and Argentina.

The industrial state is in pressing need not only of capital but of raw material. Germany, when she entered the lists, was regarded as a country rich in coal and iron. She has remained rich in coal; but by working her iron mines intensively I do not say she has exhausted them, but she can no longer extract from them the total amount of ore required by her metallurgical works. Krupp is more and more dependent on Sweden, Spain, north Africa and France. In the same way the spinning and weaving factories of Saxony and Silesia are dependent on Texas and Louisiana. If Sweden, which has nationalized her mines, puts barriers on the export of her ores, or the price of corn undergoes an abnormal rise in the market of New Orleans, it means famine for the crowds which throng into the Westphalia district or to the north of the Bohemian mountains.

Raw cotton bulks larger than any other article imported into Germany, to the amount of considerably more than £25,000,000. The cotton industry employs more than 1½ millions of workpeople and manufactures goods to the value of more than £50,000,000. Now, two thirds of the raw cotton consumed in the world is supplied by a single country, the United States. In

1894, a syndicate—the Sully cotton corner—took advantage of this situation to produce an enormous rise of prices and to reserve the cotton for the American factories. On the Bremen Exchange, in February, the price paid for cotton was 85 pfennigs a pound, while in December, when the corner had been broken up, it fell to 35. Germany lost in the operation £5,850,000 paid to the foreigner. A reduction in the production of cotton textiles and wide-spread dismissal of workmen were the results of this veritable cotton famine, which at the same time disastrously affected our own industries in the Vosges and in Normandy as well as those of Lancashire.*

The industrial state has need of capital. In spite of the prodigious increase in German wealth, German industry has an enormous appetite for capital. No sooner is capital created than it is used up in constructing new works or in remodelling machinery. In the formidable struggle in which Germany has entered she is condemned to make new conquests every day, for any defeat, nay more, any check, would be fatal.† It would be true to say that capital is swallowed up before it comes into being, for it is anticipated by credit. Companies with imposing capital dependent on industrial banks, these again dependent on

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*J. Stresemann. "The exports of Germany do not consist of raw materials which cannot be found elsewhere; on the contrary German industry is confined to the transformation of raw materials which she has to seek abroad; she is therefore in a condition of dependence. She has to pay for her raw materials and for her food supplies from abroad by means of her export of industrial products." See also F. Friedensburg. "Die zukunftige Erzversorgung der deutschen Eisenindustrie" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, May, 1913).

†Bonnefon, *op. cit.*, "No truce, no pause is possible."

central banks and especially on the Deutsche Bank, these great banks in their turn absorbing all available wealth, including a proportion of foreign capital—all this forms a marvellous but fragile structure.* The very denials of the German financiers prove that they cannot afford to disregard the assistance of foreign capital. Let but one of the streams which feed the mighty river happen to dry up, and the crisis comes with violent and widespread consequences.†

Customers are necessary to Germany even more than capital. In spite of their power of increase, in spite of their rapid advance in wealth, in spite of their appetite for enjoyment, the German people cannot by themselves alone absorb the enormous output of the German factories. They are bound to turn more and more to the outside world and to become an exporting industry.‡

All causes then combine to make Germany a tentacular state, spreading out in every direction over the world. The general staff of the industrial world needs a world-policy to find interest for its capital and to pay the wages of its workmen.§ The proletariat

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*Bonnefon, *op. cit.*, "The higher this fabulous edifice rose the more fragile it became."

†See in particular Steinberg, *Die Wirthschaftskrisis*, 1901. Bonn, 1902.

‡Ashley, *op. cit.*, "This industry cannot dispense with a wide foreign market." Similarly Bonnefon: "Germany then is dependent on the world-market." As early as 1900 it was admitted that 70 per cent. of the foreign trade of Germany was carried by sea. This shows the importance of control of the sea for German industry. Lévy-Bruhl writes: "She is suffocated by her own superabundant production."

§M. Bonnefon has collected some striking figures: Gelsenkirchen has to pay dividends on £9,000,000 of shares, and interest on £3,900,000 debentures. Krupp pays on £9,000,000 and £2,750,000; the Phœnix on £5,300,000 and £1,600,000. The rate of growth will be seen when it is remembered that the *Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft* in 1883 had a share capital of £250,000; in 1900 of £3,000,000;

have need of it to give them a full day's work and save them from starvation. That is why German socialism is imperialist.* You know what a hue and cry were raised against the French socialist who dared to make this discovery. We are compelled to-day to recognize that M. Andler was too painfully right. Even as early as 1900 the defenders of the Naval Law wrote: "The freedom of the seas and vigorous competition in the markets of the world are therefore questions of life and death for the nation, questions in which the working classes are most deeply interested." We know by recent examples what Germany means by "questions of life and death," and what methods she is in the habit of using to answer such questions and to deal with any obstacles that bar the way to their solution. Only yesterday the social democrat, Konrad Hoenisch, ex-member of the Reichstag, exclaimed: "The social interests of the German proletariat even more than political considerations make victory for Germany necessary."

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in 1911 of £6,500,000; in 1912 of £8,000,000, plus £5,500,000 debentures. The number of Joint-stock Companies before 1870 was about 200, with a capital of less than £125,000,000. They have to-day a capital of over £1,000,000,000.

*The historian G. von Below, "Militarismus und Kultur in Deutschland" (*Scientia*, 1915, ii), says: "The spirit of discipline, which reigns in the German army, is also the spirit to which we owe the economic growth which has drawn on us the hatred of England. Militarism is the school of our working classes." Gustav Stresemann, like M. Andler, in 1913 took note of the fact that the apparent opposition of socialism to the world-policy was merely "the outward aspect of the policy of the democratic party"; he called attention to articles in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, one by Max Schippfel, ex-member for Chemnitz, "The most brilliant eulogium on the expansionist policy"; and another by Quessel, a member of the Reichstag, "The economic importance of imperialism." "There are moments," he says, "when this article might seem to be written by a pan-Germanist." This account must be supplemented by the recent publications of James Guillaume and of Laskine.

III.—INDUSTRY AND WORLD-POLICY

(*Weltpolitik.*)

Thus we see the industrial state condemned to World-policy.* Its first business is to find means to develop its policy of export. The first means adopted is the system of bounties. As German industry is working less for the home market than for foreign markets it is logical to sell cheap, sometimes even to sell at a loss beyond the frontier in order to win new markets and to discourage all competition. Thanks to the system by which the chief economic forces are grouped in *cartels*, the process is easy enough. In 1902 the coke syndicate compelled the German consumer to pay 15s. a ton while at the same time it agreed to sell large quantities abroad at 11s. In the second half of 1900 the iron-wire syndicate had sold abroad at 14s. per 100 kg. while the home price was 25s. It thus made a minus profit on the foreign market, that is, a loss of £42,950, and on the home market a profit of £58,850. This gave a balance on the right side. But this time the trick was overdone, for the result was that German iron was bought up abroad to be re-exported to Germany at a profit.† Next to the system

*This is admirably put by Lamprecht, *op. cit.* The tentacular state is essentially based on the idea of the importation of provisions and raw materials, and of the export of more and more highly specialized goods. "Therefore, be always on the watch! . . . . To-day (1904) every nerve is strained to maintain the position of *Deutschtum* in the world, and to advance it." This requires that our economic life should be united, all its forces acting as a whole, "like an army" . . . List's prophecy is realized: the sea must no longer be merely a highway for our commerce and a nursing-mother of our national economy, but a battle-field in our struggle with the nations and the cradle of a new freedom."

†Steinberg, *op. cit.*

of bounties comes that of treaties of commerce, which favour the importation of provisions and of labourers (Slavs for example), and which secure a moderate tariff for German goods abroad. Such is the basis of the Russo-German Treaty of 1904, the tendency of which was to make Russia an economic colony of Germany.*

In order to meet the want of iron, Germany had to conquer new supplies of iron ore. Peaceful conquest to begin with. The expert adviser attached to the commissioners of delimitation in 1871 allowed the iron-ore strata of the Woëvre to escape, from ignorance of their real importance and also because he thought them inaccessible by reason of their depth—unworkable because of their high percentage of phosphorus. But the application of the Thomas process in 1878 converted the Briey basin into the most important iron-field at present being worked in the world. That is why Thyssen made his way into this region at Batilly, Jouaville and Bouligny under fictitious names. At the same time he sent his divers to Diélette to search for ore under the sea: he planted his agents in the mining and metallurgical company of Calvados, started under some one else's name the company of mines and quarries at Flamanville, and then the powerful company of smelting and steel works at Caen. By these operations he gained the double advantage of buying ore from us and selling coke to us. With the iron of Lorraine and Normandy and the coal of Westphalia, Germany would be the mistress of the world.

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*Steinberg, *op. cit.*, and Bonnefon. The object is by means of these treaties "to compensate by rise of wages for the higher price of cereals"; that is to say, to maintain the balance between the working classes of the west and the agrarians of the east.

To make sure of this supremacy it was of importance to remove all competition and establish German industry in the very heart of the country of her rivals. A description was given before the war of the extraordinary control acquired by German manufacturers over French works producing chemical materials, electricity, etc.* At Neuville-sur-Saône it was the *Badische Sodafabrik* which, under a French name, provided the madder-dye for the red trousers of the French army, and possibly it even inspired the Press campaign, conducted with the support of sentimental arguments, in favour of a colour which was dangerous from a military point of view. The Parisian Aniline Dye Company (*Compagnie parisienne des couleurs d'aniline*) was nothing but a branch of Meister, Lucius and Bruning, of Hoechst. We have been told how a Darmstadt company for producing pharmaceutical goods came and established a branch at Montereau in order to destroy a French factory which was there before, and how the *Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft* got hold of Rouen, Nantes, Algiers, Oran, and Châteauroux.

The same conquests were won at Seville, Granada, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Mendoza, Santiago and Valparaiso, while the other great electric company of Germany, the Siemens-Schuckert, established itself at Creil. Turkey,† Russia,‡ Italy, and Switzerland

*It is only necessary to recall the campaign conducted in the *Grande Revue* by M. Louis Bruneau (published as a volume, *L'Allemagne en France*, 1914); cf. also A. Staehling, *Bulletin du comité Michelet*, No. 3, Dec. 1914.

†German action in Turkey goes back to 1880; the Kaiser's visit in 1898 was utilized by German finance under the direction of Siemens.

‡In Poland branches were founded to evade the customs (electricity, dyes, silk and paper).

shared the fate of France. Some weeks ago a Swiss journal gave the following figures:—*Société anonyme pour l'industrie de l'aluminium* (Neuchâtel): staff, 8 Germans, 1 Austrian, 6 Swiss; *Banque des chemins de fer orientaux* (Zurich): 8 Germans, 1 Frenchman, 1 Belgian, 1 Austrian, 5 Swiss; *Banque pour entreprises électriques* (Zurich): 15 Germans, 9 Swiss; *Société des valeurs de métaux* (Basle), 10 Germans, 5 Swiss. It is to be noticed that the share-capital is held by Germans, while the debentures, the moderate interest on which does not attract the Germans, are placed in Switzerland. Thus, as the *Gazette de Lausanne* summed it up, "The money of the Swiss debenture-holder serves to support German undertakings competing with Swiss manufacturers in our own country."

A remarkable study of the same subject in Italy has been made by M. Giovanni Preziosi in some articles which appeared in 1914 in the *Vita italiana all' estero*, and were collected in pamphlet form in 1915 under the significant title, "Germany's Plan for the Conquest of Italy" (*La Germania alla conquista dell' Italia*). It was indeed a war of conquest, conducted with admirable organizing faculty. At its centre was a financial staff, constituted by the "*Banca commerciale . . . italiana*," which naturally is called Italian, just as the companies in France are called French or Parisian. This product of German finance is described as a "Germanic octopus," the very image of the tentacular state before described. Establishing itself within the directing boards, and, by means of a system of secret cards,* employing a regular system of com-

fiches, cards or slips containing notes on the persons spied upon.

mercial espionage to ruin all who resist it, it succeeded in gradually absorbing the economic energies of an entire people—establishments of credit, shipping companies, manufacturing firms; it was even able to corrupt political life, overthrow ministries and control elections. Here, as in Switzerland, the pseudo-Italian German banks "act as a pump which pumps out of Italy and pumps into Germany." Italy, which is considered a poor country, provides capital for rich Germany.

IV.—THE PART PLAYED BY THE STATE

To back up this policy of economic conquest the prestige and the strength of the Empire must be put at the service of the manufacturers. To make the state as the Germans understand it, the instrument of German expansion—this is the meaning of what the Germans have well named the policy of "business and power" (*Handels und Machtpolitik*).* Nowhere is the confusion of the two ideas more clearly exhibited than in the report forwarded to London in February, 1914, by Sir Edward Goschen, on "An Official German Organization for Influencing the Press of Other Countries."† This important document is

*The meetings of German economists which supported the Navy Law in 1912 met under this name. (See Ashley, *art. cit.*)

†*Despatches from H. M. Ambassador at Berlin respecting an official German organization for influencing the Press of other countries*, February 27, 1914. Herr Ballin's first project was to merge in one world-union (Weltverein) all the societies for German trade abroad—German-Russian, German-Argentine, German-Canadian, etc. It has been thought strange that he gave up his scheme, but it was really to create "another organization of a more subtle kind which should act more or less secretly." The meeting to constitute the society was attended not only by representatives of the companies, but by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

too little known in France, perhaps because, outside the Blue Book, it has not appeared in England except as an ordinary White Paper. But how instructive it is!

The Norddeutscher Lloyd, the Hamburg-Amerika, the Deutsche Bank, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the A. E. G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft), the Siemens-Schuckert, Krupp, and Gruson Companies, etc., form a private society, subsidized by the Imperial Office for Foreign Affairs. The object of this company, in coöperation with the Wolff Bureau, is to promote the manufacturing prestige of Germany abroad. It will supply full information gratuitously or at a low price to foreign journals in their own language concerning Germany and favourable to Germany. It will withhold the service from those who show themselves deaf to instruction.* "To reply to news meant to influence opinion on Germany and to meet attacks upon her, and to make the true situation of German industry widely known"—such is the programme. In a word, the object is the organization of a spy-system for industry—I use the phrase of Signor Preziosi—under the control of the Empire. And, as is fitting in such a system, the work of Germanizing the Press

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The society was established by subscriptions amounting to £25,000 a year, the companies paying into it what they had hitherto been used to pay for foreign advertisements. The minimum contribution of each firm taking part in it is £50, which gives the right to a vote. The Imperial Office for Foreign Affairs, which pays a subsidy of £12,500, will therefore exercise a "powerful and decisive influence." The syndicate, formed provisionally for three years, is directed by a body of three directors, and by a council, in which the great banking and exporting firms are conspicuous.

*Reduced charges for German cables. The foreign press will be watched by the syndicate's agents. The system will be applied at once in South America and the Far East, and extended gradually to all countries outside Europe.

of the world will not be done by publicists sent for the purpose: they would very soon be burnt. In an article* so naïvely transparent that its publication was thought inopportune and orders came from above not to reproduce it or make any allusion to it, the *Deutsche Export Revue* crudely remarked: "It is better to choose men already connected with the various journals, who will serve German interests without attracting so much attention."

This fusion of *Weltpolitik* and business policy was peculiarly dangerous for the peace of the world.† If imperialism, if the tentacular state, puts its strength at the disposal of manufacturing interests, the temptation is strong and constant to use this strength to break down any resistance which stands in the way of the triumph of these interests. If a crisis comes which causes a stoppage of work (there are sometimes 100,000 unemployed in Berlin‡) the neighbouring nation which may be held responsible for the crisis has reason to be on its guard. "Be my customer or I kill you" seems to be the motto of this industrial system, continually revolving in its diabolical circle: always producing more in order to sell more, always

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**Deutsche Export Revue*, June 5, 1914. "The aims of German national economy; a syndicate to supply news abroad," given in an appendix to the Goschen report.

†This point was specially emphasized by Lévy-Bruhl in the article named above: "The extraordinary development of German manufactures meant for its neighbours and for the world rather a danger of war than a guarantee of peace. This is no paradox. . . . It is not good for the peace of the world that the commercial prestige of a great nation should rest on its military prestige."

‡See the figures in Jastrow's *Arbeitsmarkt*. Steinberg mentions a whole series of metallurgical companies, the shares of which, in 1898-1900 and 1900-1901, fell from 256 to 83, from 749 to 42, &c., and their dividends from 15 per cent. to 0, from 7 to 0, from 25 to 12, from 35 to 0. Schuckert fell from 288 to 100, and from 15 per cent. to 0.

selling more in order to meet the necessities of a production always growing more intensive.

Russia is for Germany both a reservoir of labour and a market. Should Russia in 1917 refuse to renew the disastrous treaty forced upon her in the unlucky days of the Japanese war, should she put an end to the system of passports for agricultural labourers, what will become of German capitalist agriculture, which has been more and more industrialized and is more and more in the hands of the banks: the farming of the great estates of Brandenburg, Pomerania, and Prussia?

France is for Germany a bank and a purveyor of minerals. What a temptation to dip deep into the jealously guarded stocking and fill both hands! What a temptation, too, to repair the blunder made in the delimitation of 1871! Even in 1911 the *Gazette du Rhin et de Westphalie* put forward the view that the iron ores of Lorraine and Luxemburg ought to be under the same control as those of Westphalia and the Saar. And I am told that the great journals of Paris, when informed of this campaign, refused to take this "provincial journal" seriously, being blind to the fact that it was the organ of the great manufacturers of the Rhineland and of the Prussian staff. What a temptation again to take the port of Cherbourg in the rear from Diélette!

As for England, the direct competitor of Germany in all the markets of the world, and manufacturing the same goods, she is the enemy to be crushed.* Has she

*Stresemann: "Most of the present problems, national alliances, and international events, are found to have their ultimate origin in the competition of England and Germany," he writes in 1913. The article ended with a challenge to England and insisted on "the seriousness of the present tension."

not acquired the habit, and has she not taught it to France, of refusing to lend money to poor states except in return for good orders? The time is beginning to go by when it was possible to do German business in Turkey with French or English gold. Germany's rivals have learned from her the lesson of *Handels und Machtpolitik*. But what is to become of Essen, Gelsenkirchen, and all that immense industrial city of which Westphalia consists, if Rumanians, Greeks, Serbians, order their guns and their ironclads, their rails or their locomotives at Glasgow or at Le Creusot? Germany thought war preferable to this economic encirclement, and the velvet glove gave place to the mailed gauntlet.

Little by little the idea of war as necessary, of war as almost a thing to wish for, laid hold on the industrial classes. The proof is to be found as early as 1908 in a popular book by Professor Paul Arndt, one of those small shilling books which served to instruct the German mind.* All of us, even the best informed, must reproach ourselves for not having studied or studied closely enough these small books, which would have made the danger clear to us. In this volume the author, after a pæan to German greatness, begins a chapter "On the dangers of Germany's participation in world-wide trade." He shows that this participation increases Germany's dependence on the foreigner and makes her vulnerable by sea as well as by land. If international relations are disturbed there will be "many workmen without food, and much depreciation

**Deutschlands Stellung in Weltwirthschaft* (Teubner). For the same subject treated in more scientific form see Arthur Dix, *Politische Wirthschaftsgeographie*, 1910.

of capital," and that from causes "in great measure beyond the control of Germany" in countries which may seize the opportunity to weaken Germany. And in a hypothesis which is prophetic he describes the effects of the blockade.

But he accepts without hesitation these risks of the world-policy. "No doubt, if we wish to be and to remain a great people, a world power, we expose ourselves to serious struggles. But this must not alarm us. There is profound truth in the dictum that man degenerates in peace time. The call to arms is often needed to rouse a world benumbed with apathy and indolence. Those who can look far and deeply into things see that warfare is often a blessing to humanity." This German is a disciple of Joseph de Maistre.

I have shown how the over-rapid industrialization of Germany has led by a mechanical and fatal process to the German war. If any doubt were felt on the part played by economic causes in this war it would be enough to look at the picture of German victory as imagined by the Germans in their dreams during the last seven months. It is an industrial victory, a forced marriage between German coal and foreign iron, the reduction of nations into vassals who are to play the part of perpetual customers of the German workshops.

"The metalliferous strata of French Lorraine and Russian Poland," wrote Baron Zedlitz-Neukirch some time ago, "supplement in some degree our own mining works."* If we ask the impetuous Max Harden† what is to become of martyred Belgium, he replies, in

*See the *Temps*, February 23d.

†Quoted by Waxweiller, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, p. 115.

October, 1914, "Antwerp not against Hamburg and Bremen, but with them; Liége, working side by side with the arms factories of Hesse, Berlin, and Swabia; Cockerill in alliance with Krupp; Belgian and German iron, coal, and textiles under one control. . . . From Calais to Antwerp, Flanders, Limburg, and Brabant, up to and beyond the line of fortresses on the Meuse, all Prussian." The German dream is the dream of a conquering man of business, a counting-house romance founded on Freytag's *Soll und Haben* (Debit and Credit).

The war they thought would be the solution of colonial questions. In the tragic days at the end of July, 1914, Bethmann-Hollweg offered England to maintain the continental integrity of France (German industry would be content with the economic annexation of France), but refused any pledge to respect French colonies, and especially North Africa. In September they had the audacity to offer, as the price of a desertion of which they thought us capable, to divide with us the Belgian Congo, toward which the treaty of 1911 had allowed them to put out two feelers.* A German used this candid language: "We have need of France, because we cannot claim the government of the whole non-English colonial world." At the same time they attempted by stirring up revolt among the Boers and by attacks on Portuguese colonies to build up a German Empire in South Africa. The victory of Germany meant for them security of iron supply and enlarged markets: it meant Briey, Ouenza, Casablanca, Bagdad.

*Fr. Naumann. *Deutschland und Frankreich*, 1915.

The vision has faded and the building of their dreams has crumbled away. But the dream has left its lessons for us, which demand attention not only in the future but to-day. Let us cherish no illusions. Germany, though conquered and curtailed, will not cease to exist. It is idle to suppose, as some publicists write, that we are going to suppress a whole people. Even if we had the military power to do it, policy and morality would forbid us.* After our victory there will once more be a Germany which will patiently and persistently resume its labours. The great war will no sooner be ended than the other war, the economic war, will begin again. If we do not wish to be crushed we must to-day begin to prepare our mobilization for this new war.

No one is better qualified to direct this movement than your society. The duty is laid upon it not only by its name but by its history. It came into being at a time like our own in the middle of a great war. Its founders—men like Chaptal, Monge, Conté, Fourcroy, Berthollet—conceived their work as one of national revival. And when your first president, Chaptal, published his two fine volumes, *De l'industrie française*, in 1819, the programme he drew up was none other than that which must inspire us to-day—the programme of the union of science and industry.

*See my "Essai sur l'Allemagne future." (*Revue politique et parlementaire*, March, 1915.)

XV

THE NAVY AND THE WAR

(August, 1914, to August, 1915)

By The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR

First Lord of the Admiralty

XV

THE NAVY AND THE WAR

(AUGUST, 1914, TO AUGUST, 1915).

On the 31st July, 1915, the First Lord of the Admiralty addressed the following letter to Mr. Tuohy of the New York World:—

July 31, 1915.

DEAR MR. TUOHY,—

I am obliged to you for showing me a copy of the communication from Count Reventlow entitled "A Year of Naval Warfare," which has just been published in the New York *World*. I am not quite sure that I comprehend the purpose with which it has been written, but in accordance with your desire I am making a few observations upon its contents.

The introductory paragraph calls for no comment from me. Count Reventlow explains why the German fleet was not completed during the fifteen years which have elapsed since the first Navy Bill, and recounts some of the political miscalculations of the German Government through which, as he believes, the German fleet in the North Sea has been put in a position of numerical inferiority. These are points on which perhaps Count Reventlow speaks with authority; in any case they only concern his own country. But when he incidentally declares that England "desired

to attack Germany," he blunders into a controversy where he will hardly receive so respectful a hearing. The world, though he may not know it, has long made up its mind as to who is the aggressor in the present war; and I should have thought it hardly worth his while to repeat such charges outside the limits of the German Empire.

The main purpose, however, of Count Reventlow's communication is to praise the performances of the German fleet; and certainly it is no purpose of mine to belittle the courage or the skill of the sailors composing it. I doubt not that they have done all that was possible both in the honourable warfare to which doubtless they were inclined, and in the dishonourable warfare required of them by their superiors. But what, in this the first year of the war, have they accomplished by either method? He tells us that we—the British—have failed to induce the German fleet to come out and fight us—and certainly we have. So far the German fleet has thought it wise to avoid engaging a superior force, and I am the last person to blame them. But this surely is hardly to be counted as a triumph of either tactics or strategy; it is a military exploit which, however judicious, would be well within the competence of the least efficient fleet and the most incapable commander.

The truth is that the German High Sea Fleet has so far done nothing, and probably has not been in a position to do anything. At the beginning of the war we were told that by a process of continual attrition it was proposed to reduce the superior British fleet ship by ship until an equality was established between the

two antagonists. The design has completely failed. The desired equality is more remote than it was twelve months ago; and this would be true even if certain extraordinary misstatements about such small actions as have occurred in the North Sea had any foundation in fact. He tells us, for example, that in the skirmish of August 28, when some German cruisers were destroyed, the English squadron suffered heavy damage. This is quite untrue. He tells us again, that in the skirmish of January 24 last, when the *Blücher* was sunk, the British lost a new battle cruiser (the *Tiger*). This is also untrue. In that engagement we did not lose a cockle boat. I do not know that these misstatements are of any great moment. But for the benefit of those who think otherwise, let me say that in no sea fight, except that off the coast of Chile, has any ship of the English fleet been either sunk or seriously damaged.

Apart from these purely imaginary triumphs, the only performance of German warships in the North Sea on which Count Reventlow dwells with pride and satisfaction is the attack by some German cruisers on undefended towns in Yorkshire. This exploit was as inglorious as it was immoral. Two or three fast cruisers came over the North Sea by night; at dawn they bombarded an open watering-place; they killed a certain number of civilian men, women, and children; and, after an hour and a half of this gallant performance, retired to the safety of their own defended waters. Personally, I think it better to invent stories like the sinking of the *Tiger* than to boast of such a feat of arms as this.

But in truth, if any one will examine Count Reventlow's apology for the German High Sea Fleet, he will find that it amounts to no more than praise of German mines and German submarines. There is no doubt that German mines, scattered at random and with no warning to neutrals, have been responsible for the destruction of much neutral shipping and of some vessels of war. The first result is deplorable; the second is legitimate. Mine-laying is not, indeed, a very glorious method of warfare; though, used against warships, it is perfectly fair. But something more must be said about submarines. Anybody reading Count Reventlow's observations would suppose that submarines were a German invention, and that only German foresight had realized that their use would necessitate a modification in battle-fleet tactics. But this truth has been among the commonplaces of naval knowledge for years past, and was no more hid from Washington and London than from Berlin and Vienna. What was new in the German use of submarines was not their employment against ships of war, but their employment against defenceless merchantmen and unarmed trawlers. This, it must be owned, was never foreseen either in Washington or London. It is purely German. But Count Reventlow is profoundly mistaken if he supposed that, during the year which has elapsed, these murderous methods have affected in the slightest degree the economic life of England; what they *have* done is to fix an indelible stain upon the fair fame of the German navy.

If any one desires to know whether the British fleet has during the last year proved itself worthy of its

traditions, there is a very simple method of arriving at the truth. There are seven, and only seven, functions which a fleet can perform:—

It may drive the enemy's commerce off the sea.

It may protect its own commerce.

It may render the enemy's fleet impotent.

It may make the transfer of enemy troops across the sea impossible, whether for attack or defence.

It may transport its own troops where it will.

It may secure their supplies, and (in fitting circumstances) it may assist their operations.

All these functions have so far been successfully performed by the British fleet. No German merchant ship is to be found on the ocean. Allied commerce is more secure from attack, legitimate and illegitimate, than it was after Trafalgar. The German High Sea Fleet has not as yet ventured beyond the security of its protected waters. No invasion has been attempted of these islands. British troops, in numbers unparalleled in history, have moved to and fro across the seas, and have been effectively supported on shore. The greatest of military Powers has seen its colonies wrested from it one by one, and has not been able to land a man or a gun in their defence. Of a fleet which has done this we may not only say that it has done much, but that no fleet has ever done more. And we citizens of the British Empire can only hope that the second year of the war will show no falling off in its success, as it will assuredly show no relaxation of its efforts.

Pray believe me, yours faithfully,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

Appended is the communication from Count Reventlow to which Mr. Balfour refers and replies:—

A YEAR OF NAVAL WARFARE

By Count Ernst zu Reventlow

When, a year ago, the German fleet entered the great contest, it was not in a state of completion, as many persons abroad believe it to have been. At that time the German fleet had been for some fifteen years in the process of being regularly built up, for the big Navy Bill had not become a law until the summer of 1900. In that year the German navy contained only two somewhat modern battleships. It was calculated at that time that the rebuilding of the fleet would be completed in 1920. In 1906, however, came the great Dreadnought revolution in shipbuilding which quickly rendered worthless all ships built before that time (pre-Dreadnoughts), and compelled tremendous enlargements of wharves, harbours, and canals, gigantic extension of organization, &c. The work of completing the German fleet would have extended itself far beyond the year 1920 under these conditions. If one furthermore takes into consideration that—as the authorities of all lands acknowledge—experience shows that it requires not fifteen but thirty years to build up a fleet with everything that belongs thereto on water and on land, it is clear that the German fleet was far from being ready in the summer of 1914. And to this must be added a fact that has been overlooked: in 1900, when the strength of the German fleet was decided on, the relations of England to France and to Russia were

bad. England had to maintain strong fleets in the Mediterranean and in east Asia. The alliance with Japan was not yet in existence. If these conditions had persisted, Great Britain could have used only a part of its fleet in a war with Germany. Since, however, Great Britain desired to attack Germany when the proper time came, it allied itself at the right moment with Russia, France, and Japan, and was thus able to use its entire fleet against Germany and Germany's allies from August, 1914, on. Then, in the course of the war, Italy came in with its considerable fleet. The allies of Great Britain also employ their fleets in the home waters and on the seas against Germany and its allies. And since, as is well known, the fleets of Austria-Hungary and Turkey are very small, the German fleet has had to battle during the last twelve months against an extraordinarily superior might. What has the German fleet achieved in this year, what has it lost, according to what plan has it fought?

Let us begin with the last question: According to what plan has the German fleet fought? In the home waters two enemies were to be considered—Russia in the Baltic, Great Britain in and beyond the North Sea. In view of the number of Russian ships in Baltic harbours, the Russian fleet could by no means be taken lightly. Since the fall of 1914 a half dozen English submarines have been stationed in the Baltic. Therefore it was necessary to leave a portion of the German fleet there, and to be steadily prepared to employ still more forces in the Baltic should occasion arise. The greatest part of the German fleet lay, of course, in the North Sea. It was from the beginning impossible

to prevent the isolation of Germany from the oceans; for, on the one hand, the German North Sea harbours—above all the basis of operations of the German fleet—are too far distant from the English Channel and the northern passage from the North Sea, to make it possible to keep these open, and, on the other hand, the German fleet was and is much too small. At the beginning of the war, and especially after Great Britain had taken over the warships being built in British shipyards for other nations, the German fleet was hardly half as strong as the British. The British Isles lie like a long mole before the North Sea, and for this reason the command of the outlets of the North Sea is very easy for them. The British ships are at all times near their bases of operations, and in the case of the English Channel there exists the further fact that the opposite coast belongs to the ally, France. The commercial blockade could and can be easily carried out by armed merchantmen, older cruisers and battleships, light cruisers and torpedo boats, so that the British main fleet with its great battleships retains complete strategic freedom of action. Therein lay the danger for the small German fleet, and therein lay also the military necessity of employing a strategy of reserve, so far as favourable opportunities did not present themselves. In view of the unfortunate geographic position of the North Sea, the cutting off of overseas traffic could not be prevented. It was also the intention of the British fleet in the first days of the war to carry on a strategy of reserve in the North Sea, to employ good opportunities for making sallies, and also to attempt surprises. The cruiser battle in the

Bay of Heligoland on August 28, 1914, was to be a surprise of this nature. It cost us some small cruisers, and it cost the attacking English squadron heavy damage, despite its great superiority. This battle was without any significance so far as the course of the war was concerned. It demonstrated again, however, the unfortunate geographical position of the German coasts; the English knew that the German fleet could always be found in the so-called Bay of Heligoland, since we have no other harbours there. The British fleet, on the other hand, which had before then frequently enough been hunted for by our torpedo boats, was not tied to any definite place, but lay at some point on the coasts of Great Britain. It is highly probable that the leaders of Great Britain's campaign would have carried on a strategy of sorties alternating with one of holding back, in order, on the one side continuously to weaken the German fleet without running any serious risk to themselves, and on the other, in order so to disorganize and provoke it that it would let itself be induced to enter a great deciding battle under unfavourable conditions and in an unfavourable position. These plans came to naught because of the entry into the naval warfare of a factor which the British Admiralty had not anticipated. This was the German submarine warfare—the war with mines and with submarines. Through the systematic strategic employment of mines and submarines the German naval leaders have in a short time succeeded in making a continuous stay in the North Sea impossible for the British main fleet. Only occasionally since last fall have detachments of the English main fleet made

short, rapid sorties into the North Sea, only to return immediately to the Irish Sea or to the waters west and north of Scotland. This meant a shattering of all English plans of a military blockade of the German coasts, and of shutting the German naval forces up in the German harbours. The British main fleet saw itself unable to command the North Sea. Even the mercantile blockade by British warships could not be maintained, since the German submarines had become too dangerous for the large British cruisers and other warships. Therefore the British Admiralty established a gigantic mine-field at the entrance to the North Sea from the English Channel, and proclaimed other portions of the North Sea a military zone which could be traversed by neutral ships only at their own risk. This was a violation of the rights of neutral shipping unheard of in history; the neutrals have endured it. The British Government simultaneously presented as the chief means of their campaign the starving out of the German people, and by doing so drove Germany to its submarine warfare on British commerce. This is still proceeding along the same lines. What successes it will achieve cannot at this time be definitely said. It is, however, certain that the submarine warfare has a growing influence upon the whole economic life of Great Britain. No one would have considered possible the things that the German submarines are here accomplishing and have accomplished. It stands without example. Nevertheless, Germany would certainly gladly stop this submarine war against commerce if, in return, the freedom and safety of all floating property at sea were guaranteed.

It is plainly the standpoint of the British Admiralty to avoid serious encounter with the German fleet except under especially favourable conditions. It fears that it would otherwise have too few ships left, and would be weaker at sea than the United States, after the war. Whether it will be possible for the British main fleet to carry through this rôle depends also on many circumstances of political and economic nature. One can say, however, that the motives for holding back the main fleets on both sides are similar, despite the great inequality of the two fleets. In any event, it is correct to say that the great armoured ships do not come and fight for fear of the submarines; for there are many other reasons to be considered. We do not, it is true, command the North Sea without submarines, but we have through them made it impossible for the British fleet to command the North Sea. That is the great, historically new event of this naval war. The German submarines have everywhere given astounding examples of their military powers. They have even voyaged from the North Sea to the Dardanelles, and have destroyed a number of English warships there. The two German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau*, it is known, are in Turkish waters. At the beginning of the war they were in the western Mediterranean, and they succeeded in getting through the whole French fleet from Messina to the Dardanelles. In the Black Sea these two cruisers, in conjunction with the Turkish fleet, have repeatedly fought successfully against the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the latter, despite its superior might, has never dared make an earnest attack in the Turkish waters of the Black Sea.

The cruiser warfare on the seas was conducted independently of all actions. The few German cruisers here were from the start on a lost post. They had no supporting bases, and found themselves facing a tremendously superior force of British, French, Japanese, and Russian warships. Mr. Churchill has declared in the House of Commons that there were in all about ninety warships of every description hunting for the few German cruisers. Their situation was, therefore, extremely difficult, and their destruction earlier or later was assured. Their actions could, indeed, damage the enemy, but they could have no influence on the course of the war. Nevertheless, Count Spee succeeded with his squadron in destroying an English cruiser squadron on the Chilian coast. Spee's squadron was then destroyed by a tremendously superior enemy force in the battle off the Falkland Islands. An end was also put to the glorious career of the cruiser *Emden*. Well-informed persons in Germany, as has been said, had never based any hopes on this cruiser warfare, for they knew that the forces were lacking to carry it out on a large scale, and for any long time. But the glory which the German sea fighters have won for themselves on the oceans constitutes a lasting success and a gain which cannot be lost. In every contest they have demonstrated that they can be destroyed only by superior English forces, and that, ship for ship, they are superior to the English. We have experienced the same thing in the home waters, as, for instance, in the cruiser battle in the North Sea in January, 1915. Here, the German cruiser squadron was weaker, the English squadron was superior in ships and gun calibres.

Despite this, the losses of the English squadron were very much the heavier; it lost the new battleship cruiser *Tiger*, the battleship cruiser *Lion* was put out of action, and all the other cruisers were heavily damaged. On the German side, only the older cruiser *Blücher* was lost, which ought not to have been brought into the battle at all. The three German battleship cruisers were hit by only two English projectiles, one of which glanced off the armour while the other did damage aft, without affecting the ship's fighting strength. Then, as on August 28th, and on the seas, it has always been manifest that the German ships shot better than the British.

The losses of the German fleet in the first year of the war are very small. It has lost not a single ship of the first class, but only a few submarines and torpedo boats, some small cruisers and a few older cruisers. The German fleet looks to the future with confidence, and even though it has, because of the considerations referred to, carried on a strategy of reserve and of waiting, it has, on the other hand, repeatedly shown that it possesses full freedom of action in the North Sea. The German fleet has coursed about in the North Sea a great number of times, and at times, as is known, has even advanced to the English coasts in order to bombard English coast defences and marine stations.

The last twelve months have demonstrated that the days of absolute British supremacy are at an end. Ten years ago the Civil Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Lee, declared that the British dreadnoughts would be on the German coasts before the news of the

breaking out of war appeared in the German papers. The last twelve months have shown that Mr. Lee was a bad prophet. The German fleet and the German people await with confidence the events of the coming twelve months.

FRUITS OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

STATEMENT BY MR. BALFOUR

The First Lord of the Admiralty has issued the following message:—

The second anniversary of the British declaration of war provides a fitting opportunity for a brief survey of the present naval situation. Public attention is inevitably concentrated upon the great military operations by which the Allies are pressing with ever-increasing severity upon the Central Powers from the east, the west, and the south; and though none of us are likely to ignore the part which the Navy plays in the campaign, it is not easy even for those who reflect much on these subjects to see things in their true perspective; for those who content themselves with the daily bulletins it is impossible. They cannot believe that anything important is done when nothing important seems to happen.

It is true that the great battle off Jutland for a moment broke the monotony of the naval situation, and its consequences, moral and material, cannot easily be overrated. An Allied diplomatist assured me that in his view it was the turning point of the war. The tide which had long ceased to help our

enemies began from that moment to flow strongly in our favour. This much at least is true, that every week which has passed since the German High Seas Fleet was driven damaged into port has seen a new success for the Allies in one part or other of the field of operations.

It would be an error, however, to suppose that the naval victory changed the situation; what it did was to confirm it. Before Jutland, as after it, the German Fleet was imprisoned; the battle was an attempt to break the bars and burst the confining gates; it failed, and with its failure the High Seas Fleet sank again into impotence.

THE GERMAN "VICTORY"

It may perhaps be objected that this is but a British view of British triumphs, and that German accounts of naval doings tell a very different story, and leave a very different impression upon the military student. But this is not so. Study the German utterances with care, and you will find that they give precisely the same general impression of British sea power and the naval position as that which I have just expressed. It is quite true that they call that a victory which the rest of the world calls a defeat. But though they talk in German, their meaning can quite easily be expressed in intelligible English, for in essence both parties are agreed.

After all, the object of a naval battle is to obtain the command of the sea, or to keep it; and it is certain that Germany has not obtained it, and that we have not lost it. The tests of this assertion are

easy to apply. Has the grip of the British blockade relaxed since May 31? Has it not, on the contrary, tightened? Is it or is it not becoming more difficult for the Germans to import raw materials and foodstuffs; and to pay for them by the export of their manufactures? The Germans themselves will admit that it is becoming more difficult. Hence the violence of their invectives against Britain; and hence their unwearied repetition of the cry that Britain is the arch enemy that must at all costs be humbled to the dust.

Again, if they felt themselves on their way to maritime equality, would they spend so much breath in advertising the performances of the submarine which, flying a commercial flag, carried 280 tons of German produce—to say nothing of an autograph letter of the Kaiser—from Bremen to Baltimore? The operation itself involved no naval difficulty. Its commercial results were necessarily infinitesimal; its whole interest in German eyes lay in the fact that by using a submarine they could elude the barrier raised by the British fleet between them and the outer world; a barrier which they knew their own fleet could neither break nor weaken.

But sea power shows itself not merely in denying the waterways of the world to the enemy, but in using them for your own military purposes. And here again there is a singular discrepancy between German boats about the greatness of the German fleet and German admissions about its impotence. Since, nearly two years ago, England's "contemptible little army" was sent into France, a steady and ever-

increasing flow of men and munitions has been poured across the waters of the Channel. It has reached colossal proportions; its effects on the war may well be decisive; yet never has it been more secure from attack by enemy battleships or cruisers as it has been since the German "victory" of May 31.

GERMAN BOATS

But there are longer sea routes and more distant operations which in this connection it is fitting to remember. It seems that on the German anniversary of the war the German Press bade the German public to take comfort from an attentive study of the map. "See," they said, "how much enemy territory both in the east and in the west the armies of the fatherland occupy; see—and take heart." The amount of comfort, however, which the study of maps is capable of conveying depends partly on the maps you choose. Even the map of Europe shows an ever-shrinking battle-line. But why look only at Europe? Germany for twenty years has advertised itself as a great colonial Power; and it was to conquer and maintain its position as a great colonial Power that German fleets were built.

Let us, then, choose a map which contains her oversea Empire. At the beginning of August, 1914, Germany possessed colonies in the China Seas, in the Malay Archipelago, in the Pacific Ocean, in West Africa, in Southwest Africa, in East Africa. All have gone except the last; and the last whilst I write seems slipping from her grasp. The Navy has not conquered them; in the actual fighting by which they

have been or are being acquired the Navy has taken a very important yet not the leading part. But without the British navy to contain the German fleet, the operations which bid fair to strip Germany of every one of her oversea possessions could not have been successful—could not even have been attempted.

Has, then, the battle of Jutland, opened up the smallest prospect of Germany's regaining what she has lost? Can it give a moment's respite to the hard-pressed colonists in German East Africa? I doubt whether it has ever occurred to any German (and I am sure it has occurred to nobody else) that anything which the German fleet has done, is doing, or can do will delay for one moment the final triumph of General Smuts over the last of Germany's oversea possessions.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

If any desire yet further proof of the value which the Germans really attach to their "victorious" fleet I advise them to study the German policy of submarine warfare. The advantage of submarine attacks on commerce is that they cannot be controlled by superior fleet power in the same way as attacks by cruisers. The disadvantage is that they cannot be carried out on a large scale consistently with the laws of war or the requirements of humanity. They make, therefore, a double appeal to German militarism; an appeal to its prudence and an appeal to its brutality. The Germans knew their "victorious" fleet was useless; it could be kept safe in harbour while submarine warfare went on merrily outside. They

knew that submarines could not be brought to action by battleships or battle cruisers. They thought, therefore, that to these new commerce destroyers our merchant ships must fall an easy prey, unprotected by our ships of war and unable to protect themselves.

They are wrong in both respects; and doubtless it is their wrath at the skill and energy with which British merchant captains and British crews have defended the lives and property under their charge that has driven the German Admiralty into their latest and stupidest act of calculated ferocity—the judicial murder of Captain Fryatt.

I do not propose to argue this case; it is not worth arguing. Why should we do the German military authorities the injustice of supposing that they were animated by any solicitude for the principles of international law and blundered into illegality by some unhappy accident? Their folly was of a different kind, and flowed from a different cause. They knew quite well that when Captain Fryatt's gallantry saved his ship the Germans had sunk without warning twenty-two British merchant ships, and had attempted to sink many others. They knew that in refusing tamely to submit himself to such a fate he was doing his duty as a man of courage and of honour. They were resolved at all costs to discourage imitation!

"FREEDOM OF THE SEAS"

What blunderers they are! I doubt not their ability to manipulate machines. But of managing men, unless it be German men, they know less than

nothing. They are always wrong; and they are wrong because they always suppose that if they behave like brutes they can cow their enemies into behaving like cowards. Small is their knowledge of our merchant seamen. Their trade, indeed, is not war—they live by the arts of peace. But in no class does patriotism burn with a purer flame, or show itself in deeds of higher courage and self-devotion. I doubt whether there is one of them to be found who is not resolved to defend himself to the last against piratical attack; but if such a one there be, depend upon it he will be cured by the last exhibition of German civilization.

And what must the neutrals think of all this? They are constantly assured by German advocates that the Central Powers are fighting for the "freedom of the seas." It is a phrase with different meanings in different mouths; but we have now had ample opportunities of judging what it means to the Germans. It means that the German navy is to behave at sea as the Germany army behaves on land. It means that neither enemy civilians nor neutrals are to possess rights against militant Germany; that those who do not resist will be drowned, and those who do will be shot. Already 244 neutral merchant ships have been sunk in defiance of law and of humanity; the number daily grows. Mankind with now two years' experience of war behind it has made up its mind about German culture; it is not, I think, without material for forming a judgment about German freedom.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

Admiralty, August 4.

XVI

GREAT BRITAIN'S MEASURES AGAINST GERMAN TRADE

By The Rt. Hon. SIR E. GREY,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

XVI

GREAT BRITAIN'S MEASURES AGAINST GERMAN TRADE

A speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on the 26th January, 1916.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey): The Right Hon. gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. Leverton Harris) has made a most interesting speech, full of knowledge, and founded upon personal experience. The Right Hon. gentleman is one of those, of whom there are several in the House and many outside, who have been giving most devoted service on committees in carrying out the policy of the Government with regard to contraband. There have been from the beginning of the war a number of people of great knowledge and experience who have given their services voluntarily on these various committees, and whose services have been of enormous value. I think the House will have gathered from the Right Hon. gentleman's speech that the subject with which we are dealing is not really so simple, and cannot be made so simple, as might appear from some of the speeches that are made upon it and some of the articles which appear outside. It is a most difficult and complicated subject. I gather

from the debate, as far as it has gone, that there is real misapprehension in the House as to what is the present state of things with regard to the amount of trade passing through neutral countries to the enemy, and also real misapprehension, and a vast under-estimate, of what the Government is doing through its various agencies to prevent that trade. In the first place, I must deal with some of the figures scattered broadcast lately in some organs of the Press, which have created a grotesque and quite untrue impression of the amount of leakage through neutral countries—figures which will not bear examination, but the conclusions founded upon which have undoubtedly done great harm. The figures consist, as far as I have seen them, of statistics from the official returns of the United States giving the amount of exports to certain neutral countries in Europe in a normal year of peace. Figures are then given which purport to be the excess figure for those same neutral countries at the present time, these figures being greatly in excess of the peace figures. The peace figures are then subtracted from the figures of last year, and the conclusion is drawn that the whole of that surplus has gone to Germany. On that are founded various attacks upon the Government. These figures published in this way do a great injustice—or rather attacks founded upon these figures do a great injustice—to the Government. The figures take no account of the fact that in the case of many of these articles in time of peace neutral countries do not draw the whole of their supplies from the United States. They draw them from enemy countries, or from sources which are not available to them in time of war.

Therefore, to take the exports from the United States into these countries, and to assume that, because these exports have risen therefore the large surplus which has been imported into neutral countries has gone into enemy countries, entirely leaves out of account the fact that in very many cases the increased exports from the United States have been for real consumption in those neutral countries, and have taken the place of the supplies which in peace time have been drawn from other sources than the United States, and are not now available.

In the next place, the figures of exports from the United States give the amount of stuff which left the ports of the United States. These do not necessarily correspond with the amount of stuff which arrives in the neutral ports. What is the cause of all the trouble and the very great friction that there has been with the meat-packers of the United States? It is because a large amount of the produce coming from the United States consigned to neutral ports, which we believed was destined for the enemy, never reached the neutral ports. It is in the Prize Court here. So at one and the same time the Foreign Office, or the Government, is having a very warm contention indeed with neutral Governments, or groups of people in neutral countries, on the ground that we have put their produce into the Prize Court here and detained it and at the same time we are being attacked in this country on the ground that that very same produce has gone through neutral countries into the enemy countries! Some figures have been published in the Press to-day giving a very different impression of the true state of the

case as regards the neutral countries and the enemy—figures published by the War Trade Department. I recommend that those figures should be studied, for they, at any rate, reduce the thing to very different proportion.

But I have had some other figures supplied to me, out of which I am going to take two striking instances. The statement has been made in one organ of the Press, in regard to wheat, that the exports of wheat from the United States to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands collectively, rose from 19,000,000 bushels in the first ten months of 1913—that is, the year of peace—to 50,000,000 bushels in the corresponding period of 1915—that is to say, an excess of 31,000,000 bushels. The conclusion is drawn that that has all gone to the enemy through those neutral countries. It is almost incredible, if the figures supplied to me are reliable—and I believe they are—that a statement of that kind should have been made. Those 50,000,000 bushels from the United States are the figures given under a collective heading in the United States returns, which comprises, not merely these four Scandinavian countries, but "other Europe," including Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta; so that these 50,000,000 bushels not only go to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, but also include the exports to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta. The exports to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta alone amounted to 23,000,000 bushels. That is a very large part of the whole increase. Why do these countries take so much? Because no doubt they depended, I presume, in ordinary years, very largely on grain

coming from Black Sea ports which has ceased to be available. Therefore there is no need to assume that Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta were importing wheat in order to pass on to the enemy; they wanted it to supply the grain which they would have got in normal years from other sources.

From the figures that remain some millions more bushels must be deducted which have been allowed to go through under special international arrangements to the Belgian Relief Fund. When you have deducted those you find that these four countries—the three Scandinavian countries and Holland—which were supposed to have sent 31,000,000 bushels on to the enemy, had not, as a matter of fact, imported at all in excess of their normal requirements, and there is no reason to suppose that any of these bushels got to the enemy. Then I take the figures quoted in the Press for wheat-flour. The figures quoted suggest an increase in the exports of wheat-flour from the United States to Holland and the three Scandinavian countries in the first ten months of 1915, over the corresponding period of 1913, of 3,700,000 barrels; the assumption again being that that had all gone to the enemy. This increase includes not merely what went to those four countries, but also includes an increase to France of 1,400,000 barrels, and to Italy of 250,000 barrels. In addition, there was something over 1,000,000 allowed to go through to the Belgian Relief Fund, making, with the increase to France and to Italy, a total of 3,000,000 barrels. Out of, therefore, 3,700,000 barrels supposed to have gone to the enemy there is accounted for 3,000,000 barrels. The actual increase to the three Scandinavian

countries is, therefore, reduced from 3,700,000 barrels to only 650,000 barrels. In view of the deficiency of the whole production of wheat in Scandinavia in 1914, this increase, according to the information supplied to me, cannot be regarded as excessive. That puts the thing in a very different light.

Leakage, of course, through neutral countries there has been, and will be. Whatever you do, if you adopt every suggestion made in this House, you cannot prevent some leakage. You cannot take over the administration of neutral countries. You cannot prevent smuggling taking place even against the regulations of the neutral countries themselves. It is not in our power to do that under whatever system you have, whether you call it blockade, or whatever name you give to it. You have still to let through to neutral countries the things which they really require for their own consumption. You have, therefore, to distinguish between the things which they need for their own consumption and the things which they import with a view to their being passed on to the enemy. You have to make that distinction. Nobody could have listened to the speech of my Right Hon. friend the member for East Worcestershire (Mr. Harris) without realizing how impossible it is to do that perfectly. You have every sort of ingenuity brought to bear to make it difficult for you to distinguish—to make it absolutely impossible, whatever the Navy may do, whatever strict provision there may be, to make sure that in no case will a cargo, or part of a cargo which is apparently destined for consumption in a neutral country but really is destined for the enemy, go through to

that neutral country. Some leakage there will always be. We have been anxious about that leakage. We have done what we can to get real information as to what is going on. The other day Lord Faringdon, who a short time ago was well known in this House as Sir Alexander Henderson, went over to make inquiries on the spot. He is, at least, as well qualified by ability, knowledge, and experience to ascertain the facts as any one who could be sent on behalf of any unofficial agency. He has produced a report. That report does not say that there is no leakage, but I think, on the whole, it is a very satisfactory report. In my opinion it shows that the amount of leakage in the trade passing from overseas through these neutral countries to the enemy is, considering all the facts of the case, much less than might have been supposed. The general tendency of the report is to show that the maximum which can be done is being done without serious trouble with neutral countries, founded upon the idea that you are really interfering with their supplies.

SIR H. DALZIEL: Can we see that report?

SIR EDWARD GREY: No, the report cannot be published. You cannot make these inquiries and publish the information obtained without its being known to the enemy. If it is known to the enemy your power of getting further information, and of watching what is going on—the actual facts even of what is going on is useful to the enemy—will be diminished. I do not, however, see any objection to the report being shown in a way in which knowledge of it cannot get to the enemy. There is nothing in the report to conceal from people

who are looking at the matter, and examining it from the point of view from which the House is examining it this afternoon. All that there is to be concealed is from the opposite point of view—that is, the enemy point of view.

I pass from those figures to another charge which is made, not, I understand, in the debate here, not in all the Press, but in some organs of the Press, and by some persons outside, in a most offensive form, which is grossly unfair and untrue. It is that the Navy is doing its utmost to prohibit goods reaching the enemy, and that the Foreign Office is spoiling the work of the Navy. When ships are brought in by the Navy to a port with goods destined for the enemy, the Foreign Office, it is alleged, orders those ships to be released, and undoes the work which the Navy is doing. I must give the House an account of what is exactly the machinery. I do not say that in the first three months of the war, before we had got our organization complete, there was not a certain amount of confusion and overlapping, and that things were so well done as now. I will take the whole of last year up to the present date. What is the procedure? One of the ships under the Admiralty brings into port a neutral merchant vessel carrying a cargo which the naval officers think may be destined for the enemy. They have no adequate means of searching that cargo on the high seas; it has to be done in port. Until you have got that vessel in port you cannot really form an opinion of what is the probable destination of the cargo. The ship is brought into port by the Navy. If that ship turns out to have goods destined not merely for a

neutral port, but for *bona-fide* consumption of a neutral country, without which that country would be starved of some supplies which it has every right to have, that cargo obviously ought to be released, and not put in the Prize Court at all. If, on the other hand, there is reason to suppose that that cargo is not destined for *bona-fide* neutral use, then undoubtedly it ought to be put in the Prize Court. That is settled by the Contraband Committee.

The Contraband Committee is presided over at present by the Hon. and learned member for Leamington (Mr. Pollock), who, again, is one of those giving invaluable service to the State. Before he undertook the chairmanship it was presided over by my Right Hon. and learned friend who is now the Solicitor-General, who, of course, had to give up that position when he became Solicitor-General, because it was impossible to combine it with his official work. How is the committee composed? Besides the chairman, it is composed of one representative of the Foreign Office, one who represents the Board of Trade and Customs combined, and two representatives of the Admiralty, and that committee, which has acquired very great experience in the course of its work, settles the question of whether the ship, or any part of the cargo in the ship, ought to be put in the Prize Court, or whether it ought to be released and go forward. I believe that committee has done its work admirably, and that neither the country nor the Navy has any reason but to be exceedingly grateful for the knowledge and ability it has shown and the pains it has taken. Can the decision of that committee be interfered with?

Of course it can be interfered with. The Government can in any case say if such-and-such a ship, which the committee thinks ought to be detained, ought for special reasons to be released. I have made what inquiry I can, and, in accordance with my own recollection, I think in the last year there have been three cases when ships have been dealt with or undertakings about ships have been given without consulting the committee. Two of those ships were cases of ships which were released and sent back. Those two cases were discussed twice by the Cabinet, and those two particular ships were released for special reasons. The third case is that of a ship which was brought into port the other day—the *Stockholm*, a Swedish vessel. It is a ship to which the Swedish people attach great importance. It is, I believe, the first ship of a new line, a passenger vessel. The detention of it must cause great inconvenience, but it had on board a cargo which, I understand, the Contraband Committee had reason to suppose—I think rightly—was not all destined for use in Sweden, and might be sent on to the enemy. Anyhow, the detention of the vessel caused great inconvenience, and a special appeal was made from the Swedish Government in regard to that particular vessel, and with regard to one part of the cargo a special assurance was given. Of course these things have to be done rapidly if they are to be done at all. If you are to release a vessel, and wish to avoid inconvenience, you must release it quickly; and, after consulting the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, I sent a telegram to Stockholm saying that if we could receive assurances from the Swedish Government that

the cargo, which seemed to us suspect, was destined for *bona-fide* use in Sweden, and that none of it would go on to the enemy, or set free an equivalent amount of corresponding material to go on to the enemy, the ship, in order to avoid inconvenience, was to be released at once. That undertaking was given without consulting the Contraband Committee. I am sorry to say, as far as I am concerned, we have not received an assurance, and, therefore, no action has been taken. That is the sort of case in which, unless you are to forfeit entirely the good will of neutrals, unless you are to take what I consider an unduly high-handed and provocative action, you ought to say to a neutral country which makes a special case of inconvenience caused in regard to a ship, "Give us assurances with regard to that cargo, and, rather than cause that inconvenience, we will be prepared to release the ship." That, I believe, represents the extent of interference with the Contraband Committee with regard to the release of ships in the last twelve months.

Now I would ask, really, is it not time after that that these reckless figures and these reckless statements should not be made with regard to the action of the Foreign Office or any Department of the Government? What, is it supposed, is the effect upon the Navy of making charges of that sort?

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. BALFOUR): Hear hear!

SIR EDWARD GREY: If the charges made were true, and I was a naval officer, I should want to shoot the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But that is not the thing that matters. The thing that

matters is the dispiriting effect it has on our seamen. There never was a time in the whole history of this country when we—and when I say "we," I mean our allies, too—have owed a greater tribute of gratitude and admiration to the Navy than for the work done during this war. To those of us who have to bear the brunt of much work, and face much difficulty, the knowledge of the efficiency, the courage, the spirit, and the patriotism which animate the whole Navy is an upholding and a supporting thought, and there ought not to be statements of that kind, entirely unfounded as they are, put about, leading the Navy to suppose that the work which they are doing for the country, or any part of their work, is being undone by the Government, or any department of the Government.

The task of the Foreign Office in this matter is a much more complicated one and much more burdensome than people know. The Foreign Office is not burdened as a department with deciding about the release of particular ships. That, as I have shown, if it is not done by the Contraband Committee, is done by the Cabinet, or, in a very special case, by Ministers; but it is not done departmentally now. What is the work the Foreign Office has to do? The Foreign Office has to do its best to retain the good will of the neutrals. Now, supposing you know at the Foreign Office that the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Munitions, and perhaps one or more of our allies are specially anxious that you should maintain open communication with some particular neutral country for strategical reasons, or for the sake of supplies which you get from them. We are constantly being told that certain

supplies which come from abroad are absolutely essential for the Ministry of Munitions. The Board of Trade know that certain other supplies from abroad are absolutely necessary to carry on the industries of this country. The business of the Foreign Office is to keep the diplomatic relations such that there is no fear of these supplies being interfered with, and we have got at the same time to defend, to explain, and to justify to neutral countries all the interference that has taken place with trade destined for the enemy, which cannot be done without some direct or indirect interference also with neutral countries. That is not an easy matter. It is one in which the Foreign Office is constantly engaged, and I think the House must recognize, when members are pressing, as they are quite right in pressing, this question of supplies to the enemy, and saying, quite rightly, that the interests of this country come first that you must also be very careful that you do not unduly or wrongfully interfere with the rights of neutrals to get supplies which are necessary for their own consumption. You have no right to make neutrals suffer. I would like to consider—and it is rather germane to the case—what more can be done than is being done consistently with the rights of neutrals and also with effect? The Hon. member who moved this motion sketched out what he thought ought to be done, and I think the Hon. member who seconded the motion agreed with him. The suggestion was that there should be three lines of blockade, one extending to the coast of Norway, one across the Channel, and one across the Straits of Gibraltar. If you establish those lines of blockade you

must do it consistently with the rights of neutrals. You cannot establish those lines of blockade and say that no ships shall go through them at all, or you will stop all traffic of every kind to the neutral ports inside. You would stop all traffic to Christiania, Stockholm, Rotterdam, Copenhagen—all traffic whatever. Well, of course, that is not consistent with the rights of neutrals. You cannot shut off all supplies to neutral countries. You must not try to make the grass grow in the streets of neutral ports. You must let through those lines vessels *bona fide* destined for the neutral ports with *bona-fide* cargoes. Nor can you put every cargo in your Prize Court, and say it is not to go on to a neutral port until the Prize Court has examined it. The congestion in this country would be such that you could not deal with it if you did that, and you have no right to say that the British Prize Court is to be the neck of the bottle through which all trade has to pass. If we had gone, or attempted to go, as far as that, I think the war possibly might have been over by now, but it would have been over because the whole world would have risen against us, and we, and our allies, too, would have collapsed under the general resentment of the whole world. If you establish those lines, then the ship to neutral ports with a *bona-fide* neutral cargo must be allowed to go through. Therefore what I understand is meant when you say blockade is that you are going to discriminate, and not stop everything that is going through your lines, but only stop what is destined to the enemy and let go through what is for neutrals. That is what is being done at the present time, and that is actually

the action of the Admiralty to-day. The ships when brought in are dealt with by the method which I have described, and no ships are going through to German ports at all. Therefore that is actually being done. We are, as I think one Hon. member said, filtering the trade which passes through with the object of stopping all the enemy trade. We are stopping the trade coming out, and we are also stopping the imports; more than that you cannot do. You cannot do more than stop all imports into the enemy country and all exports coming out.

We are applying the doctrine of continuous voyage, and it is being applied now. On what other ground are goods to neutral ports held up but on the ground of continuous voyage? Do not let it be supposed by adopting the actual proposal made this afternoon we are going to prevent goods reaching Germany more effectively than at the present time, except in one respect. If you had established the old technical blockade you would no doubt have been entitled to confiscate more largely ships and goods than at the present time. While you stop now and detain them, and do not let the goods go through, you do not confiscate as largely as you would if you had had the old technical blockade. One of the reasons why this change is recommended is that it is going to be more palatable to the neutrals, but you are not going to make it more palatable by making the penalties more severe. What we want to do is to prevent goods reaching or coming from the enemy country, and that is what we are doing. We want to do it, and we believe that under the Order in Council it is being done.

Do not let it be supposed that the Order in Council does something special either to validate or invalidate. The mover of this motion spoke as if an order in council was one thing and a blockade was another. What would have happened if we had adopted his plan would be that we should simply substitute one order in council for the present one. The blockade would be established by the Order in Council. An order in council does not make a thing good or bad. It is merely our way under our form of constitution of announcing to the world what we are doing.

MR. S. BENN: Will the Right Hon. Gentleman deal with the point that the Allied nations should declare the blockade, rather than England by an order in council?

SIR EDWARD GREY: That is a very pertinent question, but it again shows a misapprehension. If we all declared a blockade the French Government would declare a blockade in their own way, according to their constitution, and we should declare it in our way. What is happening at the present moment, to carry out the policy of last March, is that certain instructions are issued to the British navy. The French Government issued precisely the same instructions to their navy, and so, if we and the Allied nations declared a blockade they would issue their own proclamation of a blockade, and we should issue ours. That is the way it would be done, precisely the same as now. The French have issued exactly the same proclamation on their behalf as we have in regard to our proclamation of March. The only thing is that you have, under the British constitution, to call it an order in council, although other

people may call it whatever they please. You would not have any change in that respect. I quite agree that you want common action with your allies, and that is precisely what we have been having ever since last March with the French Government. If any one wishes to realize the justification for our present policy they have only got to read the correspondence which has been published with the United States already. If they wish to read the objections taken to it, and the objections which any sort of policy might lead to, they can read the notes from the United States Government to this country, especially the last note which has been published, and which has not yet been answered.

We are going to answer the last note of the United States Government, but we are considering the whole question, and we are going to do it in consultation, in the first instance, with the French Government who are concerned in this matter. That consultation is taking place at the present time with a view to pursuing not merely the same policy, but justifying it with the same arguments, and putting the same case before the world. We may also consider it, perhaps with some of the other Allies, who may have to be actively concerned in carrying out the policy. At present we are in consultation with the French Government on the subject. I can only say, with regard to neutrals, that we are perfectly ready to examine any method of carrying out the policy of last March, that is what we believe is the belligerent right of stopping enemy trade, either to or from. We are ready to examine any other method of carrying that out, than the one we are now adopting which we are convinced will be effec-

tive, and which in form is likely to be more agreeable to neutrals, or in practice less inconvenient to them, so long as it will be effective. But do not let us hastily adopt changes of form unless we are quite sure that they are not going to impair the effectiveness of what we are doing, and that they are not going to involve us in legal difficulties more complicated than those which at present exist.

I must say to the House that at the present moment one of the greatest concerns of the Government is to explain and justify to neutrals what we are doing to avoid friction with them, and to get such agreements, not with their Governments, but with the various people interested in trade, as will make it easy to distinguish between goods destined for the neutrals, and goods intended for the enemy. I said just now that we have not any right to make neutrals suffer. By that I mean that you have no right to deprive neutrals of goods which are genuinely intended for their own use. Inconvenience it is impossible to avoid, and you cannot help it. What I would say to neutrals is this: We cannot give up this right to interfere with enemy trade; that we must maintain and that we must press. We know, and it has always been admitted, that you cannot exercise that right without in some cases considerable inconvenience to neutrals—delay to their trade, and in some cases mistakes which it is impossible to avoid. What I would say to neutrals is this: There is one main question to be answered by them. Do they admit our right to apply the principles which were applied by the American Government in the war between North and South? Do they

admit our right to apply those principles to modern conditions and to do our best to prevent trade with the enemy through neutral countries? If they say "Yes," as they are bound in fairness to say, then I would say to them, "Do let chambers of commerce, or whatever it may be in neutral countries, do their best to make it easy for us to distinguish." Take the case of the *Stockholm*, the Swedish ship, the other day. When it was pointed out what great inconvenience we were causing by detaining that ship it was also suggested that in order to avoid detention in future there should be some understanding or some means of making it sure to us that the cargo was *bona fide* a Swedish cargo and not going to the enemy. That is the sort of thing we welcome.

What we ask of them, as we cannot avoid causing inconvenience and in some cases loss, is that they will help us to distinguish by making the distinction *bona-fide* trade and thereby minimize the inconvenience. If, on the other hand, the answer is that we are not entitled to do that, or to attempt to prevent trade through the neutral countries to the enemy, then I must say definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line it is a departure from neutrality. I do not understand that they do take that line. It is quite true that there are things in the last note from the United States Government which, if we were to concede them, would make it in practice absolutely impossible to prevent goods, even contraband, going wholesale through neutral countries to the enemy. If you were to concede all that was asked in the last note of the United States you might just as well give up trying to prevent goods,

even contraband goods, going through neutral countries to the enemy, but I do not understand that that is the intention or attitude of the United States Government or of any other Government. After all, I would say this: If there was a war in which a belligerent was entitled to use to the utmost every power, or every fair development of a power which has been exercised by any belligerent in previous wars, and recognized by international law, that applies to our allies and ourselves in this war.

As to the complaints as to our interference with trade, what has Germany done? She has declared arbitrarily a part of the high seas a war zone, and in that zone she has continually sunk merchant vessels without notice or warning, with no precautions for the safety of the crews, sowing it with mines which sink merchant vessels, neutrals as well as belligerents. The sinking of merchant vessels is not confined to belligerents. A neutral vessel is sunk again and again by German submarines without warning, without inquiry as to the nature of its cargo, and without regard even to its destination, because they have been sunk proceeding from one neutral port to another neutral port and not coming to this country at all. In view of the criticism made to-day upon the action of the British Government and its allies in interfering with trade, I would ask what would have been said by neutrals if we had done that? What would have been said if, instead of bringing cargoes into our Prize Court, bringing in the ship with the crew perfectly safe, the ship undamaged, the cargo untouched, examining it, and in some cases letting it go forward when satisfied

that it is not destined for the enemy, and even in the worst case putting it into our Prize Court, so that if it turns out that we have made a mistake there can be a claim for compensation and the whole of the evidence can be examined—if, instead of doing that, we had sunk neutral vessels without regard to the character of their cargoes and without regard to the safety of the lives of innocent and defenceless crews?

An Hon. Member: And passengers!

Well, of course, in regard to passengers, as the House knows, there has been considerable controversy between the United States Government and the enemy Government. They have taken up the point with regard to passengers where their own interests are concerned, but, with regard to the rest, the sinking of even neutral merchant vessels in this way, so far as I know nothing like the kind of protest has been made by neutral governments that has been made with regard to some part of our own procedure which we believe to be perfectly justifiable in law, and which is, beyond all doubt, perfectly humane.

I understand that Germany justifies her action of that description by saying that it is retaliation upon us for stopping her food supply. The great case of stopping food supplies which Germany made the starting-ground for her illegal and inhuman policy being the fact that we detained the *Wilhelmina* early last February with foodstuffs to Germany. Was that the first instance of interfering with food supplies destined for the civil population in this war? Before that Germany had sunk two neutral vessels with cargoes of foodstuffs coming to open ports for the civil population of

this country. She had requisitioned the food supply of the civil population of Belgium, and I understand that to-day confiscation goes on in the occupied districts of Poland. It was not till a powerful international organization came into force to relieve the starvation of Belgians, whose food had been requisitioned by Germany in their own country—not till then—that there was any protection for the food of the civil population in the districts occupied by Germany. What right has Germany to complain of measures taken to interfere with her food supplies when, from the beginning of this war, her armed cruisers, so long as they could keep the seas, sunk neutral merchant vessels with food for the civil population of this country, and in effect treated food where they found it as absolute contraband? That being so, what we say to neutrals is that we are entitled to claim the utmost rights to which we can fairly found a claim upon the recognized practice—practice which we ourselves have recognized—of other belligerents in previous wars.

Let us also bear this in mind. I do not say that we are exercising these measures of blockade the least bit more for our allies than for ourselves. If we had no allies I have no doubt that we should have done precisely the same thing, and, as the House says, it is our duty to this country to do it as effectively as possible. But do not let us forget that it is our duty to our allies as well. We are in this war with allies, a war forced upon Europe after every effort had been made to find a settlement which could perfectly easily have been found either by conference as we suggested, or by reference to The Hague Tribunal, as the Emperor of

Russia suggested. Prussian militarism would not have any other settlement but war. We are now in this war with our allies. I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained—and, until it is attained, the war must proceed—is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the Continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the Continent into war. The whole of our resources are engaged in the war. Our maximum effort, whether it be military, naval, or financial, is at the disposal of our allies in carrying on this contest. With them we shall see it through to the end, and we shall slacken no effort. Part of that effort is and must remain—whether it be in the interests of ourselves or of our allies—in the interests of the great cause, the great transcending cause which unites us all together, which makes us feel that national life will not be safe, that individual life will not be worth living, unless we can achieve successfully the object of this war—that in that common cause we shall continue to exert all our efforts to put the maximum pressure possible upon the enemy; and part of that pressure must be and continue to be doing the most we can to prevent supplies going to or from the enemy, using the Navy to its full power, and in common with our allies sparing nothing, whether it be military, naval, or financial effort, which this country can afford to see the thing through with them to the end.

XVII

WHAT BRITAIN IS FIGHTING FOR

A reply to the German Chancellor, a speech delivered on the 10th April, 1916.

A DINNER was given by the British Government on the 10th April, 1916, to the French Senators and Deputies who were then on a visit to London as the guests of the Franco-British Parliamentary Committee. In proposing the toast "Our Guests," Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, spoke as follows:—

I have now the pleasure of proposing the toast of "Our Guests," and I venture, in your name, in the name of His Majesty's Government, and in the name of the members of both Houses of the British Parliament, to offer the warmest welcome to our French colleagues who have done us the honour to pay us this visit. [Cheers.]

The relations between Great Britain and France have been established happily upon unshakable foundations, and during the testing experiences of this war those relations have become marked by intimacy and affection. We welcome these visits as tending to draw still closer the bonds that unite us, the bonds of the common purpose which we share. [Cheers.]

During the last few days the Imperial Chancellor has been appealing once more to the sympathy of the

neutral world for the hard case of Germany. Germ has been misunderstood. Her peace-loving purp has been misconstrued.

The Chancellor declares that on December 9th h had expressed his readiness to enter into peace negoti tions, but that then as now the enemy declined to co sider such a thing. It is worth while to cite the act language which he used on the occasion referred t "If I am to speak of peace proposals I must first s the peace proposals of our enemies. If our enemi come to me with peace proposals proper to the digni and assuring the safety of Germany, then we are alwa ready to discuss them."

What, therefore, the Chancellor means by a readine on his part to enter into negotiations is that the initi tive should come from us, and the decision rest wit him. In other words, we are to assume the attitude o a defeated to a victorious adversary. But we are no defeated [cheers]; we are not going to be defeated [cheers]; and the Allies are bound by a solemn pact not to seek or accept a separate peace. [Cheers.]

GUILDHALL PLEDGE EXPLAINED

The terms upon which we are prepared to conclude peace are the accomplishment of the purposes for which we took up arms. Those purposes were declared by me as far back as November, 1914, and have been known to the world for more than sixteen months. I said among other things that we should not sheathe the sword until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed. [Cheers.]

The Chancellor first misquotes my language and then

proceeds to distort its obvious meaning and intention. Great Britain, and France also, entered the war not to strangle Germany, not to wipe her off the map of Europe, not to destroy or mutilate her national life, certainly not to interfere with (to use the Chancellor's language) "the free exercise of her peaceful endeavours." We were driven, both here and in France, to take up arms in order to prevent Germany (which for this purpose means Prussia) from establishing a position of military menace and dominance over her neighbours. [Cheers.]

On several occasions in the last ten years Germany had given evidence of her intention to dictate to Europe under threat of war, and in violating the neutrality of Belgium she proved that she meant to establish her ascendency even at the price of a universal war and of tearing up the basis of the European polity as established by treaty. The purpose of the Allies in the war is to defeat that attempt, and thereby pave the way for an international system which will secure the principle of equal rights for all civilized States. [Cheers.]

As a result of the war we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples, and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the over-mastering dictation of a government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia: nothing more but nothing less. [Cheers.]

There is another aspect of the war to which we have from the beginning attached capital importance.

The war began, as I have just said, in the unprovoked invasion and desolation of Belgium. From its first moment, the future fate of the smaller nationalities was seen to be in jeopardy, and the apprehensions which were then aroused have been more than justified by what has happened to Serbia and Montenegro.

We are in this struggle the champions not only of treaty rights, but of the independent status and free development of the weaker countries. [Cheers.] In these circumstances cynicism could hardly go farther than in the Chancellor's claim that it is for Germany (of all Powers) to insist when peace comes upon "giving the various races the chance of free evolution, along the lines of their mother tongue, and of national individuality." Apparently this principle is to be applied—I suppose on the approved Prussian lines—both to Poland and to Belgium.

In regard to the first of these two countries, the Poles have already had some illuminating experiences as to what is meant in Berlin by "free evolution along the lines of the mother tongue." The attempt to Germanize Prussian Poland has been for the last twenty years at once the strenuous purpose and the colossal failure of Prussian domestic policy. No one knows this better than the Chancellor, for he has been in his time one of its principal instruments, as, for example, when he tried to colonize Posen with German-speaking farmers. The use of the Polish language in schools—need I remind you?—was restricted until it was only allowed for religious instruction, and finally even this concession was withdrawn and the little Polish children had to learn to say their prayers in German.

The wholesale strike of the children, the barbarous floggings that were inflicted on them, the arrests and imprisonment of their mothers, form a black chapter even in the annals of Prussian culture. [Loud cheers.]

THE OLD BELGIUM TO BE RESTORED

And, coming to Belgium, it is with this record that the Chancellor sheds tears over the fate of what he calls "the long-suppressed Flemish race," and declares it to be the future mission of Germany to secure for them "a sound evolution based on their mother tongue." What, I wonder, do the Flemish race themselves think of the prospect which is so opened out to them?

The Chancellor goes on to say that after the war there must be a *new* Belgium which is not to be a Franco-English vassal, but between whose people and the Germans who have burnt their churches and pillaged their towns and laid waste their fields and trampled on their liberties there is to be in the future the "collaboration of neighbours." A new development, indeed, of the theory of the rights and duties of neighbourhood!

My answer is a very simple one. We, the Allies, desire and are determined to see once again the old Belgium. [Loud cheers.] She must not be allowed to suffer permanently from the wanton and wicked invasion of her freedom, and that which has been broken down must be repaired and restored. [Cheers.]

SEA POLICY: A CONTRAST

I will not waste many words upon the Chancellor's

lame and half-hearted attempt to justify the wholesale use of the submarine for the destruction of lives and property. He speaks of it as a legitimate measure of self-defence against our policy of using our command of the sea to put economic pressure upon our enemies.

The Allies are, of course, in adopting and pursuing that policy, exercising a belligerent right expressly sanctioned by the two greatest German Chancellors, Bismarck and Caprivi, recognized by every fighting Power in the Old World and the New, and they have endeavoured and are endeavouring to mitigate as far as possible the resulting inconvenience to neutral trade. They are prepared to justify the legality of all the measures they have taken as covered by the principles and spirit of international law applied to the developments of modern war. They have been carried out with the strictest regard to humanity, and we are not aware of a single instance of a neutral life lost by reason of the Allies' blockade. [Cheers.]

The German submarine blockade of Great Britain was in fact commenced and developed long before our Order in Council of March, 1915. Among other instances the Dutch vessel *Maria* and the American vessel the *W. P. Frye*, both carrying food to these islands, were sunk respectively in September, 1914, and January, 1915.

On February 4, 1915, the German Government declared their intention of instituting a general submarine blockade of the United Kingdom with the avowed purpose of cutting off all our overseas supplies. It was not till March 11th that we announced those measures against German trade which the Chancellor

now suggests were the cause of the German submarine policy. I need not dwell upon the flagrant violation which has attended its execution of the elementary rules and practices of international law and of the common dictates and obligations of humanity. Up to this moment it is being ruthlessly carried out, as well against neutrals as belligerents.

It is of the highest importance that we should at once reply to the Imperial Chancellor. It is necessary that we should lose no time in answering these travesties of the facts. We, with our Allies, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, Japan, have been fighting side by side with clean hands and with clear consciences, and side by side as we have the will, so we are confident that we have the power, to vindicate the liberties of Europe. [Loud and prolonged applause.]

M. PICHON'S REPLY

M. Stephen Pichon, the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to the toast, said that if the journey of the French visitors had been undertaken for no other purpose than to hear the magnificent speech they had just heard it would have been well worth making. It was a great honour for them to have been able to hear those memorable words. They considered this honour as crowning the work which they had undertaken together with their colleagues of the British Parliament. From the very outset the British and French Governments had seen eye to eye and had established community of aim and action; so it would be until the victorious end. [Loud cheers.]

XVIII

WHY BRITAIN IS IN THE WAR AND WHAT SHE HOPES FROM THE FUTURE

By The Rt. Hon. VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

XVIII

WHY BRITAIN IS IN THE WAR
AND
WHAT SHE HOPES FROM THE FUTURE

A speech addressed to the Representatives of the Foreign Press in London, on the 23d October, 1916.

LET me say to you that, in a time of war such as this, we all value the presence amongst us of a body of men belonging to other countries, both Allied and neutral, who will faithfully represent what they find to be our feeling; who will send out to the world a faithful picture of this country in the great struggle through which it is passing, who will speak the truth and who, if they can succeed not only in speaking the truth, which is comparatively easy, but in getting the truth believed through the world at large, will have rendered the greatest possible service we can ask of them.

The President said I was going to make an historic speech. I doubt whether any historic speech can be made while the war is still in progress. After the war, very likely, but while the war is in progress the real historic work is being done in the offices of the General Staffs of the Allied countries and on the battlefield, where our soldiers are fighting. Words can do but little. The work done by the General Staffs at head-

quarters, by the armies in the field, and the navies on the sea—that is the real work which is making history. We have had, since the autumn began, two or three notable speeches—first of all, a great speech by M. Briand in the French Chamber; then, next in time, an interview given by Mr. Lloyd George to a Press correspondent in this country; then a speech by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons; and lately we have had a note struck just as firmly in Petrograd by an official *communiqué*, under the auspices of the Minister of the Interior.

Those speeches have given to the world the note and the tone and the feeling of the Allies at this moment. I endorse all that they have said, but this afternoon for a few moments I would like to talk, not about the conditions of peace, which can only be stated and formulated by the Allies all together and not by any one of them separately, but about the general object which the Allies must secure in this war.

1870 OVER AGAIN

To do that I would ask you to recall that we must never forget how the war came about. If we are to approach the subject in a proper spirit it can only be by recalling, and never for one moment forgetting, what was the real cause of the war. Some people say "You need not go back on the old ground now; everybody knows it!" You cannot go back on it too often. It affects the conditions of peace.

Germany talks of peace. Her statesmen talk of peace to-day, but what sort of peace do they talk of? Oh, they say, Germany must have guarantees against being attacked again. If this war had been forced

upon Germany that would be a logical statement. It is precisely because it was not forced upon Germany, but forced by Germany upon Europe, that it is the Allies who must have guarantees for future peace.

In July, 1914, no one thought of attacking Germany. It is said that Russia was the first to mobilize. That, I understand, is what is represented in Germany as a justification for the statement that the war was not an aggressive war on Germany's part, but was forced upon her. Russia never made the mobilization of which Germany complained until after Germany had refused a conference, and she never made it until after a report had appeared in Germany that Germany had ordered mobilization and that report had been telegraphed to Petrograd.

As a matter of fact it was the story of 1870 over again—preparation for war, not only the preparation of material, but the preparatory stages for war all advanced in Berlin to a point beyond that of any other country, and then, when the chosen moment came, a manœuvre was made to provoke some other country to take a defensive step, and when that defensive step was taken, then to receive it with an ultimatum which made war inevitable.

The same thing with the invasion of Belgium. Strategic railways had been made in Germany, and the whole plan of campaign of the German staff was to attack through Belgium, and now it is represented that they had to attack through Belgium because other people had planned to attack through Belgium. I would like nothing better than to see those statements—that the Russian mobilization was an aggres-

sive and not defensive measure, and that any other Power than Germany had trafficked in the neutrality of Belgium or planned to attack through Belgium—I would like to see those statements investigated before any independent and impartial tribunal.

GERMANY'S WILL TO WAR

German organization is very successful in some things, but in nothing more successful than in preventing the truth from reaching their own people, and succeeding in presenting to them a point of view which is not that of the truth—the statement that the war was forced upon Germany. When England proposed the conference Russia, France, and Italy accepted the conference; when four Powers offer a conference and one Power refuses it, is it the Powers who are offering the conference which are forcing war, or the Power which refuses it? The Emperor of Russia offered The Hague Tribunal. One Sovereign offers The Hague Tribunal and another ignores it. Is it the Sovereign who offers reference to The Hague who is forcing war on the Sovereign who ignores the offer?

On the very eve of war France gave her pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium if Germany would not violate it. We asked for such a pledge. Was it the Power which asked for the pledge and the Power which gave the pledge which were responsible for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, or the Power which refused to give the pledge? Belgium knows, and every Frenchman and Englishman knows, that never at any time was there a suggestion that French or English soldiers should enter Belgium unless it

were to defend Belgium from a violation of her neutrality, which had first been undertaken by Germany.

Why was it that all the efforts to avoid the war in July, 1914, failed? Well, because you cannot have peace without good will, and because in Berlin there was the will to war and not the will to peace.

Now just lately, I think to an American, the Crown Prince has deplored the loss of life caused by this war. Yet it was because we knew what the suffering of war must be, because we knew how terrible a thing war let loose in Europe would be, that we tried to avoid it in 1914. Then was the time to have been penetrated with a sense of all that war would mean. After we have had this terrible experience, our allies and ourselves are determined that the war shall not end till we can be sure, at any rate, that the generations which come after us and our nations in future are not to be subjected to such a terrible trial again.

THE PLAN THAT FAILED

What was the German plan? I saw some statement in the Press the other day that a German officer had recognized that Germany had failed this time, but that in ten years she was going to succeed. What was the plan; what was the failure? It was to be a short, successful war. There was a time-table—so long to get to Paris; so long to defeat France; so long afterward to defeat Russia—and as to England, the plan was that England should be kept out of the war, but if England did enter the war it was not thought that the expeditionary force we had available would be enough to upset the enemy's plans. People who are

militarists, whose ideas and thoughts run solely on military considerations, wholly material, forget to estimate and cannot estimate the spirit and the soul which exist in nations when they are attacked and are fighting for their lives. The plan was that France and Russia were to be defeated, England was to be isolated—and disgraced.

We must never forget, as we go through this war, that an offer was made to us to keep out of the war. We were asked by the German Government to engage to remain neutral on certain conditions. We were asked to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium—because that was what the offer came to—though the German Government were pledged by treaty to uphold it. And we were asked to give Germany a free hand to take whatever she liked of the French colonies. That is why I say the plan was not only to isolate us, but to discredit us. I would ask any neutral to put it to himself—what would be the future of this country if the British Government had for a moment accepted such an offer? We might have had an army and a navy, but there would have been no *morale*—no spirit in the nation. We should have had the contempt of the whole world. Tactics so gross as that did not succeed, and I need not recall what the reply of the British Government was, nor what the spirit of the nation was at the opening of the war.

We should not think merely of what Germany says to-day: it is worth looking back to the expectations of her Government and people when the war started. Then we saw something of their real mind. There was a certain Professor Ostwald in Germany, who un-

burdened himself, I think to an American, in August, 1914. He called himself a pacifist, and this is what he described as German aims. Germany was to dictate peace to the rest of Europe, and the principle of the absolute sovereignty of individual nations must be given up.

Don't let us forget that that was the spirit in which Germany began this war. What is the spirit in which the war is being carried on by the Allies and ourselves to-day? I take it from the words of the Prime Minister the other day: "We shall fight until we have established supremacy of right over force, free development under equal conditions, and each in accordance with its own genius, of all States, great and small, which build up the family of civilized mankind."

ALLIED UNITY ESSENTIAL

Into this struggle we have put, rightly and necessarily, all our resources, all our wealth, all our material, and all our labour; and now, when we have had time to equip and train a large army, we are putting into it all the best life's blood of the nation to shed it on the Continent, side by side with our allies, in emulation of them, stimulated by the courage and self-sacrifice which they themselves are showing in defence of their own country. We are doing it because we know that their cause and ours is one; that to the end and for the future we fall or stand together; that the separation of one from the other is the destruction of the one separated, and not its safety, and that for all of us unity is essential, not merely to victory, but to our future life and success. Germany has been trying through-

out the war to separate one from the other—now one, now another. Not a week passes that does not confirm our resolve to go through with our allies to the end, and theirs to go through with each other. I trust that the memory of the suffering we have undergone together, the memory of the joint courage which is carrying us through all that we have been through side by side, will be a perpetual bond of alliance and sympathy between our Government and peoples.

WHAT NEUTRALS CAN DO

Looking to the future after the war, what is it that neutrals can do? The other day a correspondent sounded me upon the subject of what neutrals can do. I wrote in reply: "I believe that the best work that neutrals can do for the moment is to work up an opinion for such an agreement between nations as will prevent a war like this from happening again. If nations had been united in such an agreement, and prompt and resolute to insist in July, 1914, that the dispute must be referred to a conference or to The Hague, and that the Belgian Treaty must be observed, there would have been no war." I would ask neutrals to observe this—that belligerent countries engaged in war, fighting as we are to-day in a struggle for life and death, fighting, it is true, for victory, with increasing prospects of seeing that victory approaching nearer, but still knowing that if we stop short of victory we stop short of everything—nations engaged in such a struggle cannot be expected to have much time to spend upon developing ideas of what can be done after victory is secured. But neutrals can do it, and it is interest-

ing to observe the attitude, not only of President Wilson, but of Mr. Hughes, the Republican candidate for the Presidency.

In the United States a league has already sprung up, supported by various distinguished people, with the object, not of interfering with belligerents in this war, but of getting ready for some international association, after this war is over, which shall do its part in making peace secure in future. I would like to say that if we seem to have little time to give to such ideas ourselves while we are engaged in this struggle, such a work in neutral countries is one to which we should all look with favour and with hope. Only bear this in mind, if the nations in the world after the war are to do something more effective than they have been able to do before, to bind themselves together for the common object of peace, they must be prepared not to undertake more than they are prepared to uphold by force, and to see when the time of crisis comes that it is upheld by force. In other words, we say to neutrals who are occupying themselves with this question that we are in favour of it. But we shall have to ask when the time comes for them to make any demand on us for such a thing: "Will you play up when the time comes?" It is not merely a sign manual of Sovereigns or Presidents that is required to make a thing like that worth while; it must also have behind it Parliaments and national sentiment.

The object of this league is to insist upon treaties being kept and some other settlement being tried before resort to war. In July, 1914, there was no such league in existence. Supposing a generation hence such a

condition of things as in July, 1914, recurs and there is such a league in existence, it may, and it ought to, keep the peace. Everything will depend upon whether the national sentiment behind it is so penetrated by the lessons of this war as to feel that in the future each nation, although not immediately concerned in this dispute, is yet interested, and vitally interested, in doing something, even if it be by force, to keep the peace.

GERMANY THE GREAT ANARCHIST

But there must be more than that. You must have some agreement after this war is over as to the methods under which war is to be conducted. Germany complains of our methods in this war. She complains of our blockade. From the very beginning Germany did her utmost to prevent food reaching this country. In the early stages of the war she sank two neutral ships with food for this country. It does not lie with her to complain of our blockade. But what about other methods which have been introduced—the sowing of mines indiscriminately upon the high seas, a danger equally to neutrals and to belligerents; the pouring of shells into defenceless coast towns?—because you must remember that what is required, according to the German official *communiqués*, to convert an Allied town on the coast into a fortress is not the position of guns in it or the presence of troops, but merely the fact that it has been fired upon by a German cruiser. Then there is the use of poisonous gas in war, which nobody would have believed possible if the Germans had not begun it, which nobody thought of using till the Germans began it. In the Gallipoli

Peninsula neither we nor the French used gas, because we would not be the first to introduce it anywhere. That has been brought into the war. Then there is the sinking of merchant vessels, with the destruction of the passengers and crews; the acts committed in Belgium and other Allied territory in the occupation of Germany, some of which have been the subject of investigation and report, in breach of all the laws and conventions of war and all the most elementary dictates of humanity.

And one thing more, of which we hear little, very little, and do not know the full story. Since the outbreak of war, since Turkey entered the war, she has been the vassal of Germany. Enough has leaked through to make it clear that there has gone on, and is going on, in Turkey on a scale unprecedented, and with horrors unequalled before, an attempt to exterminate the Christian population; horrors which Germany could have prevented, and which could only have gone on with her toleration. Perhaps some day some neutral nation who knows the full story will make it known to the world. All these things have been happening during this war, and what a prospect it opens for the future! Are all the resources of science to continue to be devoted after this war to invent means of destroying the human race, with no restriction upon their use? It is a prospect which threatens civilization and the existence of the race itself.

Germany, in letting loose these things, has been the great anarchist who has let loose on the world a greater and more terrible anarchy than any individual anarchist ever dreamed of. In future, war, unless there is some

means of restraining it, will by the development of science be made even more terrible and horrible than this war has been, because Germany has thrown down all the barriers which civilization previously built up so as to keep the horrors of war within bounds. Neutral nations have an interest in seeing that something is done to ensure that there shall be rules which shall be kept in future wars—rules which shall be so laid down and supported that it will be clear that any nation which departs from them will be regarded by the whole world as the enemy of the human race, and have the whole world against it.

The indiscriminate use of high explosives to destroy great cities, to destroy combatants and non-combatants alike, all those things which have been done in this war, the introduction of poisonous gas, the introduction perhaps of disease! It will need all the efforts not only of belligerents but of neutrals, after this war is over, to see that the barriers necessary to secure that the inventions of science are used in the future, in the air, on the land, in the water and under the water, not for the destruction of mankind, but for its welfare, to see that all nations shall recognize some responsibility to prevent outbreaks of war, and that, if there be war, it shall be conducted by rules at least as humane as those which our ancestors observed, and which Germany to-day has disregarded and thrown to the winds. This is a matter in which the whole human race is interested.

YOUTH'S SACRIFICE

Day by day it is brought home to us that here and in the countries of the Allies there are hundreds of

thousands of homes to which, indeed, victory may bring a sense of pride and satisfaction, but to which it can never bring just the same gladness and joy in life that was in these homes before the war. Thousands of young men—one young life after another—go to the front, mount in spirit heights of nobleness and courage, to which in ordinary times even a long life gives no opportunity of attaining. And on those heights many of them pass away, leaving often some record of the spirit with which they have met their death, which makes us doubly proud of them, although it adds to the poignancy of grief and sense of sorrow and loss. They are succeeded by others, and yet by others, and will be as long as the effort is required—a long procession from all our countries of men who die but who do not fail, because their life and the manner of their death is a glorious success.

This generation in its prime is giving its life, but it is giving it that the older generation now among us may live out its years after this war in peace, freedom, and honour, and that the generation which is now children, and the generations who are yet to come, may enjoy life and develop the national life, free from the stifling oppression of the domination of Prussian militarism. For years before this war we were living under the deepening shadow of Prussian militarism extending itself first over the whole of Germany, and then extending itself over the whole Continent. There must be no end to this war, no peace except a peace which is going to ensure that the nations of Europe live in the future free from that shadow in the open air and in the light of freedom. For that we are contending. We

know that if mankind has any birthright, as we believe it has a birthright, to peace and to liberty, then our cause is just and right, because it is for those we are fighting.

When they ask us: "How long is the struggle to be continued?" we can but reply that it must be continued till these things are secured, and if it be hard that the present generation in its prime should be called on to sacrifice all, it is for the sake of the future of the nation and the generations that come after. It is our determination, which the progress of the war but deepens, in common with our allies, to continue the war until we have made it certain that the Allies in common shall have achieved the success which must and ought to be theirs, until they have secured the future peace of the whole Continent of Europe, until they have made it clear that all the sacrifices we have made shall not have been in vain.

XIX

THE DEATH OF EDITH CAVELL



XIX

THE DEATH OF EDITH CAVELL

"What year in our history has done more to justify our faith in the manhood and the womanhood of our people? It has brought us the imperishable story of the last hours of Edith Cavell facing a worse ordeal than the battlefield —the moments creeping on slowly and remorselessly and death already swallowed up in victory. She has taught the bravest man among us a supreme lesson of courage."

—The Prime Minister, Tuesday, November 2d.

I. EDITH CAVELL'S LIFE

EDITH CAVELL was forty-three years old when she died. She was born in 1872 at the village of Swardeston, in Norfolk, of which her father was rector; and she grew up there in the country with her parents. During her childhood, Florence Nightingale's life-work was beginning to bear fruit in a great development of trained nursing in England. The girls of Edith Cavell's generation found a wonderful field of service opening before them, and Edith Cavell herself was one of those that entered upon it. There is no need to tell how unselfish and unwearying she was in her vocation. For any one acquainted with the tradition and practise of nursing in England, it will be enough to know that she did honour to her

profession. But we ought to add that her skill was on a level with her devotion; for it was this professional skill that singled her out for the important post which she occupied during the last few years of her life, and which occasioned the circumstances of her heroic death.

Miss Cavell began her training at the London Hospital when she was twenty-one. She qualified in 1896, and distinguished herself by ten years of responsible work in England, until she was called to a still more arduous mission abroad. Thanks to Florence Nightingale's inspiration, English nursing had outstripped the rest of the world in its development, and other countries were applying for English nurses to instruct them in the new English methods. One of these countries was Belgium. A Belgian School of Certificated Nurses was in process of foundation at Brussels, and in 1906 Miss Cavell was asked, and consented, to be its first directress. In addition to her professional experience and enthusiasm, she was especially qualified for the task by the fact that she had spent several years of her girlhood in Brussels at school, and so was already familiar with Belgian life. The patrons of the new Nursing Institute found reason to congratulate themselves on their choice, and looked forward to the great development of the nursing profession in Belgium which Miss Cavell, with half her life before her, would achieve.

But she was not to achieve it, for in the eighth year of her pioneer work came the war.

II. THE ARREST

She was spending a holiday with her mother in England at the moment war broke out, and she had no

difficulty in deciding where her duty lay. Germany had revealed her criminal designs against Belgium. There would be work in Brussels for her to do, and she returned immediately to do it. She arrived in time to share the terrible experience of the German entry into the Belgian capital, and then absorbed herself in the duties that crowded upon her.

The Training Institute, of course, transformed itself under Miss Cavell's direction into a hospital for sick and wounded soldiers. Belgians, Frenchmen, and Englishmen, as well as the German invaders, all came under her impartial care; and she nursed friend and foe with the single-minded devotion and humanity that is the creed of her calling. But she did not limit her services to this. She took counsel with her Belgian friends, and succeeded, with their assistance, in conveying many of her French, British, and Belgian patients, as they recovered, to the farther side of the Dutch frontier, that they might fight again for the common cause instead of undergoing whatever fate the German authorities allotted to convalescent prisoners of war. She also helped in the escape of Belgian civilians of military age, who had been overtaken, before they could join the colours, by the rapidity of the German advance, and were being held at home in virtual captivity by every means in the German Government's power.

So she worked for a year—a year of military nursing, and nine months of friendship in need to her friends and fellow-countrymen—until the German administration in Belgium discovered her share in the escapes. They acted immediately upon the discovery, and one

evening Edith Cavell was arrested at her hospital by soldiers and carried away to the military prison of St. Gilles. This was on August 5, 1915.

III. THE AMERICAN LEGATION INTERVENES

The German authorities kept what they had done to themselves. Edith Cavell had been three weeks in prison before her family in England heard of her arrest, and then they only heard of it privately from a traveller who happened to have come from Belgium since the event. They communicated the news to the Foreign Office, and action was immediately taken by Sir Edward Grey. When the Germans occupied Brussels, the American Minister there took charge of British interests in the occupied territory. The chief of these interests was, of course, the protection of any British subjects that remained in this territory from wrongful treatment at the invaders' hands. And Sir Edward Grey accordingly sent a note on August 26th to Mr. Page, the United States' Ambassador in London, requesting him to inquire of the United States' Minister at Brussels, by telegraph, whether the report of Miss Cavell's arrest were correct, and, if it were, what reason had been alleged in explanation.

We may take this opportunity to record, at the outset, the magnificent loyalty with which the American Legation at Brussels, and all those connected with it, exerted themselves from first to last in their voluntarily accepted trust on Edith Cavell's behalf. We shall repeatedly have occasion, in the course of this narrative, to admire the forethought and the energy, the tact and the feeling of these noble public servants of the

United States. And in doing this service they were serving not their country alone, nor yet the kindred nation which had entrusted them with the protection of its citizens under a hostile and violent-handed military administration; they were serving humanity, and standing for the principles of civilization.

Sir Edward Grey would request Mr. Page to express to Mr. Whitlock and the staff of the United States' Legation at Brussels the grateful thanks of His Majesty's Government for their untiring efforts on Miss Cavell's behalf. He is fully satisfied that no stone was left unturned to secure for Miss Cavell a fair trial, and, when sentence had been pronounced, a mitigation thereof.

These were the words in which the representative of Great Britain expressed his gratitude to the American diplomatists at Brussels after the whole tragedy was over, and they will be endorsed by every civilized man and woman in the world.

This magnificent spirit of the American officials became apparent as soon as the call was made. On receiving Sir Edward Grey's note, Mr. Page acted as promptly as Sir Edward himself. He telegraphed to his colleague at Brussels, Mr. Whitlock, next morning; and four days later, on August 31st, Mr. Whitlock addressed an inquiry on the subject to Baron von der Lancken, the chief of the Political Department (*Politische Abteilung*) of the German Military Government in the conquered territory. Here is Mr. Whitlock's note*:

*All documents here quoted are taken word for word from the British White Paper, *Miscellaneous, No.* 17 (1915), entitled, "Correspondence with the United States Ambassador Respecting the Execution of Miss Cavell at Brussels."

Brussels, August 31, 1915.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

My Legation has just been informed that Miss Edith Cavell, a British subject residing in the Rue de la Culture, Brussels, is said to have been arrested.

I should be greatly obliged if your Excellency would be good enough to let me know whether this report is true, and, if so, the reasons for her arrest. I should also be grateful in that case if your Excellency would furnish this Legation with the necessary authorization from the German judicial authorities, so that M. de Leval may consult with Miss Cavell, and eventually entrust some one with her defence.

I avail, etc.,

BRAND WHITLOCK.

This was written on August 31st, and after waiting ten days without being vouchsafed an answer, Mr. Whitlock followed it up in another note on September 10th:

The United States' Minister presents his compliments to Baron von der Lancken and has the honour to draw his Excellency's attention to his letter of the 31st August, respecting the arrest of Miss Cavell, to which no reply has yet been received.

As the Minister has been requested by telegraph to take charge of Miss Cavell's defence without delay, he would be greatly obliged if Baron von der Lancken would enable him to take forthwith such steps as may be necessary for this defence, and to answer by telegraph to the despatch which he has received.

Brussels, September 10, 1915.

The Chief of the German Political Department could not ignore the American Minister at Brussels a second time. Baron von der Lancken was compelled to answer, and here is what he wrote in reply:

Political Department
of the
Governor-General in Belgium.
I. 6940.

Brussels, September 12, 1915.

SIR

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that Miss Edith Cavell was arrested on the 5th August, and that she is at present in the Military prison of St. Gilles.

She has herself admitted that she concealed in her house French and English soldiers, as well as Belgians of military age, all desirous of proceeding to the front. She has also admitted having furnished these soldiers with the money necessary for their journey to France, and having facilitated their departure from Belgium by providing them with guides, who enabled them to cross the Dutch frontier secretly.

Miss Cavell's defence is in the hands of the advocate Braun, who, I may add, is already in touch with the competent German authorities.

In view of the fact that the Department of the Governor-General as a matter of principle does not allow accused persons to have any interviews whatever, I much regret my inability to procure for M. de Leval permission to visit Miss Cavell as long as she is in solitary confinement. I avail, etc.,

LANCKEN.

This was written on September 12th, more than five weeks after Miss Cavell's imprisonment. These five weeks of precious time, during which they had staved off any intervention on her behalf, were a triumph for the German authorities; but at last they had been compelled to show their hand. They had announced the offence of which Miss Cavell was accused, and revealed the name of the advocate who was conducting her case.

It might seem a strange "principle" of the Governor-

General's Department, "not to allow accused persons to have any interviews whatever." It is not a principle that would commend itself to English or American ideas of justice. But that might pass. The important thing was that the American Legation had now a basis on which to act.

IV. M. DE LEVAL TAKES STEPS

At this stage, as at all others, the American officials acted with superb zeal and promptitude. M. de Leval, whose name is referred to in Mr. Whitlock's first note and Baron von der Lancken's final reply, is a Belgian advocate retained as Legal Counsellor by the United States' Legation in the Belgian capital; and in a report from his own pen, which he drew up for Mr. Whitlock after the whole tragedy was over, he very clearly describes the successive steps he took in the case.

As he might not see Miss Cavell, M. de Leval got into touch with her advocate, M. Braun. At his request M. Braun came to call on him at the Legation a few days later. It appeared that he was a member of the Brussels Bar, and that he had been asked by personal friends of Miss Cavell to defend her before the German Court; "but owing (he said) to some unforeseen circumstances he was prevented from pleading before that Court." This, then, was the outcome of his dealings with "the competent German authorities." M. de Leval had wasted his time, the Political Department had gained a few more days. But perhaps there was more behind it than that. M. Braun added that "he had asked M. Kirschen, a member (likewise) of the Brussels Bar, and his friend, to take up the case

and plead for Miss Cavell, and that M. Kirschen had agreed to do so." Now, there is no question of M. Braun's personal good intentions and good faith. He had been asked to take up the case independently by Edith Cavell's friends, and had independently undertaken to do so. But when we come, in the sequel, to M. Kirschen's behaviour, we shall find ourselves passing a very different judgment on his character—such a judgment, in fact, as to make us speculate whether, in his selection of M. Kirschen, M. Braun was equally independent, or whether, perchance, his choice of a successor was not uninfluenced by "the competent German authorities."

V. THE ADVOCATE KIRSCHEN

However, that was more than M. de Leval could foresee at the moment. Under the circumstances, he took the only possible course, and proceeded to put himself in touch with M. Kirschen, who, after a slight further delay, accorded him the interview for which he asked. In the course of this interview M. Kirschen told M. de Leval a number of important and even remarkable things, which deserve to be reproduced here as carefully as M. de Leval has recorded them in his official report:

(i.) When M. de Leval asked M. Kirschen whether he had seen Miss Cavell, and whether she had made any statement to him, M. Kirschen informed him that *the lawyers defending prisoners before the German Military Court were not allowed to see their clients before the trial, and were not shown any document of the prosecution.* This, he added, was in accordance with the German military rules.

(ii.) He declared that the hearing of the trial of such case was carried out very carefully, and that, in his opinion, although it was not possible to see the client before the trial, in fact the *trial itself developed so carefully and so slowly*, that it was generally possible to have a fair knowledge of all the facts and to present a good defence for the prisoner. This would specially be the case for Miss Cavell, because *the trial would be rather long*, as she was prosecuted with thirty-four other prisoners. He assured M. de Leval over and over again that the Military Court at Brussels was always perfectly fair, and that there was not the slightest danger of any miscarriage of justice.

(iii.) On learning of M. de Leval's intention to be present at the trial, so as to watch the case, M. Kirschen strongly dissuaded him from doing so. Such an attitude, he said, would cause a great prejudice to the prisoner, because the German judges would resent it and feel it almost as an affront if M. de Leval appeared to exercise a kind of supervision on the trial. He thought that if the Germans would admit M. de Leval's presence, which was very doubtful, it would in any cause prejudice to Miss Cavell.

(iv.) *He promised that he would keep M. de Leval posted on all the developments which the case might take*, and would report to him the exact charges that were brought against Miss Cavell, and the facts concerning her that would be disclosed at the trial, so as to allow him to judge for himself about the merits of the case.

(v.) He insisted that he would do all that was humanly possible to defend Miss Cavell to the best of his ability.

With this, M. Kirschen took his departure, leaving things very much where they were before. If the prisoner's own advocate was legally prohibited from communicating with her before the trial began, there was clearly nothing to be done meanwhile by her friends at the American Legation.

So darkness descended again on the case for another three weeks, until, on Monday, October 4th, M.

Kirschen duly notified M. de Leval that the trial was to begin on the following Thursday, October 7th. Upon the receipt of this news, M. de Leval immediately wrote M. Kirschen a letter "confirming in writing in the name of the Legation the arrangement that had been made between them at their previous interview." For reasons which will appear later on, it will be as well to reprint this letter in full:

Brussels, October 5, 1915.

SIR,

I thank you for the letter you were so good as to address to M. de Leval, in which you informed him that Miss Cavell's case would come before the court-martial at 8 A. M. next Thursday. In pursuance of the arrangement already come to, I should be most grateful if you will be so good as to send me, after the hearing, a memorandum setting forth the acts for which Miss Cavell is being prosecuted, and stating the charges which are brought against her at the hearing, and also the sentence passed.

I am, etc.
(For the Minister),
G. DE LEVAL,
Legal Adviser to the Legation.

This letter was delivered to M. Kirschen by a messenger of the Legation, and M. de Leval waited anxiously for his next report.

VI. THE TRIAL

On Thursday, October 7th, the trial of Edith Cavell and her fellow-prisoners began. It was nine weeks since her first arrest and imprisonment. That had been on August 5th, and all this time she had been retained (unconvicted though she was) in solitary con-

finement, cut off from communion with her friends and from all intercourse whatsoever with the outside world. Now she was brought before the Military Court to be convicted—the only verdict by which her judges could justify the conduct of her gaolers.

M. de Leval was not present at the trial—he could hardly have gone against M. Kirschen's deliberately expressed advice—but he has embodied in his report a very exact account of the proceedings, which he afterward obtained from some one who had taken part in them. We may say at once that this informant was *not* M. Kirschen. How that came to be will appear hereafter. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to indicate the source from which M. de Leval's narrative comes, and we may draw on it with confidence for our own information.

Says M. de Leval's informant:

> Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped English and French soldiers, as well as Belgian young men, to cross the frontier and to go over to England. She had admitted by signing a statement before the day of the trial, and by public acknowledgment in court, in the presence of all the other prisoners, and the lawyers, that she was guilty of the charges brought against her.

The penalty fixed for these actions by German Military Law is death.

Paragraph 58 of the German Military Code says:

> Will be sentenced to death for treason any person who, with the intention of helping the hostile power, or of causing harm to the German or allied troops, is guilty of one of the crimes of paragraph 90 of the German Penal Code

The case referred to in above said paragraph 90 consists in:

. . . . conducting soldiers to the enemy . . . . (viz.: *dem Feinde Mannschaften zuführt*).

The penalties above set forth apply, according to paragraph 160 of the German Code, in case of war, to foreigners as well as to Germans.

Now, Edith Cavell was undoubtedly aware from the beginning of the extreme penalty she was incurring under the German Military Code. She did not succour her friends and compatriots in distress because she thought she could do so with impunity. She succoured them, in the first place, from pure humanity —a humanity which has been shown by women through all ages to fugitives wounded and in distress; and, in the second place, because she thought (as she declared in court) that she was doing her unquestionable duty to her country. But she knew all the while that she was doing it at the risk of her life; and, knowing this, she never demeaned herself by excusing or minimizing what she had done, but willingly responded to her inquisitors by an admission of all, and more than all, their charges.

Edith Cavell's own position in the case is simple and heroic. The position of the German authorities is very different indeed.

In defending their conduct, the Germans lay great stress on the fact that their victim had done what she did with open eyes. Here, for instance, is a quotation from a statement vouchsafed to an American

journalist by Herr Zimmermann, the Imperial German Under-Secretary-of-State for Foreign Affairs:

> All those convicted were fully cognizant of the significance of their actions. The Court went into just this point with particular care, and acquitted several co-defendants because it believed a doubt existed regarding their knowledge of the penalties of their actions.

That might conceivably settle the issue between the executioners and the dead, but it cannot absolve Germany in the judgment of the civilized world. What justifies a law? Certainly not the mere drafting of it, or its publication to those whom it may concern. Otherwise, the vilest law would possess an equal sanction with the best, and a band of ruffians with brute force at their command could foist any atrocity as law upon the world. The only sanction of a law is the moral conviction of humanity that it is right, and paragraphs 58 and 90 of the German Military Code will be stripped of their legality under this ordeal. No civilized man or woman will admit for a moment that Edith Cavell deserved the penalty of death for the offence she had committed against the German Empire. Herr Zimmermann strains his hardest to prove that she did. He exaggerates, he prevaricates, he gravitates into open falsehood. But it is only himself and his country that he convicts:

> In the Cavell case (Herr Zimmermann pronounces) we are in presence of a well-thought-out, *world-wide* conspiracy which succeeded for nine months in rendering the most valuable service to the enemy to the disadvantage of our army.

Countless British, Belgian, and French soldiers are now again fighting in the Allies' ranks who owe their escape from Belgium to the activity of the band now sentenced, at the head of which stood Miss Cavell.

"A world-wide conspiracy"—that is how he describes a little band of thirty-five men and women in a Belgian province. "Countless enemy soldiers enabled to escape"—that is a round number for the few dozen wounded men and fugitives who were actually conveyed across the Dutch frontier by the good offices of Miss Cavell and her friends.

With such a situation under the eyes of the authorities (he continues), only the utmost severity can bring relief, and a Government violates the most elementary duty toward its army that does not adopt the strictest measures. These duties in war are greater than any other.

So Miss Cavell, it appears, had seriously compromised the safety of the German army! These few dozen refugees—or few hundred, or few thousand, if Herr Zimmermann asks for the benefit of the number—were gravely altering the balance of forces on the western front! That is what Herr Zimmermann implies, and we have only to state it to expose its absurdity; but, after all, it is not the fundamental question at issue. Who were these Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Belgians in the case? They were not invaders, or raiders, or spies. They were men wounded or missing from armies fighting for the liberty of the country in which they found themselves, or they were citizens of that country seeking an opportunity to give

her their service. Their hope was to escape from the hand of the enemy, in order to take up the duty to which they were called; and the alternative that faced them was terrible. If they did not escape, they would either be shot summarily by German patrols (Edith Cavell, their rescuer, declared this at her trial, and her judges did not contradict her), or they would be doomed to the lingering torment of the German prison camps, from which death, again, was the final and only relief.* And as for the rescuers themselves, they were no more intruders than those they rescued, nor on ground where they had no right to be. Most of them were natives and citizens of Belgium, while Edith Cavell—the "head of the conspiracy," as Herr Zimmermann prefers to call her—had come to Belgium, on the invitation of the Belgians themselves, to carry out a work of public beneficence, on which she had already been engaged for more than eight years. And the acts for which they were now arraigned were likewise acts of mercy, which women, at any rate (and many of the "band" were women, besides their "head") have never refused to perform on behalf of fellow-creatures in distress, and which have never among civilized men been reckoned against them as a crime.

These were the people against whom the German administration was obliged to "adopt the strictest measures," for fear of "violating the most elementary duty toward its army." Herr Zimmermann's phrases are so complacent and so officially correct, that it needs an effort to remind ourselves what that army

*For the treatment of prisoners of war in Germany, see the British White Paper *Miscellaneous No.* 12 (1915) [Cd. 7862].

actually was. It was the German army which had invaded without provocation a country whose inviolability the German Government had solemnly guaranteed. It was the army which had treated the helpless and innocent population among whom it came as no invaded people for centuries had been treated by European soldiers—the army that plundered and burnt and slaughtered and ravished. The German army, it is to be supposed, had committed itself to its career of "frightfulness" in Belgium in order not to fail in its duty toward the German Government; and now the Government was inflicting the same frightfulness on Miss Cavell in order to carry out its duty to the Army. The German army and the German Government have indeed proved not unworthy of one another.

No consideration whatsoever was allowed, in Edith Cavell's case, to weigh in the balance against this German principle. Herr Zimmermann, of course, repudiates emphatically the consideration of sex. It is enough for him that "no law book in the world, least of all those dealing with war regulations, makes any such differentiation." But even if Edith Cavell had been a spy, even if she had been a male spy and not a woman, there were further circumstances in the case which Herr Zimmermann leaves discreetly out of account, but which will weigh more strongly with the rest of the world.

It is not an unimportant point that, even under the German Military Law by which she was tried, Edith Cavell was only rendered amenable to the death penalty by evidence which she volunteered of her

own accord, and which no one else could have obtained against her. M. de Leval's informant told him that:

> She had acknowledged not only that she had helped these soldiers to cross the frontier, but also that some of them had thanked her in writing when arriving in England. This last admission made her case so much the more serious, because if it only had been proved against her that she had helped the soldiers to traverse the Dutch frontier, and no proof was produced that these soldiers had reached a country at war with Germany, she could only have been sentenced for an attempt to commit the "crime," and not for the "crime" being duly accomplished.

That was one point in the case, but there is another which would have appealed still more directly to any judge whose human instincts had not been warped by German Military Law. Edith Cavell was an English patriot, but first and foremost she was a nurse, inflexibly constant to the high ideals of her calling. If part of her efforts had been given, during those nine months, to assisting her convalescent patients to escape, her daily labours were spent, as they always had been, on the unconditional service of the sick. She had not only succoured the English, French, and Belgian wounded that came under her care; she had nursed Germans as well—nursed them back to life that they might fight again for their own country, with just the same devotion as she displayed to those others whom she was sending home to fight for a cause which was hers as well as theirs.

That service to their wounded comrades should have made Edith Cavell's life sacred in the eyes of the German officers who condemned her to death. It should

have reprieved her even if she had been a spy, or if the German people and the German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been more sincerely convinced than they were that the infinitely less serious offence which she had committed was justly punishable by the penalty assigned to it under German-made Military Law. Her execution, under whatever code, was an outrage to humanity, and the voice of humanity speaks in the following sentences of Sir Edward Grey*:

Sir Edward Grey is confident that the news of the execution of this noble Englishwoman will be received with horror and disgust, not only in the Allied States, but throughout the civilized world. Miss Cavell was not even charged with espionage, and the fact that she had nursed numbers of wounded German soldiers might have been regarded as a complete reason in itself for treating her with leniency.

But the German authorities were not governed by such considerations. Their thought was not of justice, but of results.

Once for all (states Herr Zimmermann), the activity of our enemies has been stopped, and *the sentence has been carried out to frighten those who may presume on their sex to take part in enterprises punishable with death.*

Those words have a familiar sound, and they admit the uttermost of the charge they were intended to rebut. It is the old, futile, abominable policy of "Frightfulness" once more, and Edith Cavell is its latest victim.

*Quoted from his letter addressed to Mr. Page, the United States' Ambassador in London, after the perpetration of the deed.

From the beginning there was no doubt about the intentions of the Military Court. Their purpose is written large in the narrative of the trial which M. de Leval had from his informant, and which he incorporated in his own report.

In her oral statement before the Court, Miss Cavell disclosed almost all the facts of the whole prosecution. She was questioned in German, an interpreter translating all the questions in French, with which language Miss Cavell was well acquainted. She spoke without trembling and showed a clear mind. Often she added some greater precision to her previous depositions.

When she was asked why she helped these soldiers to go to England, she replied that she thought that if she had not done so they would have been shot by the Germans, and that therefore she thought she only did her duty to her country in saving their lives.

The Military Public Prosecutor said that argument might be good for English soldiers, but did not apply to Belgian young men whom she induced to cross the frontier, and who would have been perfectly free to remain in the country without danger to their lives.

M. Kirschen made a very good plea for Miss Cavell, using all arguments that could be brought in her favour before the Court.

We may note in passing that the "competent German authorities" could take no umbrage at M. Kirschen's fine speeches. They lent the proceedings a savour of free debate, and they were not likely to prejudice the military judges. At any rate, the prosecutor was not embarrassed by them, as the sequel of the narrative shows:

The Military Public Prosecutor, however, asked the Court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and eight other prisoners amongst

the thirty-five. The Court did not seem to agree, and the judgment was postponed. The person informing me said he thought that the Court would not go to the extreme limit.

These were the first impressions of a looker-on, and we cannot help marvelling at the artistic solemnity with which the sinister show was played through.

VII. KIRSCHEN'S SILENCE AND CONRAD'S ASSURANCE

The Court rose on Friday, October 8th, one day after its sitting had begun. Meanwhile, M. de Leval was waiting for M. Kirschen's next communication. He did not expect to hear that the Court had risen—M. Kirschen had himself assured him that "the hearing would be carried out very carefully and the trial would be rather long"—but he was hoping for a report from the prisoner's advocate of the first phases in the defence. His astonishment was therefore considerable when he was informed by an outsider* that "the trial had taken place, though no judgment would be reached till a few days later." This was on Saturday, October 9th, and not a word from M. Kirschen had been received.

Receiving no report from M. Kirschen, continues M. de Leval, I tried to find him, but failed. I then sent him a note on Sunday, asking him to send his report to the Legation or call there on Monday morning at 8.30.

. . . On Monday morning I was very much surprised still to receive no news from M. Kirschen, and I called at his house at 12.30; but I was informed that he would not be there till about

*Not to be confused with the eye-witness who afterward furnished him with the narrative of the trial.

the end of the afternoon. I then called, at 12.40, at the house of another lawyer interested in the case of a fellow-prisoner, and found that he also was out. In the afternoon, however, the latter lawyer called at my house, saying that in the morning he had heard from the German Kommandatur that judgment would be passed only the next morning—viz., Tuesday morning. He said that he feared that the Court would be very severe for all the prisoners.

Shortly after, this lawyer left me. . . .

And that is the last that has been heard of M. Kirschen. Doubtless he has had his reward, for his utility to the "competent German authorities" has been inestimable. From Thursday, October 7th, to the afternoon of Monday, October 11th—the most critical days in their operations against Edith Cavell—he had stood between them and her friends at the American Legation.

He had not shielded them completely, however, owing to the perseverance of M. de Leval. On Sunday evening, the narrative of the trial which we have quoted above was communicated to M. de Leval by a private person who had been a witness of the proceedings; and on receipt of this information, M. de Leval did not wait to hear the last of M. Kirschen before addressing himself directly to the German Governor-General's Political Department. It will be better to give his account of what followed in his own words:

After I had found out these facts (viz., Sunday evening), I called at the Political Division of the German Government in Belgium and asked whether, now that the trial had taken place, permission would be granted to me to see Miss Cavell in jail, as

surely there was no longer any object in refusing that permission. The German official, Mr. Conrad, said he would make the necessary enquiry at the Court and let me know later on.

I also asked him that permission be granted to Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, to see Miss Cavell.

At the same time we prepared at the Legation, to be ready for every eventuality, a petition for pardon, addressed to the Governor-General in Belgium, and a transmitting note addressed to Baron von der Lancken.

Monday morning, at 11, I called up Mr. Conrad on the telephone from the Legation (as I already had done previously on several occasions when making enquiries about the case), asking what the Military Court had decided about Mr. Gahan and myself seeing Miss Cavell. He replied that Mr. Gahan could not see her, but that she could see any of the three Protestant clergymen* attached to the prison; and that I could not see her till the judgment was pronounced and signed, but that this would probably only take place in a day or two. *I asked the German official to inform the Legation immediately after the passing of said judgment,* so that I might see Miss Cavell at once, thinking, of course, that the Legation might, according to your intentions,† take immediate steps for Miss Cavell's pardon if the judgment really was a sentence of death.

This, then, was the situation as it revealed itself to the American Legation on Monday morning. The Prosecutor had asked for a sentence of death, and the Court was still in council. It might issue a death sentence at any moment, but it had not done so yet, and there was a presumption that it would not do so for at least another day. This had been the impression of M. de Leval's two private informants, it had been the opinion of the advocate acting for one of Edith Cavell's co-defendants, and it had been endorsed by

*Presumably of German nationality.

†M. de Leval's Report is addressed to Mr. Whitlock.

no less competent a German authority than Herr Conrad himself.

Again, there was nothing to do but to keep vigilant watch upon the march of events, and the American Legation performed their part once more with unfailing zeal and constancy.

At 11 o'clock on Monday morning "*Herr Conrad gave positive assurances that the Legation would be fully informed as to developments in this case.*"

That is, word for word, the categorical statement of Mr. Gibson, Secretary of the United States' Legation at Brussels, in the report which he drew up for the Minister, Mr. Whitlock, on the following day. But Edith Cavell's friends at the Legation did not rest content with that.

Despite these assurances (Mr. Gibson continues), we made repeated enquiries in the course of the day, the last one being at 6.40 P. M. Belgian time. Mr. Conrad then stated that sentence had not yet been pronounced, and *specifically renewed his previous assurances that he would not fail to inform us as soon as there was any news.*

This was at 6.20 P. M. and further enquiries and assurances would doubtless have been exchanged in the course of the evening, had not the process been cut short by a sudden blow.

While (M. de Leval reports) I was preparing a note about the case, at 8 P. M. I was privately and reliably informed that the judgment had been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, that Miss Cavell had been sentenced to death, *and that she would be shot at 2 o'clock the next morning.* I told my informer that I was extremely surprised at this, because the Legation had received no

information yet, neither from the German authorities nor from Mr. Kirschen, but that the matter was too serious to run the smallest chance, and that therefore I would proceed immediately to the Legation to confer with your Excellency and take all possible steps to save Miss Cavell's life.

The death sentence had been signed at 5 P. M. An hour and twenty minutes after its signature, Herr Conrad had once more assured the American Legation that nothing had happened and all was well. The Legation had learned the truth at 8 o'clock, and still no intimation of it had been conveyed to them by the competent German authorities. The German authorities never informed them of the truth, until they were taxed with it by emissaries from the Legation itself.

At this point we may pause a moment to enumerate the chain of prevarications and subterfuges by which the German officials cheated Edith Cavell's legitimate friends and protectors at the American Legation of their unimpeachable right to supervise her case.

When Mr. Whitlock made his first enquiry at the Political Department, on August 31st, Baron von der Lancken delayed his answer for twelve days, and then only vouchsafed it under pressure of a second and more urgent request. When Miss Cavell's friends appointed an advocate to conduct her case, the man of their choice, after getting into touch with the competent German authorities, was compelled, "owing to some unforeseen circumstances," to transfer his brief to a more receptive colleague. The impression was created that the trial would be lengthy; it lasted two days. When the Court so abruptly rose, the

further impression was created that the pronouncement of the sentence would be some time deferred; it was delivered within seventy-two hours. Six hours before its delivery a high official in the Political Department gave the American Legation "positive assurances" that he would acquaint them immediately that event occurred. Neither he nor his colleagues ever gave them the least indication of it, and even when taxed with it cast doubt upon its truth, as will appear shortly hereafter.

We may sum up this charge by remarking that the German authorities only informed the American Legation, from beginning to end, of one positive fact—the name of Edith Cavell's first, and already superseded, advocate. And the advocate substituted in M. Braun's place only gave them knowledge of one single fact more—the date on which the trial was to begin. All the important facts—the fact that the Court had risen; the narrative of what had taken place before it rose, including the supremely important fact that the death penalty had been demanded; and the final fact that this sentence had already been pronounced—these were all communicated to the American Legation by private informants. They were the vital facts in the case, the facts which it was essential for them to know if they were to take effective action, and they learned them, not from the German authorities and not from Edith Cavell's semi-official defender, but by chance alone, and at the eleventh hour.

This is how it is put by Sir Edward Grey:*

*In the letter (already quoted) which he wrote to Mr. Page after the Germans had carried the case of Edith Cavell to its designed conclusion.

The attitude of the German authorities is, if possible, rendered worse by the discreditable efforts successfully made by the officials of the German civil administration at Brussels to conceal the fact that sentence had been passed and would be carried out immediately. These efforts were no doubt prompted by the determination to carry out the sentence before an appeal from the finding of the court-martial could be made to a higher authority, and show in the clearest manner that the German authorities concerned were well aware that the carrying out of the sentence was not warranted by any consideration.

In these words he is merely expressing the feelings of the civilized world.

Further comment on these proceedings (he adds) would be superfluous.

VIII. MONDAY NIGHT—THE "POLITICAL DEPARTMENT"

It was the eleventh hour, yet the American Legation had no thought of abandoning the struggle. In view of this very eventuality they had drawn up the day before, with admirable foresight, two "pleas for mercy" (*requêtes en grâce*), of identical purport, but addressed respectively to Baron von der Lancken, the Chief of the Political Department, and to Baron von Bissing, the Governor-General of the Occupied Territory. This appeal sets forth so cogently the considerations in Edith Cavell's favour that we reproduce it here as it stands:

Brussels, October 11, 1915.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have just heard that Miss Cavell, a British subject, and consequently under the protection of my Legation, was this morning condemned to death by court-martial.

If my informant is correct, the sentence in the present case is more severe than all the others that have been passed in similar cases which have been tried by the same court, and, without going into the reasons for such a drastic sentence, I feel that I have the right to appeal to your Excellency's feelings of humanity and generosity in Miss Cavell's favour, and to ask that the death penalty passed on Miss Cavell may be commuted and that this unfortunate woman shall not be executed.

Miss Cavell is the head of the Brussels Surgical Institute. She has spent her life in alleviating the sufferings of others, and her school has turned out many nurses who have watched at the bedside of the sick all the world over, in Germany as in Belgium. At the beginning of the war Miss Cavell bestowed her care as freely on the German soldiers as on others. Even in default of all other reasons, her career as a servant of humanity is such as to inspire the greatest sympathy and to call for pardon. If the information in my possession is correct, Miss Cavell, far from shielding herself, has, with commendable straightforwardness, admitted the truth of all the charges against her, and it is the very information which she herself has furnished, and which she alone was in a position to furnish, which has aggravated the severity of the sentence passed on her.

It is then with confidence, and in the hope of its favourable reception, that I have the honour to present to your Excellency my request for pardon on Miss Cavell's behalf.*

I avail, &c.,

BRAND WHITLOCK.

The one thing now to be done was to present this appeal at the earliest possible moment, and to reinforce it by personal representations of as weighty and as urgent a kind as possible. The American Minister,

*This is the text of the appeal to the Governor-General. In the otherwise identical appeal to Baron von der Lancken the last paragraph runs:

"It is then with confidence, and in the hope of its favourable reception, that I beg your Excellency to submit to the Governor-General my request for pardon on Miss Cavell's behalf."

Mr. Whitlock, himself was unfortunately ill and confined to his bed. Yet he would not spare himself in his efforts on Edith Cavell's behalf. With his own hand he wrote a note of personal intercession, which poignantly proves, if further proof were needed, how whole-hearted he was in his struggle for Edith Cavell's life.

MY DEAR BARON,

I am too ill to present my request to you in person, but I appeal to the generosity of your heart to support it and save this unfortunate woman from death. Have pity on her!

Yours sincerely,

BRAND WHITLOCK.

This final appeal, as well as the more formal pleas for mercy that had been previously prepared, was taken charge of by Mr. Gibson, the Secretary of the Legation, and Mr. Whitlock's colleague and subordinate. Accompanied by M. de Leval, Mr. Gibson proceeded on his mission, and we shall quote what followed from his own official report.*

At 8.30 it was learned from an outside source that sentence had been passed in the course of the afternoon (before the last conversation with Mr. Conrad), and that the execution would take place during the night. In conformity with your instructions, I went (accompanied by M. de Leval) to look for the Spanish Minister, and found him dining at the home of Baron Lambert. I explained the circumstances to his Excellency and asked that (as you were ill and unable to go yourself) he go with us to see Baron von der Lancken and support as strongly as possible the plea, which I was to make in your name, that execution of the

*Drawn up and dated the following day—Tuesday, October 12th. It is addressed to Mr. Whitlock.

death penalty should be deferred until the Governor could consider your appeal for clemency.

We took with us a note addressed to Baron von der Lancken, and a plea for clemency (*requête en grâce*) addressed to the Governor-General. The Spanish Minister willingly agreed to accompany us, and we went together to the *Politische Abteilung*.

Baron von der Lancken and all the members of his staff were absent for the evening. We sent a messenger to ask that he return at once to see us in regard to a matter of utmost urgency. A little after 10 o'clock he arrived, followed shortly after by Count Harrach and Herr von Falkenhausen, members of his staff. The circumstances of the case were explained to him and your note presented, and he read it aloud in our presence. He expressed disbelief in the report that sentence had actually been passed, and manifested some surprise that we should give credence to any report not emanating from official sources. He was quite insistent on knowing the exact source of our information, but this I did not feel at liberty to communicate to him. Baron von der Lancken stated that it was quite probable that sentence had been pronounced, that even if so, it would not be executed within so short a time, and that in any event it would be quite impossible to take any action before morning. It was, of course, pointed out to him that if the facts were as we believed them to be, action would be useless unless taken at once. We urged him to ascertain the facts immediately, and this, after some hesitancy, he agreed to do. He telephoned to the presiding judge of the court-martial and returned in a short time to say that the facts were as we had represented them, and that it was intended to carry out the sentence before morning. We then presented, as earnestly as possible, your plea for delay. So far as I am able to judge, we neglected to present no phase of the matter which might have had any effect, emphasizing the horror of executing a woman, no matter what her offence, pointing out that the death sentence had heretofore been imposed only for actual cases of espionage, and that Miss Cavell was not even accused by the German authorities of anything so serious. I further called attention to the failure to comply with Mr. Conrad's promise to inform the

Legation of the sentence. I urged that inasmuch as the offences charged against Miss Cavell were long since accomplished, and that as she had been for some weeks in prison, a delay in carrying out the sentence could entail no danger to the German cause. I even went so far as to point out the fearful effect of a summary execution of this sort upon public opinion, both here and abroad, and, although I had no authority for doing so, called attention to the possibility that it might bring about reprisals.

The Spanish Minister forcibly supported all our representations and made an earnest plea for clemency.

Baron von der Lancken stated that the Military Governor was the supreme authority (*Gerichtsherr*) in matters of this sort; that appeal from his decision could be carried only to the Emperor, the Governor-General having no authority to intervene in such cases. He added that under the provisions of German Martial Law the Military Governor had discretionary power to accept or to refuse acceptance of an appeal for clemency. After some discussion he agreed to call the Military Governor on to the telephone and learn whether he had already ratified the sentence, and whether there was any chance for clemency. He returned in about half an hour, and stated that he had been to confer personally with the Military Governor, who said that he had acted in the case of Miss Cavell only after mature deliberation; that the circumstances in her case were of such a character that he considered the infliction of the death penalty imperative; and that in view of the circumstances of this case he must decline to accept your plea for clemency or any representation in regard to the matter.

Baron von der Lancken then asked me to take back the note which I had presented to him. To this I demurred, pointing out that it was not a *requête en grâce* but merely a note to him transmitting a communication to the Governor, which was itself to be considered as the *requête en grâce*. I pointed out that this was expressly stated in your note to him, and tried to prevail upon him to keep it; he was very insistent, however, and I finally reached the conclusion that inasmuch as he had read it aloud to us, and we knew that he was aware of its contents, there was nothing to be

gained by refusing to accept the note and accordingly took it back.

Even after Baron von der Lancken's very positive and definite statement that there was no hope, and that under the circumstances "even the Emperor himself could not intervene," we continued to appeal to every sentiment to secure delay, and the Spanish Minister even led Baron von der Lancken aside in order to say very forcibly a number of things which he would have felt hesitancy in saying in the presence of the younger officers and of Mr. de Leval, a Belgian subject.

His Excellency talked very earnestly with Baron von der Lancken for about a quarter of an hour. During this time M. de Leval and I presented to the younger officers every argument we could think of. I reminded them of our untiring efforts on behalf of German subjects at the outbreak of war and during the siege of Antwerp. I pointed out that, while our services had been rendered gladly and without any thought of future favours, they should certainly entitle you to some consideration for the only request of this sort you had made since the beginning of the war. Unfortunately, our efforts were unavailing. We persevered until it was only too clear that there was no hope of securing any consideration for the case.

We left the *Politische Abteilung* shortly after midnight, and I immediately returned to the Legation to report to you.

HUGH GIBSON.

IX. MONDAY NIGHT—THE PRISON OF ST. GILLES

That is what happened at the Political Department of the German Administration in Brussels on the evening of Monday, October 11th. Meanwhile, a very different interview was taking place in the Military Prison of St. Gilles, where Mr. Gahan, the British chaplain in the Belgian capital, had been admitted at last to visit Edith Cavell at 10 o'clock, five hours after

the sentence had been passed and four hours before it was put into execution.*

On Monday evening, the 11th October (Mr. Gahan writes), I was admitted by special passport from the German authorities to the prison of St. Gilles, where Miss Edith Cavell had been confined for ten weeks. The final sentence had been given early that afternoon.

To my astonishment and relief I found my friend perfectly calm and resigned. But this could not lessen the tenderness and intensity of feeling on either part during that last interview of almost an hour.

Her first words to me were upon a matter concerning herself personally, but the solemn asseveration which accompanied them was made expressedly in the light of God and eternity. She then added that she wished all her friends to know that she willingly gave her life for her country, and said: "I have no fear nor shrinking; I have seen death so often that it is not strange or fearful to me. . . ."

She further said: "I thank God for this ten weeks' quiet before the end. . . .

"Life has always been hurried and full of difficulty. . . .

"This time of rest has been a great mercy. . . .

"They have all been very kind to me here. But this I would say, standing as I do in view of God and eternity, I realize that patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness toward any one."

We partook of the Holy Communion together, and she received the Gospel message of consolation with all her heart. At the close of the little service I began to repeat the words "Abide with me," and she joined softly in the end.

We sat quietly talking until it was time for me to go. She gave me parting messages for relations and friends. She spoke of her

*Mr. Gahan describes his last interview with Edith Cavell in a report which he drew up a few days later at Mr. Whitlock's request, and from which we quote what follows.

soul's needs at the moment and she received the assurance of God's Word as only the Christian can do.

Then I said, "Good-bye," and she smiled and said, "We shall meet again."

* * * * * * *

The rest is silence. All we know is the testimony of the German military chaplain who was with her at the end.*

She was brave and bright to the last. She professed her Christian faith, and that she was glad to die for her country. . . .

She died like a heroine. . . .

Beati mortui qui in Domino moriuntur, ut requiescant a laboribus suis; opera enim illorum sequuntur illos.

*Communicated to Mr. Gahan, and included in the latter's report.

XX

THE SOUL OF FRANCE

By MAURICE BARRÈS

Membre de l'Académie française

XX

THE SOUL OF FRANCE

THE rain was falling as I reached the ruins of Gerbéviller-le-Martyr in the evening, to seek out the nuns mentioned by General de Castelnau in his despatches.

"You want to see Sister Julie? You can't go wrong. It is the only house still standing on your right as you go up."

The only house! There it was; a house of no particular character, neither the house of a peasant, nor that of a *bourgeois*, but with some traits of each. The dining room, where I waited a few minutes, was ornamented with a cheap and tawdry hanging lamp. The lack of refinement and distinction attracted me. I was about to see in the commonplace surroundings of a narrow life a soul ennobled by circumstance.

But here comes Madame Julie Rigarel, in religion Sister Julie, whom the General eulogized, whom the *préfet* came to embrace, and on whom the *sous-préfet* temporarily conferred all the rights of the Mayoralty.

"Sister, the President of the League of Patriots salutes you with the greatest respect."

I explained to the noble woman that I was travelling through Lorraine to enquire into the outrages committed by the Germans, and hear of the virtues of my compatriots.

I could not see her features very distinctly in the dim light shed by the small petroleum lamp overhead. I could only make out that she was a rather robust and capable-looking woman; she talked quickly, with a pronounced accent, and looked a typical *religieuse* or *bourgeoise* of our small provincial towns, but had remained homelier, and her face beamed with kindness.

"But what have I done that people should take so much notice of me? The sisters of St. Charles are nursing sisters: I could not have done anything else."

The sisters of St. Charles are the Lorraine congregation *par excellence*, an old foundation of our duchy. Their letters patent of the seventeenth century laid on them the mission of praying for the preservation and prosperity of the House of Lorraine. They have now done good service to the honour of the Lorraine people.

"Very well, sister, nothing you have *done* was extraordinary for a sister of St. Charles. But you must have *seen* some extraordinary things."

"Yes, indeed. The great rifle-fire and the bombardment lasted from nine in the morning till nine at night on August 24th. During the night of the 23d-24th, they sent us some of the little Alpine Chasseurs to hold the way. About fifty, and they were so young—mere boys. They fought. Bombs and bullets were showered upon us. The Mayor said to them: 'Boys, you can do nothing, there are too many of them. And you will expose the village to their vengeance.' They answered gently: 'The General told us to hold out to the last.' And they did hold out till the evening, when the German infantry reached the middle of the

town. Then they managed to creep away along the ground and over the walls of the cemetery without being seen by the Germans. The enemy accordingly took their revenge on the civil population. They entered every house, striking the inhabitants and driving them before them. An officer came to my house with his soldiers. He came up to the place where I had my wounded. The poor fellows were trembling. I put myself between them and him and said: 'Don't touch them, they are wounded.' He went to every bed and tore the blankets off to see the dressings. He had a revolver in one hand and a dagger in the other. Sometimes I followed him and sometimes went in front of him. How bold I was! I wonder at myself now. How could I have dared? . . . But then I did not know that they were killing and torturing women and children in the village."

She told me various things about the crimes of violence committed by the Germans, and suddenly, as if terrified by the images she had evoked, she cried:

"Do you think they will come back? Oh! I am so frightened!"

I was deeply touched by this exclamation. It revealed human nature beneath the heroism of the nun.

"They spared you and your nuns, sister?"

"I nursed their wounded as well as our own. It is my duty as a sister of St. Charles. I have a right to prefer ours, but I nursed the others equally. Now, on August 25th, we had 258 wounded Prussians and no one to tend them."

"Where are your doctors?" I asked.

"They have forsaken us. We dressed their wounds,

but we had no expert knowledge. There was one who had two fingers hanging from his hand. I cut them off with my scissors. It was at Roselieures especially that they had been battered by our '75' guns. Some had no calves, some no cheeks, some no ribs."

"Did they complain much?"

"No. They just said: 'How it burns!' They entered Gerbéviller on the evening of August 24th, as I told you. Well, on the 28th, at 5 o'clock, the French returned. You know what a struggle there was, and how it lasted incessantly till September 13th, at 8 o'clock in the evening. The battle was always going on, the artillery duel, and especially the machine guns, which our people call the 'coffee mill.'"

The sister gave me a mass of information, but I preferred to impress on my memory only what would throw light on her own personality. I did not want to hear of the sufferings of Gerbéviller from her: I had seen the ruins; nor did I ask for a description of the battle. That must take its place in the general story of the operations. I had come to see her, to see a person who, all unconsciously, possessed heroic powers, and whose generous soul leapt into life when the hour struck.

"Our priest," she said, "had been carried off by the Germans. The church was on fire. Then it suddenly occurred to me that the ciborium was in danger. I ran and fetched it from the tabernacle. I brought it here, and, kneeling down, I administered the sacrament to myself."

Here, in this room, under the gilded hanging lamp! This scene explained Sister Julie to me: an excellent

nature, divinely moulded. I recognized in her a countrywoman full of loving kindness and practical sense, but deeply imbued with mystical feeling.

While we were talking other sisters, hospital orderlies, officers, soldiers, maimed men, refugees, among them some children, and a few of the poor inhabitants who had returned to the ruins, entered the room, one after another. They told me that they had now completed the work of burying the dead who had been killed in the battle, and that to-morrow morning an open-air Mass would be said for them, in the midst of the graves. They asked if I would be present and speak. Sister Julie was insistent, but I declined the honour, not, indeed, because I wanted to spare myself a little effort on behalf of fellow-creatures who had given their lives, but because I felt myself unworthy of so great a part, which seemed to me to belong to priests and soldiers —to those who had suffered.

"You would have given pleasure to all of us."

This phrase of Sister Julie's haunts me in the darkness after I have returned to the carriage which takes us once more through the ruins on our way back to Lunéville. I think of the service she has rendered us by manifesting the moral generosity of our nation in the midst of the German horrors. She makes one understand the cry of the sacred orator: "The hands that are raised to heaven destroy more battalions than the hands armed with pike and lance." This nun tending the murderers themselves on the scene of their murders—she, the daughter and the sister of their victims—makes a very different impression at Gerbéviller from that made by the *Drunkards in the Charnel-*

house at Roan! Let us hope that this radiant soul of French womanhood may be seen among the ruins of her town by the Americans and other neutrals who hesitate between France and Germany. Why had I opposed my scruples to her expressed desire? She had arranged a beautiful rite; she imagined that my titles, such as they are, would add some lustre to it. I cannot but obey her. Back to Gerbéviller! I go back and say to her:

"Sister, be it as you wish. I am going to sleep at Lunéville, but I will return to-morrow punctually at 9 o'clock, to be present at the Mass on the plateau, between Gerbéviller and Moyen."

4th November, 1914.

THE MASS ON THE GRAVES OF VICTORY

Next morning I returned from Lunéville to Gerbéviller and a little beyond, to Moyen. It had been raining all night, the ground was a quagmire; it was cold, and at intervals the wind brought the dull roar of cannon to our ears. On the undulations of the plateau that we followed above La Mortagne, not a tree was left standing, but trunks, shaved off about a yard above the ground, bore witness to the fury of a battle that had lasted twenty days. The last corpses had been buried, and I was hastening to be present at a Mass over their graves.

Near Moyen I noticed to the right of the road, in the fields, a small crowd, to which silent groups were making their way from every side.

I left the carriage and went toward this assembly on foot. A party of officers came forward to meet

me. We shook hands as they introduced themselves. Then we were silent. What was the use of speech? The mounds of earth around us adequately expressed our thoughts.

A peasant approached me, saying: "I am the Mayor of X..... I owned five houses. Not a stone of any one of them has been left standing, and the coat I am wearing was lent me by a friend at Lunéville."

"M. le Maire, it is the duty of France to clothe, shelter, and feed you."

He showed me a tragic group of old men, women, and children from the ruined villages who had come to join this gathering of soldiers, and pray for their defenders. I repeated these words to them. Then I went and stood in the midst of the officers and doctors, beside Sister Julie, the angel of the ruins, who had put on her spectacles and was bending over her prayer book.

We were at the principal cemetery of the battlefields of La Mortagne, where a service was about to be held for the dead whose graves lay thick as far as eye could reach, from St. Dié to beyond Lunéville.

Imagine the scene: some hundreds of soldiers grouped round a mound thirty yards long, decked with flags, humble wreaths, and piles of arms. At the head of this funeral mound were two groups, one of ruined peasants, the other of officers and nuns surrounding an altar to which a priest ascended. He genuflected, and disclosed a pair of red trousers beneath his vestments.

The soldier-priest! Amazing figure, which reappears at long intervals in the history of France: the bishop

of the *chansons de gestes*, the warrior-monk of the Crusades, the parish priest of 1914, a man who combines two mysteries, and who has a double power to touch our hearts. All heads are uncovered, all faces are tight-set. And, as he begins the office, each listener gives himself up to the musings of his soul. We go back to the great pure and primitive ages of our race. Falsehood flies, and rites are once more able to uplift the soul to God. The cannon roars in the distance; the mournful bells of our ruined villages toll. And when, at the supreme moment, the soldier-priest lifts the chalice above the battlefield, one seems to hear the beating of hearts deeply stirred.

You were there, you girls of Moyen, the three sisters Hasse, who on September 4, 1914, wrote from your hearts the following sublime letter to your brother:—

My dear Edouard,

We have just heard that Charles and Lucien were killed on August 28th; Eugene is seriously wounded. Louis and Jean are dead, too. Rose has disappeared. Mother weeps; she says you are strong, and wants you to go and avenge them. I hope your chiefs will consent. Jean had got the Legion of Honour; you must be his successor.

They have taken our all. Out of eleven who were fighting eight are dead. My dear brother, do your duty, that is all we ask. God gave you life; he has the right to take it again. Our mother sends you this message.

We send you our dearest love, though we should like very much to see you first. The Prussians are here. Jandon's son is dead. They have stolen everything. I have just come back from Gerbéviller, which is destroyed. The cowards!

Go, my dear brother, offer the sacrifice of your life. We hope to see you again, for a kind of presentiment bids us hope. We

send you our fond love. Good-bye, and may we meet again, if it be God's will.

Your sisters:
BERTHE HASSE.

It is for us and for France. Think of your brothers, and of our grandfather in 1870.

You, too, were there, Madame G., peasantwoman of Moncel, who sent these burning words to your husband:

MY DEAR HENRI,

The Germans have been here harassing us for the last three weeks. I am going to tell you the truth, for I cannot keep it to myself any longer. But you must be brave, as I have been. . . .

You need not worry yourself any more about the family, for you have no one left but me. You know that I have had courage. Courage gives strength; and this is why *you* must have courage, to avenge our two children and our poor family. You must take courage to crush them all and prevent them from coming into our country again, for, if it were allowed, I would myself take a rifle and try to kill one or two of them. You can show this letter to your comrades, so that all French soldiers may try to avenge us. . . . Do not worry about me, for I have no children now. . . . What do I want you to do? Send them plenty of bullets, crush them all, for they are not worthy to see the light.

Women of the invaded districts, such were your admirable and terrible words when the inferior race undertook to break the bones of our race, and beside you, more perfect still, we see Sister Julie and her nuns, your kinswomen, who preserved soldiers for France and aroused the admiration of the whole world. It is the attribute of woman to feel and translate the forces of the blood. It is only when we perceive its deep currents that we appreciate the shadowy origin

of the sublime. As I stood on the plateau, throughout this solemn ceremony, in the midst of this motionless assembly, and in its eternal sentiments of love, hatred, desolation, courage and religion, I seemed to touch the eternal substance, the very soul of the land. . . . The Mass was finished. Now it was my turn to speak. They made me get up on the funeral mound. I was to be their voice, the voice of the ruined villages, of the terrified spaces. But what poet would be worthy to touch the keys of the organ in this open-air cathedral, and to voice the lament of this countryside! I will be content to proclaim the message of victory to the four quarters of the field of battle in the simplest and most rapid words:

"Our brothers have died, and they lie in these mounds; our houses are shattered and burned, and our fellow-citizens have been shot or taken away into captivity. But you have not suffered in vain, and your terrible sacrifices have ensured the salvation of France.

"The Battle of Sarrebourg, on August 24th, had been a disaster for us. For four days, the Germans advanced without a check. They thought they would advance in this fashion to Bayon and Charmes, and cross the Moselle. Their pride was their undoing. On the 24th they debouched, with bands playing, at the village of Xermamesnil, five kilometres from there. But they were greeted by a terrible salvo from a French battery emplaced at the abbey farm of Belchamp. This magnificent task was carried out at a noble but decayed spot of old Lorraine, and the ancient glory of Belchamp was revived, while the Germans yelled with pain under the death-dealing shrapnel. And at the same time,

on the same line, they were held up till evening by fifty-one Alpine Chasseurs, under the command of *Adjudant* Chèvre, who was mentioned in despatches. These two bold strokes which arrested the debouchment of two whole army corps for an entire day, enabled our troops to get into position for the attack. This was the reason of the German fury in our villages. If they could have crossed La Mortagne and then forced the Moselle and the Gap of Charmes, Joffre's operations would have been hopelessly compromised, and his armies cut in two. But for twenty-one days the two armies of Castelnau and Dubail held their ground in our hapless but now glorious villages, and on September 11th the enemy suddenly decamped between seven and eight o'clock in the evening, on learning the results of the Battle of the Marne, which had been made possible only by your sufferings and your tenacity."

Such were the words with which I extolled to my peasant and soldier audience the immediate results of their sacrifices. I might have added more; other fruits will ripen in the centuries to come on the mystic tree of which our dead were the willing roots; but mere words cannot express what still remained to be said. Enough that our souls are ever conscious of the presence in the skies above Xermamesnil and Gerbéviller and in the clouds that hover above the Bois de la Chipotte, of our fallen heroes, who will watch over us in Lorraine.

Indeed the radiance that they have shed has transfigured the people of Lorraine, even in the midst of the horrors of the war. The horror is still with us, but calm has fallen upon our troubled and distraught spirits.

Happy the people amongst whom these dead have chosen to live! Happy the skies which will forever see their outspread wings as they watch over and inspire their comrades on earth!

9th November, 1914.

Obverse Side Lusitania Medal

Reverse Side Lusitania Medal

[See Page 441]

XXI

A GERMAN NAVAL VICTORY

"With joyful pride we contemplate this latest deed of our navy. . . ."—*Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 10th May, 1915.

This medal has been struck in Germany with the object of keeping alive in German hearts the recollection of the glorious achievement of the German navy in deliberately destroying an unarmed passenger ship, together with 1,198 non-combatants, men, women, and children.

On the obverse, under the legend "No contraband" (*Keine Bannware*), there is a representation of the *Lusitania* sinking. The designer has put in guns and aeroplanes, which (as was certified by United States' Government officials after inspection) the *Lusitania* did *not* carry; but has conveniently omitted to put in the women and children, which the world knows she *did* carry.

On the reverse, under the legend "Business above all" (*Geschäft uber alles*), the figure of Death sits at the booking-office of the Cunard Line and gives out tickets to passengers, who refuse to attend to the warning against submarines given by a German. This picture seeks apparently to propound the theory that if a murderer warns his victim of his intention, the guilt of the crime will rest with the victim, not with the murderer.

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
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